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ABSTRACT
The army of the Habsburg Monarchy was the central 
institution of the Habsburg state, and it embodied the 
ideal of non-national, dynastic rule. The army leadership 
was aware of the dangers of nationalism, but in the period 
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the revolutions 
of 1848, no attempt was made to overcome the danger of 
national disaffection. The revolutions of 1848 caused the 
army to remove Hungarian and Italian units from their 
homelands, but, despite the suspicion in which they were 
held, these troops fought well in the wars of 1859 and 
1866.
The financial weakness of the Monarchy and the coming 
of home rule to Hungary caused this policy of garrisoning 
Hungarian units outside of Hungary to be gradually 
abandoned after 1867. The worsening of relations with 
Russia after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 led the 
Monarchy's army to undertake a series of reforms designed 
to reduce the time needed for mobilization. Central to 
rapid mobilization was a "territorial" system wherein most 
of the Monarchy's soldiers were garrisoned in their 
recruiting districts. Despite the growth of nationalist 
agitation, the army leadership expressed no fears for the 
loyalty of the troops. Nonetheless, the army became 
deeply involved in suppressing nationalist unrest, 
especially in Bohemia and Hungary. This process
vi
culminated in 1905 with proposals for full-scale military 
intervention in Hungary.
In the last decade before the outbreak of the First 
World War the army leadership, aware of the growing of 
nationalist feeling and the growing social isolation of 
the officer corps, sought to develop its own plans for a 
renewal of the Monarchy. These various plans, which 
became increasingly pessimistic, involved proposed wars 
with Italy or Serbia or support for the plans of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, the Monarchy's heir-apparent, who 
intended to begin his reign with a military coup in 
Hungary that would enable him to reconstruct the Monarchy 
as a centralized state. By 1914 the army leadership, 
though not the soldiers in the ranks, had come to despair 
of the Monarchy's future.
INTRODUCTION
Between 1848 and 1914 the Habsburg state changed its 
boundaries, its name, and the designation of its armed 
forces. In 1848 the state was known as the Austrian 
Empire, and its armed forces were the kaiBerlich-koniglich 
(imperial-royal) Armee. In 1914 the subjects of a state 
known variously as Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Monarchy, 
or the Dual Monarchy, marched off to war in three 
different formations— the imperial-and-royal (kaiaerlich- 
und-koniglich) joint army, the imperial-royal Landwehr of 
Austria, and the royal Honvdd of Hungary. The changes in 
designation, both for the state itself and for its army, 
reflected the attempts of the Monarchy's rulers to deal 
with the effects of nationalism— particularly of Hungarian 
separatism— on a multinational state.
Both the supporters and opponents of the Habsburg 
state regarded the army as the special servant of the 
dynasty. It was the army that held the Monarchy together 
during the revolutions of 1848/49, putting down revolts in 
Italy, Prague, and Vienna and fighting a bitter civil war 
to keep Hungary from asserting its independence. The 
events of 1848 made both the friends and opponents of the 
dynasty acutely aware of the multinational composition of 
the army— and of the role of the army in supporting a 
political order which was explicitly opposed to the idea
of nationalism. Throughout the half-century between the 
coming of Hungarian home rule in 1867 and the outbreak of 
the First World War, political debates on the size and 
structure of the Habsburg army were defined by the army's 
presumed role in creating and maintaining a unified, non­
national, dynastic state.
This study deals with the effects of the nationality 
problem on the Habsburg army between 1848 and 1914. It 
treats the Habsburg army both as an object in the 
political debates within the Monarchy and as an 
institution trying to preserve its own particular ethos in 
the face of political and social changes it only dimly 
understood.
The Habsburg armies held the Habsburg state together 
in 1848/49 and, despite the growth of nationalist 
sentiment within the Monarchy, fought throughout the First 
World War with both loyalty and tenacity. In an era which 
has seen the dissolution of both state and army in 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the army of the Habsburg 
Monarchy provides yet another example of an institution 
attempting to reconcile its own belief in state service 
with the conflicting demands of nationalism and a 
supranational ideology.
CHAPTER 1
ARMY AND DYNASTY: VORMARZ AND REVOLUTION
The army of the Habsburgs survived the Napoleonic 
wars with its prestige intact and its role in European 
policy enhanced. The soldiers of the dynasty had fought 
the French danger for a generation, and though repeatedly 
savaged, had avoided the sudden catastrophe that had 
overtaken their Prussian rivals. The officers of the 
Austrian army held fast to the memory of Aspern and were 
quick to point out that in 264 engagements in the French 
wars, Austrian arms had carried the day in 168.1 The 
Habsburgs had fielded the largest of the allied armies in 
the campaigns of 1813-14, and an Austrian field marshal 
had been supreme commander at Leipzig. The army of the 
dynasty had outlasted the ambitions of General Bonaparte, 
and Prince Metternich and his emperor expected it to be 
the main support of legitimacy and stability in the 
postwar age. Twenty years after the end of the French 
wars, Austrian generals could still note with pride that, 
in the fight against liberalism and subversion, "even 
today the legitimate part of Europe can look with full 
confidence only towards the Austrian army."2
The army with which Prince Metternich proposed to 
defend legitimate interests in central Europe consisted
3
4in 1847 of 294 battalions of infantry, 268 squadrons of 
cavalry, 56 dispersed batteries and 121 companies of 
artillery, and some units of technical troops and 
frontier guards. The army was organized by branch as3
Infantry
58 line infantry regiments 
20 grenadier battalions 
18 Military Border regiments 
1 Tirol J£ger regiments 
12 Jager battalions 
6 garrison battalions
Cavalry
8 cuirassier regiments
6 dragoon regiments
7 chevaux-leger regiments 
12 hussar regiments
4 uhlan regiments
Artillery
5 field artillery regiments 
various garrison units
Metternich boasted that the peacetime strength of the 
army was 400,000 men— 315,000 infantry, 49,000 cavalry,
24,000 artillery, and 9400 technical troops. In theory, 
another 400,000 could be raised by summoning the 
Hungarian Insurrectio and mobilizing the seventy 
battalions of the Austrian Landwehr. The Insurrectio, 
however, had last been called out in 1809, when the 
Magyar lords had ridden out to do their feudal duty in 
their ermine cloaks and egret plumes and were slaughtered
by the French at Raab. The affair had been a set-piece 
on the theme of chivalry against metallurgy, and the 
Insurrecto— as demands in the Hungarian Diets of 1832, 
1836, and 1840 for its revival seem to indicate4— had 
been allowed to fall dormant. The Landwehr— which had 
done fairly well in 1809— led a shadowy existence 
throughout the Vormarz. Gunther Rothenberg declared that 
the emperor had decided to abolish the militia in 1827 
and that the Landwehr was "completely shelved" in 1631.5 
However, Wrede's Geschichte der k.-u.-k. Wehrmacht as 
well as reports from contemporary British observers grant 
the Landwehr a continued existence.6
In any case, the wartime strength of the Habsburg 
army in Metternich's day was far below the 800,000 men of 
the chancellor's calculations. The peacetime estimate of
400,000 was itself more than wishful thinking. Army 
expenditures were fixed at 40-44 million florins a year, 
and military expenditures fell as a percent of the budget 
from 50% to 20% between 1815 and 1848.7 The military 
coped with an inflationary era by keeping essential 
cadres on active duty and sending the rest of the men on 
leave. Perhaps a third of the army was permanently on 
leave, and in the latter half of the 1820s the figure may 
have climbed to one-half.8 Alan Sked calculated that in 
the Vormarz years the chancellor "could count on only
6270,000-300,000 troops, and he preferred not to rely on 
them at all."9
Sked's remark bears further consideration.
Metternich's policies abroad were predicated on diplomacy 
rather than force, and the defense of the Rhenish 
frontier was by and large simply handed to the Prussians. 
Yet the Austrian army was regularly employed throughout 
the Vormarz. Austrian units did garrison duty in the 
federal fortresses of southern and western Germany, and 
in 1832 Metternich assembled a brigade for a proposed 
intervention against radical elements in the princedoms 
of the southwest. The army intervened in Naples and 
Piedmont in 1820/21, in central Italy in 1831, and in 
Parma and Modena in 1847. The Grenzer units on the 
Military Border fought regimental-sized campaigns against 
brigands, Bosnian rebels, and Turkish irregulars in 1819, 
1831, 1834, and 1845/46.10 Metternich's diplomacy, the 
saying went, was all done with mirrors. The same was 
true of his military policy. Neither Metternich, the 
Archduke Charles, still the Monarchy's most prestigious 
soldier, nor Count Kolowrat, Metternich's rival and 
architect of the Monarchy's financial policies, 
considered the army ready for foreign war. It was the 
state of the army that kept the Austrian government from 
going to war over the Eastern crisis of 1829 or against
France in 1840, despite favourable diplomatic conditions. 
The Monarchy was prepared to intervene in Italy in 
defense of "order" throughout the Vormarz, since Austrian 
policy held that the road from Paris to Vienna ran 
through Milan,11 but the role of the army there, as in 
the Monarchy as a whole, was largely one of security. 
Critics of Feldmarschall Count Radetzky, the commander of 
Austrian forces in Lombardy-Venetia, were unimpressed 
with the training given the Austrian armies in Italy, and 
Radetzky's famed field maneuvers may have been more 
shadow than substance, exercises in propaganda designed 
to convince the population of Lombardy that, whatever the 
temptations of nationalism and French doctrines, the 
double-headed eagle still flew in Milan.12
The armies of the dynasty were intended to support 
stability and legitimacy in Europe and within the 
Monarchy itself. The image of an army of 800,000 led by 
the heirs of Schwarzenberg and Archduke Charles served 
that role abroad, while at home the army fulfilled its 
mission by suppressing brigandage on the Turkish 
frontiers, protecting Austrian rule in Lombardy and 
Venetia, and putting down political disturbances. In 
1845 Illyrian rioters were put down by force in Agram, 
and the next year the army and a loyal peasantry crushed 
a rising of Galician nobles and occupied the free city-
8state of Cracow. Strikes that took on a political color 
could be dealt with by the military, and Prince Alfred 
Windisch-Graetz first made his name in Prague by putting 
down a strike of textile and handicraft workers in 1844. 
No provincial gendarmerie existed outside Lombardy- 
Venetia until 1849, and the army provided police service 
in the Austrian countryside. The urban criminal police 
forces of the Monarchy were pitifully small, and in major 
cities grenadier and pioneer troops from local garrisons 
did duty as supplemental police.13 An army designed to 
fight abroad or on the frontiers generates much of its 
own cohesion; the urge to defend one's home, the glories 
of empire and conquest, and the sense of being with one's 
own kind in an alien land are all powerful bonds. An 
army whose role is largely internal must possess far 
stronger inner strength, and that point was not missed in 
Vienna. After 1848 the dynasty was well aware that only 
its generals had saved the Monarchy, and in the 
continuing Hungarian crises at the end of the century 
Archduke Albrecht was quick to point out that only the 
army linked the lands of the Monarchy together; if the 
army's spirit failed, then the dynasty was lost and 
Austria would exist no more.14
The Austrian army of the Vormarz, Rudolf Kiszling 
maintained, was ”an absolutely reliable instrument of
i
power in the hand of the monarch."15 Yet in 1848/49 the 
army experienced a mutiny unequalled in its history. 
Thousands of Italian regulars deserted the colors, nearly 
the whole of the Austrian fleet offered its services to 
Daniele Manin's reborn Venetian Republic, and thousands 
of Hungarian regulars took up arms against their 
sovereign. The events of 1848/49 within the army are 
made even more difficult to understand by the lack of any 
official inquiry into their causes.16 The question 
remained: how reliable was the army of the dynasty, and 
what measures were taken to ensure its loyalty?
Francis I is supposed to have observed of his empire
that
My peoples are strange to one another and that 
is all right. They do not get the same sickness at 
the same time. In France if the fever comes you are 
caught by it at the same time. I send the 
Hungarians into Italy, the Italians into Hungary. 
Every people watches its neighbor. The one does not 
understand the other, and one hates the other...From 
their antipathy will be born order and from the 
mutual hatred general peace...17
The peoples of the Monarchy were strange to one another, 
and the soldiers of its army hardly less so. Perhaps 
two-thirds of the officers were German, a figure which 
one contemporary observer put at eleven in twelve for 
some Slav regiments, and the old Habsburg tradition of 
accepting the swords of foreign officers lingered on:
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Englishmen, Danes, French, Russians, and Swiss were to be 
found serving the dynasty.18 Englishmen (Including 
Richard Guyon, who became one of Kossuth's generals In 
1848) fought as hussar officers on both sides in the 
Hungarian war, exiled Legitimist Frenchmen commanded 
Austrian troops in Italy, a Cavanagh of Ballyane fell 
leading Hungarian infantry at Vincenza, and in a 
celebrated remark Heinrich Hentzi, the imperial commander 
at Budapest in May 1849, explained to his besiegers that, 
though born in Debrecen, he was no Hungarian but a Swiss 
loyal only to the emperor. Officers in 1848 were in any 
case under no obligation to learn their soldiers' 
languages and, as in Wellington's army, they could not 
really be expected to talk to the men. Ethnic and 
linguistic purity were rare in any province and 
especially so in Bohemia and Hungary. There were, Istvan 
Deak points out, Hungarian regiments where hardly anyone 
spoke Hungarian, and while a regiment from Transylvanian 
Siebenburgen might be German enough to understand a 
Salzburg unit, it would remain wholly alien to a Szekler 
unit raised a few days' ride away.19
The dynasty's armies had always been multinational, 
and as early as 1715 Prince Eugene had wished to exclude 
Poles, French, Italians, Hungarians, and Croats from line 
regiments. A Hofkriegarat ordinance of 1722 warned
11
against those nationalities who were "great slackers and 
braggarts" and who would "debauch and lead astray" their 
German comrades.70 Yet the army had never been a merely 
German institution, and in the VormHrz the provinces of 
the Monarchy provided regiments as follows (exclusive of 
the Military Border)i
Infantry Cavalry Artillery
Austria 9 7 2
Bohemia 8 8 2
Galicia 13 8 -
Hungary 12 12 -
Lombardy-Venetia 8 1 -
Moravia-Silesia 5 2 1
Transylvania 3 - _
In the last year before the revolution the strength of 
the peacetime army (including Jtiger and Grenzer units but 
excluding technical branches) was rated at 339,574 
officers and other ranks. This number could be broken 
down by province of origin as*1
Austria (Upper, Lower, Inner) 55,546 16.1%
Bohemia 47,544 14.1%
Galicia 55,540 16.5%
Hungary 76,179 22.64
Lombardy-Venetia 30,100 8.74
12
Moravia-Silesia 24,930 7.4%
Transylvania
South Slav Areas 31,228 9.2%
18,507 5.4%
These numbers must be treated with some caution, since 
the Hungarian figures would include large numbers of non- 
Magyars, and large numbers of Germans would be included 
in the figures for Bohemia and Moravia. Yet the army can 
be seen with fair accuracy as being very likely half Slav 
and only about a sixth German. Hungary, where regular 
line regiments had been raised only since Theresian 
times, provided the single largest "national" contingent.
The loyalty of multinational armies and imperial 
populations has been a problem since antiquity. Athens 
used citizen-soldiers and sailors to police its Aegean 
empire but kept order in Athens itself with Thracian 
slave-soldiers; Rome kept its native auxiliaries away 
from their recruiting areas. The heterogeneity of the 
Habsburg army was obvious, and the problem of nationalism 
did not escape the dynasty and the Hofkriegsrat, the 
Monarchy's central military administrative council. The 
imperial authorities, the American consul in Hungary 
reported, devoted "millions of money and the highest 
orders of intellect" so that the "enormous mass of 
machinery which pervaded the empire, and held in
13
subjection the hetereogeneous and discordant nations of 
which it was composed” would be an effective internal 
force.22 Key to this was a military system of divide- 
and-rule. The standard English-language work on the 
Habsburg army, Rothenberg's The Army of Francis Joseph, 
points out that at the end of 1847, six of fifteen 
Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed in Italy, 
four more were in the Austrian crownlands, and only five 
remained inside Hungary. Four of the eight Italian 
infantry regiments were stationed outside Italy, while 
six regiments from the Austrian crownlands had been sent 
to Lombardy-Venetia and four more to Hungary. Thirteen 
of twenty-five non-Hungarian cavalry regiments were 
garrisoned in Hungary, and six of the twelve regiments of 
Hungarian hussars had been sent outside Hungary. 
Rothenberg insists that these figures show that
To counteract nationalist influences, Vienna 
adopted a policy of distributing troops outside 
their ethnic areas, and in addition troops were 
transferred frequently to avoid their becoming too 
friendly with the local inhabitants.23
Some current scholarship agrees with this view. Alan 
Sked has translated from the Magyar parts of an article 
on "The Austrian Military Organization in Hungary and the 
Troops Stationed in Our Country in April 1848” by Aladar
14
Urban of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Urban 
explains that
The Hungarian cavalry and infantry 
regiments...were dislocated, naturally mainly in 
foreign provinces, far from their homeland. Thus at 
the beginning of 1848 out of 45 battalions of the 15 
Hungarian and Transylvanian infantry regiments, only 
24 were garrisoned inside the country; of the five 
Grenadier battalions...only two were stationed at 
home. The position of the Hussar regiments was 
similar; of the 12 regiments, only 4 were in Hungary 
and the annexed lands or were in Transylvanian 
territory. On the other hand, 16 battalions of 
seven foreign infantry regiments, besides 12 cavalry 
regiments, were stationed in Hungary and Croatia and 
Transylvania. That is, nearly half of the foreign 
cavalry regiments were stationed in our homeland and 
the number of foreign infantry was comparatively 
large.24
The image of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule 
is firmly established in Habsburg historiography. The 
classic view is exemplified by the American diplomat W.
H. Stiles, who in explaining the events of 1848/49 to 
Americans, wrote that
A body of troops, in ordinary times, is 
quartered in every capital and every town in the 
empire, the number in each being regulated by the 
size and character of the population. Infinite 
care, too, is taken in the disposition of these 
troops, which is always made with reference to the 
different nationalities. Agreeably to the "divide 
and conquer" principles of Metternich, no troops 
were permitted to remain at home, or in those 
provinces where they were enlisted and belonged, but 
invariably transferred to another and more distant
15
nation, where they could not speak the language, had 
no sympathy with the people, and where they were 
ready, at any moment, to shoot them down with as 
little compunction as they would a foreign enemy 
whom they had never before seen. Bohemians, for 
instance, were quartered upon the Hungarians; 
Hungarians upon the Austrians; Austrians upon the 
Poles; Poles upon the Italians; and Italians upon 
the Croatians, &c.3!
Sixty years after the events of 1848 it was firmly 
believed by Franz Ferdinand and his circle that prior to 
the 1880s an extra-territorial garrison system had been 
applied to deunpen national enthusiasms in the army and 
such a system should be immediately re-established.36 
Yet official references to any such system are remarkably 
absent. Certainly there was concern about nationalism. 
Count Frimont, commander of Austrian forces in Italy in 
the 1820s, had argued against using Lombard or Venetian 
units to suppress revolutions in the Italian states and 
refused to allow Italian officers to serve in the 
Austrian military mission sent to rebuild the army of the 
duchy of Parma in 1834.37 Radetzky himself wrote in 
1834 that Italy and Poland would never be properly loyal 
"military countries,"36 and there had been arrests of a 
handful of disaffected junior officers in Galician 
regiments in 1840.39 Yet there was no official policy 
of relocating regiments away from their homelands.
Istvan Deak claimed that army policy was to send the two
16
line battalions of each regiment to distant areas 
inhabited by different nationalities while leaving the 
third battalion and the recruiting and training machinery 
of the regiment in its home district. But he went on to 
admit that such a system was "never consistently 
pursued."30 Any presumed policy of divide-et-impera 
must be examined in light of the histories of the 
individual regiments, Sked's, Survival, analysis of 
Radetzky's order of battle, and the state of imperial 
finances.
The army was the property of the emperor, the 
supreme warlord. Its soldiers were bound by their oath 
to fight "wherever the imperial will of His Majesty may 
command, on land and water, by day and by night, in 
fights, battles, skirmishes and enterprises of any 
kind"31 and from the time of Montecuccoli and Eugene the 
Hofkriegsrat had attempted to run the army as an imperial 
institution and not as a collection of provincial 
militias. There was no standard method of training 
officers or levying recruits in the VormSrz and no 
standard term of service. Until the 1640s Cisleithanian 
recruits served for fourteen years, Italians for eight.
In Hungary, where the county authorities used the army as 
a dumping ground for undesirables, service was for life. 
Only in 1845 was a standard eight-year term introduced.
There was concern that Cisleithanian provinces were 
bearing a disproportionately heavy burden— Radetzky 
pointed out that between a fourteen-year active term and 
a thirteen-year Landwehr committment, a Cisleithanian 
recruit had a military liability up to age 453Z— and a 
continuing unhappiness with the quality and number of 
recruits provided by the Hungarian counties.
Nonetheless, the regiments were, within the limits 
imposed by linguistic diversity, regarded as all of a 
kind. Regiments could not be built up from a common 
draft of recruits— Galicians brigaded with Lombards and 
Voralbergers— but all were soldiers of the emperor, and 
the Habsburg army appears to have taken seriously Article 
1 of Archduke Charles's service regulations: nationality
and religion were of no significance next to a soldier's 
oath of loyalty.33
The army was a long-service institution, and a 
recruit whose life revolved around his regiment for eight 
or fourteen years would presumably be insulated from many 
of the political fevers of the civilian population. Yet 
the Habsburg army was hardly unique in setting long terms 
of service. Contemporary military thought still held 
that only long-service troops could be properly and 
economically trained. In any case, even long-service 
troops would be exposed to local agitation if left in one
18
garrison long enough, and the accepted image of Habsburg 
policy is that regiments were deliberately and frequently 
shuffled about:
Vienna adopted a policy of distributing troops 
outside their ethnic areas, and in addition troops 
were transferred frequently to avoid their becoming 
too friendly with the local inhabitants. One 
regiment...Infantry Regiment "Hoch-und- 
Deutschmeister" Nr. 4, was stationed in Milan in 
1815, posted to St.-Polten the next year, switched 
to Bergamo in 1820, to Naples in 1822, to Capua in 
1830, to Gorz in 1831, to Verona in 1833, to 
Kaisers-Ebersdorf in 1836, to Vienna in 1840, and 
finally to Tarnow and Lemberg in 184 6.34
Rothenberg's example is somewhat flawed. The Hoch- 
und-Deutschmeister was a Viennese regiment, and the 
memorial raised by the Viennese to "our Deutachmeister" 
on the regiment's second centenary still stands in the 
little Deutschmeisterplatz before the Rossauer Kaserne. 
The list of regimental movements is impressive, yet in 
the thirty years Rotheberg considers, one might note that
M  f
Deutachmeister spent four years at St.-Polten, only a 
day's march to the west of the capital, four years at 
suburban Kaisers-Ebersdorf, and six years in Vienna 
itself. It was presumably at Naples and Capua on active 
service, and was part of the forces sent to police 
Galicia in 1846. In other words, between 1815 and 1846 
the regiment was in or near its home for fourteen years.
A look at Wrede's listings of regimental stations 
suggests that regiments, on the whole, moved every four 
to six years. Yet exceptions abound: the Hungarian 2.
Infantry was at Pressburg from 1830 to 1848; the Bohemian
1. Cuirassiers at Brandeis from 1819 to 1848; the 37. 
Infantry (Grosswardein) at Lemberg throughout the 
Vormarz; the 4. Cuirassiers (Lower Austria) at Pressburg 
from 1817 to 1847 and the 8. Cuirassiers (Bohemia) at 
Podiebrad from 1836 to 1848. Two of the Italian 
regiments which remained loyal to Radetzky in 1848— the 
38. (Brescia) and 45. (Verona) Infantry— spent 1830-48 in 
narrow orbits around their recruiting areas in northern 
Italy, rarely more than a few days' march from home.35 
When the Richter Grenadiers were ordered to Hungary in 
October 1848, they had been in Vienna for more than 
fourteen years.36
A purely tactical view favored exposing regiments to 
more than one locale and not allowing a unit to go to 
seed in one garrison, since as imperial property all 
regiments existed to defend the Monarchy as a whole. A 
garrison post requiring one battalion of infantry could 
be manned equally well by Galicians or Veronese. In 
March 1830 directives were issued for large-scale 
transfers designed to stir the army from its "peacetime 
slumber."37 Yet by the mid-1830s there were budgetary
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pressures against moving regiments across the Monarchy. 
More regiments were garrisoned in their home districts/ 
large numbers of men were simply sent home on unpaid 
leave, and, when regiments were moved, it was to posts in 
nearby areas. Italian units on the move were more likely 
to march to Croatia or the Dalmatian coast than Hungary 
or Bohemia. Between 1835 and 1837 the percentage of 
Italian infantry in Radetzky's forces rose from thirty to 
forty-five percent.38 Count Franz Hartig, the former 
governor of Lombardy protested to Vienna that prudence 
dictated that Italian soldiers be kept out of Lombardy- 
Venetia,39 but as the army's budget stagnated in the 
decade before 1848 the Hofkriegsrat could not afford to 
pay for constant relocations.
Regimental histories also suggest that the picture 
of a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule is suspect, 
the Berkeleys give Radetzky's order of battle in January 
1848 as containing 70-75,000 men deployed in sixty-one 
battalions, thirty-six squadrons, and 108 batteries.
They go on to note that "the greatest mistake made by 
Radetzky was to have left so many Italian regiments... in 
Italy."80 The Verona general command had no Italian 
gunners or troopers, but twenty-four battalions— about 
forty percent of the infantry and a third of the total 
force— were made up of Italians, a figure twice the size
of the twelve battalions of Austrians who made up the 
next largest ethnic unit. The remaining twenty-five 
battalions can be broken down as ten Croat, nine 
Hungarian, and six Bohemian-Moravian. Even if the 
Hungarian and Bohemian units contained large numbers of 
Germans, the infantry at Radetzky's disposal had a solid 
Italian core. These troops were exposed to considerable 
propaganda bombardment in Lombardy, but Alan Sked's 
search of Metternich's files turned up only a single case 
of Italian soldiers being successfully suborned by 
nationalist sects before 1848.41 In 1833 the governor 
of Lombardy reported to Metternich that, while his 
Italian troops were subject to constant attempts by 
nationalists to subvert their loyalty "as far as the 
military is concerned, the conduct of the Lombard troops 
up till now can in no way be reproached. With regard to 
both discipline and loyalty to their oaths, no blame 
whatsoever can be attached to them."42 Radetzky was 
more than satisfied with the morale of his Italians into 
March 1848, and it is worth noting that three Italian 
regiments remained loyal throughout 1848/49, and the 38. 
Infantry (Brescia) distinguished itself against the 
Piedmontese and against rebels in Milan and the Veneto.
Rothenberg maintains that at the end of 1847 ten of 
the fifteen Hungarian infantry regiments were stationed
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outside Hungary. His figures, which apparently derive 
from Rudolf Kiszling's work,43 are not as reliable as 
Aladar Urban's, which are drawn from the Hungarian 
archives. However, Urban's contention that at the 
beginning of 1848 twenty-four of forty-five Hungarian 
battalions were at home does not bear out his point that 
the Hungarian regiments were largely relegated to 
garrisons "far from their homeland." If indeed sixteen 
non-Hungarian battalions were stationed in Hungary, 
Transylvania, and Croatia, Urban does not indicate how 
many were in Croatia, where in view of the large-scale 
fighting that broke out on the Military Border in 
1845/46, one might see them as reinforcements for the 
Grenzer and not (as Urban does) as foreign occupation 
troops. Sked also notes that in Urban's view a non- 
Hungarian unit at, say, Agram would count as a "foreign" 
unit in Hungary; a Hungarian regiment sent to Croatia 
would count as being away from "our homeland."44
In April 1848 Count Latour, the new Austrian war 
minister, reported that imperial troop strength in 
Hungary was twenty-four battalions, sixty-two squadrons, 
and eleven companies of artillery.45 The figure cannot 
be taken as definitive. Troop levels in Hungary were 
extremely fluid throughout the spring of 1848. Hungarian 
units returned from other parts of the Monarchy, some
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Cisleithanian units were, at the behest of the Hungarian 
war ministry, sent out of Hungary, and still other 
Hungarian units were sent from Hungary to reinforce 
garrisons in Italy or the Border. Nonetheless, Latour's 
report indicates that while surprisingly little of the 
cavalry (eight of sixty-two squadrons) was Hungarian, 
sixteen battalions were from Hungarian regiments. While 
much of the artillery was Bohemian (Bohemia and Moravia 
supplied three of the army's five artillery regiments), 
two-thirds of the infantry garrisoned in Hungary was, if 
not solidly Magyar, at least from regiments raised in the 
Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The imperial garrison 
in Hungary was officially rated at 32,000 men; some
14,000 of them (forty-three percent) were Hungarian. 
Latour's report makes only an eighth of the cavalry 
Hungarian— as compared to a third (six of nineteen 
regiments) for Rothenberg and Kiszling and a quarter 
(four of sixteen regiments) for Urban. Nonetheless, the 
number of Hungarian soldiers in Hungary in early 1848—  
two-thirds of the infantry, forty-three percent of the 
total, including the garrisons of the major fortresses of 
Komorn and Peterwardein— is too large to fit easily into 
a policy of divide-and-rule.
Even if no deliberate policy of moving regiments 
outside their national areas can be demonstrated, other
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policies could be used to guard against any potential 
disloyalty. The post-Mutiny Indian Army restricted 
access to combat branches to those northern "martial 
races" who had been loyal in 1857. The Soviet army tried 
to confine its Central Asian conscripts to labor and 
service units. Unsupported infantry are a manageable 
threat, and one might cripple any chance of a rising by 
denying suspect nationalities access to heavy weapons. 
Stiles certainly felt that the Austrian army employed 
such devices:
Another most admirable arrangement for... 
strengthening the empire at the expense of the 
provinces, consisted in the arrangement of the army, 
and by which each nation of the empire was 
instructed in only a single arm. The Bohemians, for 
example, were mostly infantry; the Hungarians, 
cavalry; the Austrians, artillery; the Tyrolese, 
riflement; the Poles, lancers. The whole, 
therefore, when united under imperial command, 
constituted a powerful and efficient force; but 
divided, no province, in case of revolt, was 
possessed of a complete and formidable army.46
And in point of fact neither Hungary nor Galicia provided 
any artillery. The reason, though, seems less one of 
deliberation than tradition. Artillery was by tradition 
a bourgeois branch of service, and the skills required of 
an artillery officer were not really compatible with 
being a gentleman— a situation not unknown in the English
and Prussian armies. Artillery was largely a Bohemian—  
Bohemian German but more often Czech—-arm. Was there 
ever, Archduke Albrecht would ask, a better or more cold­
blooded gunner than a Czech?47 Artillery was a field for 
the urban bourgeoisie and skilled workers, and those 
classes were notably absent in East Galicia or trans- 
Danubian Hungary. There was no attempt to deny cannon to 
the Italians; Venetians with a taste for military 
trigonometry could become naval gunners. Other Italian 
officers dominated the army's technical branches—  
fortification, engineering, cartography.46 The same 
sort of logic applied to the cavalry as well. Lombardy 
provided only a single regiment of chevaux-leger (one 
which would remain conspicuously loyal in 1848/49), but 
northern Italy, like Transylvania and the Tirol, was not 
horse country. Steppe lands— Galicia and Hungary— were 
cavalry country by tradition, and those two provinces 
provided twenty regiments of cavalry between them.
The simplest means of controlling suspect 
populations is to station overwhelming force at the 
source of disaffection. English liberals like the 
Berkeleys or Priscilla Robertson certainly believed that 
the Austrian army was deployed to overawe the population; 
Cecil Woodham-Smith once cast a glance at 1820s Austria, 
"ruled by an army, where even to speak of liberty was a
crime."4* Urban suggests that, since in February X848 
the imperial garrison in Hungary— twelve grenadier 
companies, 130 companies of line infantry, seventy-two 
squadrons of cavalry, eleven companies of artillery, plus 
technical and fortress units— amounted to about one-tenth 
of total imperial strength, Hungary was under military 
occupation.*0 The same image— which perhaps owes more 
to Browning's poetry than to political observers— is 
applied to Lombardy and Venetia. The Hofkriegarat, well 
aware of Napoleon's maxim that the road from Paris to 
Vienna ran through Milan— and of revolutionary currents 
inside Italy— kept the Verona general command on a 
wartime footing. Yet the garrison levels in such a 
sensitive area remained low. In 1833 Radetzky 'a army was 
made up of 75,000 men, but by early 1846 the marshal 
disposed of only 49,000— 15,000 of whom were fortress 
garrisons in the Quadrilateral. In point of fact, as 
Sked noted, there seemed to be no relation in the Vormarz 
between garrison strengths and the presumed political 
reliability of the various provinces. Sked's chart of 
1846 garrison levels shows little evidence of quartering 
troops on the disaffected!*l
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Table 1.1. Civil and Populations, Habsburg Monarchy 1846
Civil Ratio Civil/
Province Population Military Military Rank
Lower Austria 1,375,400 34,226 40.19 2
Upper Austria 844,914 12,652 66.78 7
Steiermark 966,863 18,466 54.72 4
K&rnten-Krain 757,355 2,146 352.93 14
KUatenland 477,702 3,487 137.00 13
Tirol 830,948 8,807 94.36 10
Bohemia 4,112,085 62,083 66.24 6
Moravia-Silesia 2,162,086 4,552 474.97 15
Galicia 4,718,991 78,252 60.31 5
Dalmatia 384,572 9,456 40.67 3
Lombardy 2,516,420 31,556 79.74 9
Venetia 2,137,608 30,945 69.08 8
Hungary 12,039,400 56,802 211.96 11
Transylvania 2,069,600 9,400 220.17 12
Border 1,147,283 56,322 20.37 1
Some 34,000 soldiers were stationed in Lower
Austria, but the capital itself was lightly garrisoned. 
When revolution broke out in March 1848, the young 
Archduke Albrecht, commanding the city garrison, had only
14,000 men of all branches to control a city of more than 
400,000. Albrecht *as able to restore order in the Inner 
City after a day of street fighting, but his men were 
unable to control the suburbs. The authorities in 
Vienna, like their counterparts throughout Europe,' were 
paralyzed by the sudden onset of the revolution that 
Metternich had long predicted, and their lack of 
resolution contributed much to the springtime triumph of 
the revolutionaries. As R. J. Rath's account of the
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revolution in Vienna makes clear, the authorities had
given little or no thought to planning for the
52maintenance of order. The March Days in Pressburg and
Budapest met no military opposition; neither the court
nor its palatine in Hungary suggested resorting to arms
to block the designs of Kossuth and Batthyany. The
Venetian command abandoned the city after a Grenzer
battalion, sent in only after all authority had
collapsed, had failed to reclaim the Arsenal from armed
workers and Manin's National Guard. Radetzky's army had
been brought back to strength by the beginning of 1848,
but the Milan garrison was only 10,000 strong and the
available field forces had been distributed in small
units all across the countryside on the orders of
53Archduke Rainer, viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia. Despite
years of telling one another that the day of revolution 
was at hand, the imperial authorities had never 
considered the problems of dealing with a widespread 
revolt.
During the crisis of 1848-49 the imperial army and
its generals held the empire together against Piedmontese
Invaders, Hungarian rebels, and domestic revolutionaries.
"Grapsehot and bayonet," wrote Rothenberg, "preserved the
54Habsburg dynasty and its empire." Yet in the course 
of 1848 thousands of Italian soldiers deserted the
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colors, more thousands of Hungarian regulars joined 
Kossuth's rebel armies, and imperial regulars under the 
command of the new Hungarian war ministry fought against 
Croat troops who claimed to be defending the imperial 
regime which had proclaimed them outlaws. The irony is 
of course that the initial rebel successes in Italy and 
the ability of the Hungarians to secede depended on the 
presence of large numbers of native troops. There had 
been no system of assuring national reliability employed 
before March 1848; the defections of the spring and fall 
would not be forgotten after the restoration of order.
About a third of Radetzky's men were Italian-born, 
and while the marshal had consistently regarded political 
suspicion of his men as malicious and ignorant civilian 
attacks on military honor, he had admitted in a report of 
December 1847 to the Hofkriagarat that one could not 
expect of the Italian troopB "more than is . . . 
reasonable . . .  There can be no doubt that these troops 
will be subject to all kinds of influences and will be 
enticed to desert; if the luck of war goes against us in 
the first battle, then I shall not answer for their 
loyalty; such an experience would not even be surprising; 
it is as old as history itself. "5S
The Austrian army in Lombardy-Venetia had been 
highly regarded by the populace in the first half of the
Vormarz; they had lived in the glow of being the 
conquerors of the French. But the Italian regiments had 
been subject to popular abuse and enticements to 
disloyalty throughout the 1830s and 1840s; their loyalty 
was keyed to their membership in a solid and successful 
organization. The sudden onset of revolt and the 
collapse of Austrian authority left the Italian troops 
scrambling out of the wreckage. By the last week of 
March 1848 reports of large-scale desertions were being 
sent to Vienna from the Verona command. Venetia was 
struck first— a battalion of the 13. Infantry and the 
Angelmayer battalion of grenadiers had deserted in Venice 
itself, joined by a battalion of the 16. at Udine and 
four companies of the 8. FeldjUger at Padua.9* The 
losses in Venice— where 2460 of a city garrison of 8370 
were Italian97— included much of the imperial fleet as 
well. Three corvettes, two steamers, and three frigates 
escaped to Trieste with depleted crews, but the bulk of 
the fleet— including six brigantines, three corvettes, 
and perhaps 100 patrol and supply ships— and the whole of 
the naval infantry went over to the rebels.9' The fleet 
had been inherited wholesale from the moribund Venetian 
Republic at the end of the French wars, and its 
traditions and outlook were wholly Venetian. But the 
desertions ashore were consequent upon a total failure of
will on the part of the army commanders in the city, who 
had given in to the demands of Manin and his supporters 
before any major violence had broken out.59 The pattern 
was much the same in Lombardy; the inital successes of 
the revolutionaries in mid-March gave rise to an air of 
panic and despair on the part of the authorities. On 5 
April Radetzky reported that he had lost seventeen 
battalions, two squadrons, and one battery— units that 
had deserted, been evacuated from Venice to Trieste, or 
been cut off in the countryside. Two weeks later he 
reported that his losses were little more than a thousand 
dead and wounded, but that 10,860 had deserted and 13,000 
had been cut off.50
The Berkeleys claimed that a quarter of all Austrian 
casualties were "willful missing"— Italians who had 
deserted rather than fight the rebels of Piedmontese— and 
that four-fifths of Radetzky's Italian troops deserted or 
went over to the enemy.61 The latter figure would mean 
that more than 16,000 Italian soldiers deserted.
Lawrence Sondhaus put the number of deserters at about
15,000 but argued that, despite the Berkeleys' claims, 
between one-half and two-thirds of all troops raised in 
Lombardy and Venetia remained loyal and that very few 
Lombard troops ever took up arms against their old 
service.62 The dispersal of small units across the
countryside prior to the outbreak of the revolts 
guaranteed a high number of men who would be quite simply 
missing. The experience of being one of a dozen or two 
soldiers stationed in the midst of an armed and hostile 
countryside, abused by the population and clergy, out of 
touch with any higher authority would be more than a 
little unnerving. And communications in Lombardy-Venetia 
still moved at the same speed--a man on horseback— as in 
Roman times. The report of 5 April indicates the 
fragmented state of the army: a battalion of Warasdiner
Kreuzer Grenzers was "supposed to be fighting its way to 
the Tirol from Como;" the whereabouts of three companies 
of the 43. Infantry, the garrisons of Lecco, Marbegno, 
and Sondrio were completely unknown; the 2. battalion of 
the Banat Grenzers was presumably somewhere behind the 
Isonzo.63 How many of those listed as "missing," "cut 
off," or "deserted" were ultimately moved from one 
category to the other remains unclear, although large 
numbers of deserters returned to the colors after the 
initial shocks of March. Once his forces had 
consolidated their position in the fortresses of the 
Quadrilateral, Radetzky issued a series of amnesty 
decrees that attracted men back into service "by the 
thousands." 64
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Disaffection in the imperial ranks came suddenly, 
and events seem to have borne out Radetzky's belief that 
any initial reverse would shake the loyalty of troops who 
had resisted nationalist blandishments in peacetime. 
Troops faced with revolt in March 1848 found themselves—  
as in Milan, where events paralleled those in Vienna—  
facing in inadequate numbers a large and well-armed 
population, or— as in Venice— commanded by officers who 
had given themselves over to panic. Small local 
detachments were abandoned in a hostile countryside, 
subject to the counsel of nationalists and their own 
fears. The nature of recruiting took its own toll.
Sked's account of the 26. Archduke Ferdinand d'Este 
(Udine) Infantry makes it clear that the Este, securing 
communications between Lombardy and the Tirol, had long 
been used as a dumping ground for undesireables and petty 
criminals. The imperial commander in the Tirol 
complained on the eve of the revolts that the 26. had 
twenty to twenty-five convicts dumped in each of its 
twelve companies, and that the Este had already 
established a reputation for rioting and brawling in 
Innsbruck. By April the Este had become unmanageable.
The 400 Hungarian troops in the area had no supplies, 
and, with only two rounds available per man, could not be 
relied upon to quell any serious unrest in the Este. The
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26. was subject to overt bribery in both cash and wine by 
local revolutionaries, and it was isolated by the 
collapse of political authority. Nearly 400 men of a 
suspect and ill-regarded regiment had been sent with only 
two officers into a zone filled with unrest and stripped 
of local officials.6* There are no exact figures for 
the return of deserters after Radetzky had begun to 
reassert imperial authority, but desertion itself seems 
to have ceased by the early summer of 1848. The Italian 
troops that remained loyal during the retreat to the 
Quadrilateral stayed loyal afterwards. Radetzky himself 
appears to have understood the nature of much of what had 
happened to his Italians. His own policies toward 
deserters— at least for private soldiers— were quite 
mild, and in February 1849 the marshal reported that "the 
greater part" of the deserters had returned to their 
regiments.66
The ultimate cohesion of Radetzky's army is borne 
out by events that did not happen. In early 1848 
Radetzky's armies contained ten battalions of Grenzers 
along with eight line battalions from Hungarian 
regiments, a Hungarian grenadier battalion, and sixteen 
squadrons of hussars— 10,000 South Slavs and 10-12,000 
Hungarians. By mid-June Magyars and Serbs were 
slaughtering one another in the Voivodina; in early
September a Croat army invaded Hungary proper. As early 
as May the Vienna authorities had reported that Grenzer 
units on their way to Italy were deeply worried about 
leaving their homes and families to the mercies of the 
Magyars.67 The Hungarian press was solidly in favor of 
Italian independence, and its editorials called for the 
withdrawal of all Hungarian units serving in Italy. The 
imperial authorities were able to exercise some control 
over communications with Lombardy-Venetia, but the 
outbreak of war in Hungary was no secret, and the 
treatment dealt Magyars and South Slavs by one another 
was no secret either. Yet while the numbers of 
Hungarians and Grenzers on service in Italy rose to about
30,000 each, there were no internecine outbreaks.
Neither were there any significant desertions. The 
Italian press assumed that all Hungarians in Italy were 
fighting only under the knout and were straining at the 
leash to desert in support of Italian ambitions, but even 
after revolutionary Hungary proclaimed its intent to seek 
a Piedmontese alliance, "hardly a Hungarian soldier from 
the 30,000 stationed [in Italy] defected."68 Radetzky 
strictly enforced a policy of even-handed treatment of 
his troops, and the circumstances of war against a 
foreign enemy worked to promote cohesion in the ranks, as 
did reports of Italian atrocities at Brescia. Despite
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the early desertion of half the Italians, the imperial 
armies in Italy, made up in large part of men whose 
families were killing one another along the Drave, held 
together on a core of corporate loyalty.
The cohesion of the army was unshaken throughout 
most of the empire. Only in a single instance— the mutiny 
of the Richter Grenadiers on the Taborbriicke in October 
1848— did the rank-and-file of imperial units fire on one 
another without orders from their officers. Even in the 
case of the Richters, it might be noted that the 
Bezlrkschef urging the grenadiers to refuse to leave 
Vienna was a former captain in the unit.69 In Prague, 
where the military under Windisch-Graetz applied a policy 
of calculated provocation, troops from the Bohemian 42. 
Infantry (Theresienstadt) and the 8. Curassiers (Prague) 
fought with some relish against Czech students and 
workers. Prague has often been taken as the first great 
victory of the counterrevolutions imperial troops 
commanded by resolute officers stayed true to their oaths 
and fought energetically against the designs of civilian 
rebels. A quiescent Bohemia then supplied the imperial 
armies with a steady stream of loyal recruits throughout 
the Italian and Hungarian wars. In March-April 1848 more 
than 100,000 reservists and soldiers on extended leave 
were recalled to their regiments without incident.
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Recruiting continued— even across the Leitha— without 
serious disruption, and the Hungarian regiments continued 
both recruiting (which served both Vienna and Budapest) 
and, more to the point, providing reinforcements for 
Italy into the summer.70
The proclamation of constitutional government in 
Hungary had been made with imperial assent, and imperial 
troops in Hungary came under the administration of the 
Hungarian Ministry for War, a situation confirmed in May 
by royal decree. While Kossuth and Batthyany temporized 
on the question of recalling Hungarian troops from Italy, 
some Hungarian units were returned from Cisleithania. As 
of May 1848 the Hungarian ministry controlled twenty-five 
battalions of line infantry from Hungarian regiments, two 
battalions of grenadiers, and four complete hussar 
regiments; four more line battalions and four more hussar 
regiments were returned in the early days of summer.71 
Kossuth appealed in the summer for all other Hungarian 
units to return from Cisleithania, and some units of 
hussars responded. Units of the 8. and 12. Hussars under 
junior officers attempted to fight their way home from 
Galicia and Bohemia. Most of the deserters from the 12. 
were cut up or driven into Prussian internment by 
Bohemian cuirassiers, but a few hundred men from the two 
regiments did arrive in Hungary, where they faced the
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wrath of Kossuth's War Minister, the hussar colonel Lazar 
Meszaros, who threatened to have them tried and hanged 
for desertion and insubordination.72
The troops available to the Hungarian ministry in 
early summer formed no negligible force. However, some 
units of the twenty-nine available battalions were sent 
out to Italy, and the state of the regular army in the 
Vormarz Monarchy told against the Hungarians. Gyorgy 
Klapka, the deputy war minister, claimed that all units, 
and especially the cavalry, were understrength.
Hungarian forces in mid-summer were carried as twenty-one 
battalions of infantry, seventy squadrons of hussars, and 
two regiments of Szekler Grenzers— a regular force 
supplemented by ten fairly inchoate battalions of 
national guard (Honvdd) volunteers. At 15,000 foot and 
7000 horse, the regular units were seriously 
undermanned.73 Regulars, on Meszaros's instance, were 
kept separate from the Honvdd. In later and more 
desperate times, regulars might be put in the same 
tactical formation as the militia, but even so radical a 
general as Arthur Gorgey was still enough of an imperial- 
royal officer to disdain the Honvdd. Gorgey acidly 
described his northern corps of 20,000 men as being "two- 
thirds useless volunteers"74 and, like Meszaros, put his 
faith in regulars. Troop returns for May 1849— the high
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tide of Hungarian defiance— still carry nineteen regular 
battalions and ten regular hussar regiments as the core 
of the Hungarian armies, separate from and prized above 
106 Honvdd battalions, four rifle battalions, and six 
regiments of Honvdd hussars.75
Throughout the Austrian half of the Monarchy there 
were units that remained loyal to their oaths in the face 
of revolutionary appeals. Czech troops fought loyally in 
Prague, and Czech recruits and reservists continued to 
report to their depots. In Italy there were Italian 
units that fought against Piedmont and against rebels in 
Lombardy and Venice. Two battalions of the 45. (Verona) 
Infantry and two of the 38. (Brescia) Infantry 
distinguished themselves against the Piedmontese. Units 
of the 38. held the fortress of Mantua for Radetzsky 
throughout the early weeks of revolt and war, and a 
battalion of the 45. took part in the siege of Venice.
The first two battalions of the 44. (Milan) Infantry 
deserted in the spring of 1848, but the third battalion 
remained loyal and was singled out for special praise at 
the battles of Santa Lucia and Custozza.76 After 1849 
some Hungarian exiles made great play of the fact that 
soldiers of two Italian regiments in Hungary, the 16. 
Zanini (Treviso) and the 23. Ceccopieri (Lodi) took 
service with Kossuth.77 Some units of the 16. at Essegg
attempted to remain neutral in the ethnic warfare that 
flared across Slavonia in the autumn of 1848, but 
Hungarian units secured the fortress until loyalist 
officers surrendered it to Baron Jellacic in February 
1849.78 Yet four companies of the 16. took part in the 
defense of Temesvar. One battalion of the 23. was at 
both Temesvar and the siege of Komorn. Another battalion 
fought under Hentzi at Budapest and was taken prisoner in 
May 1849; the battalion commander and a party of officers 
and senior enlisted men were killed in a failed attempt 
to blow up the Chain Bridge over the Danube at Buda.79 
The 7. Chevaux-leger, the only cavalry unit raised in 
Lombardy-Venetia, had been in Hungary almost continuously 
since 1815; it went over to Jellacic in the autumn of 
1848 and fought with great ferocity throughout the 
campaigns of 1848-49.80 Hungarian units in Italy fought 
loyally, despite the efforts of the revolutionary 
government in Hungary to seek an Italian alliance. The 
33. (Altsohl), 52. (FUnfkirchen) and 61. (Temesvar) 
Infantry and the 5. and 7. Hussars distinguished 
themselves in the field; much of the credit for the 
victories at Mortara and Novara went to two battalions of 
the 33. Gyulai (Arad) Infantry.
Many of Radetzky's Italian soldiers melted away in 
confusion in the spring of 1848. Men leaving Lombard
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regiments sought to desert, not to defect. Only in 
Venice itself, where the third battalion of the 13. 
(Padua) Infantry and a grenadier battalion stationed in 
Venice since 1837 and made up of men from the 16. 
(Treviso) and 26. (Udine) Infantry81 joined sailors and 
naval infantry in manning the walls, did they fight 
against the imperial standards. Hungarian units in Italy 
remained loyal. The Hungarian units in Hungary joined 
Kossuth's forces en masse.
There were a few conspicuous foreign names among the 
Hungarian commanders— the Pole Jozef Bern, the Hessian 
Count Karl Leiningen, the English hussar officer Richard 
Guyon— and into the autumn of 1848 some non-Hungarian 
units stationed in Hungary continued to take orders from 
the Hungarian government. The first encounter between 
Jellacic and the Hungarians at Pakozd was decided by 
batteries of the 5. (Prague) Artillery, firing against 
units of the same regiment serving in the Croat ranks.
In the course of the autumn, though, the Czech gunners 
returned to imperial service, and their places were 
filled by miners hastily recruited in Upper Hungary. The 
armies of.Kossuth were almost wholly Magyar and Szekler. 
The military forces of the Hungarian revolution— a core 
of regular infantry and hussars and a HonvSd force that
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eventually reached 140 battalions and eighteen regiments 
of hussars82— were a "national" army.
The 15,000 regular infantry that made up the spine 
of the Hungarian armies in the late summer of 1848 and 
which bore the brunt of the fighting against Jellacic83 
stayed loyal to Kossuth and Gorgey throughout the war, 
and the local authorities in the counties of Hungary 
continued to forward conscripts to the training depots of 
the regular Hungarian regiments. Imperial courts-martial 
did not attempt to delve into the causes of their 
defection, and the motives of many officers and enlisted 
men alike can only be guessed at. A sense of Magyar 
nationalism certainly existed, although for the rank-and- 
file the meaning of nationalism is likely to have reduced 
itself to a reaction against attacks on Magyardom and 
Magyar dominance in Hungary by Serbs, Croats, and 
Romanians in the summer's fighting in the south and east. 
More important, in all likelihood, was the habit of 
discipline. Conscripts continued to arrive at the drill 
square or the riding school, orders continued to be 
passed on from officers and non-commissioned officers to 
ordinary soldiers, and orders continued to be obeyed. 
Certainly this was the view of the imperial authorities: 
a decree of 20 August 1849 granted amnesty to all private 
soldiers and non-commissioned officers of regular
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battalions or cavalry squadrons in the rebel armies, 
provided that they had been born in the lands of the 
Crown of St. Stephen. At Peterwardein and in the Szekler 
Grenzer battalions the enlisted men had thrown out their 
loyalist officers to fight for Kossuth's commissioners, 
but in general the command structure remained intact.
The officers, especially the junior officers of a 
regiment provided leadership for loyalty or rebellion.
Perhaps 200,000 Hungarians— 50,000 regulars of all 
branches, including about 1500 officers— saw service in 
the rebel armies in 1848/49. Many of the 50,000 were 
"blissfully ignorant of their new status as rebels: in 
the first months of the war, and many officers continued 
to believe that in taking orders from the Hungarian 
government— from Batthyany and Meszaros as royal 
ministers— they were bring true to their oaths.84 To 
march out as a regular against the Serbs or Jellacic in 
the summer of 1848 was to obey the orders of regular 
officers responsible to a legally-constituted war 
ministry sanctioned in turn by the king-emperor. The 
commander of the 2. Schwarzenberg Uhlans at Alt-Arad 
found himself fighting on royal orders against Serbian 
volunteers raised on "imperial" authority by the Austrian 
consul in Belgrade, who was busy earning his general's 
rank by persuading Serb Grenzers to fight Hungarian
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regulars. Baron Blomberg of the Schwarzenberg Uhlans 
pleaded desperately with Vienna for either clarification 
or recall.es Latour's war ministry in Vienna alternated 
between ordering imperial generals in Hungary to obey 
Meszaros's War Ministry in Budapest and telling them to 
follow their own consciences— "an inhuman task," Deak 
commented, "for men who had been taught never to think 
independently. "8*
The Swabian and Romanian burghers of Weisskirchen in 
southern Hungary petitioned the court to explain the new 
state of affairs: "What in one place is good and legal, 
in another place appears as a betrayal of the good cause, 
and no matter what one does, one is bound to violate Your 
Majesty's laws in the very act of obeying them."87 The 
officers of imperial regiments were no less caught among 
interpretations of their oaths. Meszaros at the 
Hungarian war ministry continued to style himself a royal 
minister and annotate promotions and transfers with 
"pending the gracious approval of His Majesty."88 
Imperial officers fighting in the Voivodina knew 
themselves to be acting under legal and proper orders; it 
was only in the autumn of 1848 that the lines of 
rebellion and loyalty began to harden. An imperial 
rescript of 3 October 1848 defined disloyalty as 
obedience to the Hungarian authorities after that date.
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That date was too late for many officers who wished to 
return to imperial service. Faldmarschalleutnant Janos 
Moga, who had fought Jellacic's army at Pakozd, resigned 
from Hungarian service on 1 November 1848 and departed 
for the imperial camp; a court-martial sentenced him to 
five years' fortress detention. Feldmarschalleutnant 
Baron Janos Hrabovszky, one of the Monarchy's most 
decorated and distinguished officers, spent too long 
fighting the Serbs. He left Hungary only at the end of 
1848; his sentence was ten years in a fortress 
dungeon.89 The change of rulers in December 1848 
blurred lines of loyalty for others. Many Hungarian 
officers consoled themselves with the thought that they 
were fighting for the good Ferdinand and his constitution 
against the "usurper" Franz Josef, creature of the court 
camarilla. Many officers sought service on the Italian 
front, where no questions of honor applied; not a few 
rebel officers told their judges they would have been 
utterly loyal if only they could have gone to Lombardy to 
serve their monarch. Others followed Gorgey out of 
desperation: at least the chill punctilio of the 
subaltern-turned-field marshal gave off the impression of 
military rectitude divorced from the grey fog of 
politics.
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The uniforms of regulars on both sides remained the 
same, and trumpet-signals and German commands were not 
changed until late in the affair.90 Only when Windisch- 
Graetz's men put white ribbons on their shakos— the 
standard sign for "enemy" troops on maneuvers— did the 
number of tragic and comic mistakes fall off. Meszaros 
fought long and hard against Kossuth's plans to magyarize 
the Hungarian armies, and Hungarian forces were commanded 
in German throughout the early days of the war.91 The 
commanders on both sides treasured the common bond of 
their uniforms and hesitated to shatter the unity of the 
army. "I shudder," wrote Jellacic in September 1848, "at 
the thought of training my cannon on hussars. If this 
happens, a chasm will open, perhaps forever, in the ranks 
of the army."92 Count Adam Teleki, commanding the 
Hungarian regulars blocking Jellacic's path to Budapest, 
ordered his men to stand neutral and attempt 
negotiations; Teleki's predecessor Ottinger had decided 
to treat the whole affair as a sort of maneuver and 
ordered a quiet withdrawal while forbidding his men to 
use their weapons.93 On 28 December 1848, Ottinger, now 
a major general commanding cavalry for Windisch-Graetz, 
encountered the 2. battalion of the 34. (Kaschau)
Infantry at Babolna near Raab. Ottinger, with the 
Wallmoden Curassiers and the Civilart Uhlans, stood off
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from the 2/34, hesitant to engage old comrades of the 
observation corps deployed against the Croats in August. 
Only when the infantry fired upon his horsemen did 
Ottinger sound the charge, and 300-400 of the 2/34 fell 
to the lances and swords of the cavalry.94
The Hungarian rebel armies enlisted 200,000 men in 
the course of the war; perhaps 10,000 of that number were 
officers, 1500 of those professionals. Under the terms 
of the amnesty decree of 20 August 1849 junior Honvdd 
officers were subject to service in the ranks as private 
soldiers, but few ex-lieutenants and captains had to 
endure more than brief periods of service in the ranks. 
The imperial armies had grown to 648,000 men by October 
1849, and the strains on budget and staff were heavy.
The military did not wish to accomodate an influx of 
disaffected ex-officers, and most were shortly 
discharged. The full weight of military displeasure fell 
on outsiders: members of the Viennese Academic Legion who 
had left Vienna to serve in the Hungarian armies found 
themselves marched off in chains to penal detachments. 
Military courts tried 498 officers above the rank of 
captain: 231 were sentenced to death and forty were 
actually executed; most of the dead were junior officers 
in the regular army who had attained high rank in the 
Honvdd.95 A special MilitSr-Zentralunterauchunga-
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Koimission, which sat from 1 November 1849 to 31 December 
1850 heard 4628 cases— twenty-four generals, seventy-one 
staff officers, 376 line officers, thirty-nine military 
bureaucrats, twenty-nine military doctors and technical 
personnel, 354 other ranks, 1448 civilians, and thirty- 
nine civil servants. The commission was less sanguinary 
than Haynau's courts-martial: of the seventy-one staff 
officers, two were cashiered and imprisoned, four lost 
rank and pension rights, fifty-three were "purified" and 
rehabilitated, two cases were simply dismissed, and nine 
were still awaiting a hearing when the commission was 
adjourned.96 Generations of Hungarians were raised to 
revere the thirteen Hungarian generals executed at Arad, 
and the 120 soldiers, civilians, and peasant partisans 
executed immediately during and after the war. By the 
standards of the twentieth century the number of 
executions was almost trivial; to Hungarians of the post­
revolt generation the number was proof of Austrian 
ruthlessness and cruelty.
The treatment of regulars who had fought on the 
rebel side was, at least by twentieth-century standards, 
quite lenient. The Austrian Verzeichniss der wegen 
Hochverrathes durch Teilnahme an der ungarischen 
Revolution gefall ten kriegsgerichtlichen Urtheile lists 
759 condemned rebels, two-thirds of them soldiers. One
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need only count, up the number of dead and look at the 
dates of amnesty for those Imprisoned to understand the 
changes in the treatment of armed rebellion since 
1850.97 The composite regular officer on Kossuth's 
side, Deak noted, was a subaltern who "grabbed the 
opportunity for promotion, adventure, the chance to 
command army corps instead of platoons [and] when in 
doubt consoled [himself] with patriotic sentiments and 
progressive slogans." (Klapka, one might note in 
passing, had been so bored as a junior officer that he 
had thought seriously of going off to Bengal to buy a 
place in the East India Company's army).9* Those 
officers who were "purified" by imperial tribunals 
returned to their old service, apparently without 
official prejudice, although suspicion persisted in 
officers' messes for years.99 The rank-and-file were 
luckier. They had after all only done what they were 
told by their superiors and betters. They were subject 
to discrimination neither from their commanders nor their 
comrades.100
The regiments that had fought on the rebel side 
could not be simply dissolved and their names stricken 
from the army list, as the East India Company had done 
with Madras regiments after the mutinies of 1806 or the 
Bengal regiments after the mutiny of 1857. They were
however "reorganized"— sent out of Hungarian territory 
and provided with new officers; NCOs and enlisted men who 
had been conspicuously pro-Kossuth were quietly 
discharged. The 62. (Maros-Vasarhely) Infantry, from 
which only the officers and fifty men had remained loyal, 
was sent off to Leoben and Trentino to be rebuilt. The 
60. (Eperjes), which had distinguished itself in street 
fighting in Vienna before its return to Hungary and 
subsequent disloyalty, was shipped back to Lower Austria 
and totally rebuilt, since all three battalions and their 
officers had gone into revolt.101 There had been three 
Italian regiments in Hungary in 1848, the 16. and 23. 
Infantry and the 7. Chevaux-leger. The light horse had 
stayed with Jellacic and had been notably loyal; the 
infantry presented a problem. Four companies of the 2/16 
had fought at Temesvar, but the rest of the two 
battalions in Hungary had tried to stay neutral. The 
3/16 at Treviso and the regiment's grenadiers in Venice 
had been disloyal. The line infantry of the 16. were 
sent off to OlmUtz to be re-trained; after the fall of 
Venice the grenadiers were shipped to the imperial siege 
lines around Komorn to redeem themselves. The 23. 
Ceccopieri was treated with more leniency. The 1/23 and 
2/23 had won acclaim at Komorn, and only the 3/23 in the 
regiment's home district at Lodi was purged.10*
The army had held the Monarchy together, and if the 
Hungarian and Italian regiments were suspect, the civil 
population was subject to the full weight of military and 
imperial displeasure. Martial law lasted in Vienna and 
Prague until mid-1853 and in Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia 
until mid-1854. Vienna itself, where the population had 
defied regulars and murdered an imperial war minister, 
was treated to special consideration. The Vormarz 
garrison of 14,000— made up largely of pioneer and 
grenadier units— had been inadequate to subdue an armed 
populace of 400,000, and after the restoration of order 
the army returned in force, trebling its garrison 
strength. In 1850-56 the new Arsenal was built on the 
high ground near the Siidbahnhof as a home for three 
regiments of infantry and supporting artillery units. An 
American military observer pronounced the new Arsenal to 
be "doubtless perfect in all respects" and within its 
walls were sufficient ammunition and materiel to give the 
army's gunners fire superiority over the whole of the 
city for an extended siege.103 A new Franz-Josefs- 
Kaserne was built near the Dominikanerbastei at the 
eastern edge of the Innere Stadt, providing control over 
the Danube bridges and the city's other railway station. 
Temporary strongpoints were set up and linked by 
heliograph, and continuous patrols— which clashed with
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angry civilians on more than a few occasions— were run 
between the Arsenal and scattered firebases. On any 
night in the early 1850s, as many as 100 patrols might 
leave the Arsenal gates for the streets of the Innere 
Stadt.106
In October 1848 loyal regulars had taken five days 
to blast and batter their way inside the city walls. The 
army and the court were convinced that new outbreaks were 
imminent— in 1850 the young emperor wrote his mother that 
"here...the spirit grows worse day by day, but the people 
are too cunning to let it come to an armed showdown.. .On 
Sunday, a great church parade on the Glacis, to show our 
dear Viennese that troops and guns still exist."105 The 
army's engineers drew up plans for. a chain of forti­
fications all around the walls, for adding a 30-ft. scarp 
onto the exiting walls, and for demolishing all houses 
along the curtain. The system was laid out so that the 
"Inner City as well as the Glacis might be effectively 
controlled, the swarming out of the suburbs by the rabble 
into the Inner City, where the most valuable citizens are 
gouped, be hindered, plundering might be prevented, and 
effective bombardment allowed."106 Vienna's commercial 
and industrial leaders protested that any extension of 
trade and industry required the demolition of the old 
walls so that the suburbs might be annexed and the city's
chronic housing shortage alleviated, but the Archduke 
Maximilian d'Este, something of an expert for the court 
on social unrest, noted that the proletariat had already 
tasted the blood of its betters, that it was daily 
swelled by an influx of foreign outcasts and transients, 
and that only the walls stood between the Hofburg and the 
rabble.107 Special instructions were drawn up for the 
garrison in 1853 and renewed in 1857: the army had no 
intention of being left surprised and helpless before a 
new rising.108 On the eve of the Italian war of 1859 
the city garrison was given notice that large-scale 
reinforcements were available; Archduke Wilhelm had 
arranged for an additional fifteen thousand men to be on 
hand within 72 hours.109
The heightened requirements in both Vienna and the 
Monarchy as a whole were also met by the creation of a 
new force of gendarmerie, established throughout the 
various crownlands in the autumn of 1849. Thirteen 
battalions of gendarmes, trained and outfitted on 
military lines, were set up under Feldmarachalleutenant 
Johann Baron Hempen von Fichtenstamm, then governor- 
general of Budapest. Hempen saw his new command as an 
elite force. His men received better pay and quarters 
than line soldiers (as well as cash bonuses for each 
arrested criminal actually convicted, with a sliding
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scale for severity of the crime), and their authority 
extended to both civilians and soldiers, including 
officers.
By early 1850 the new gendarmerie was co-opting the 
best of the army's NCOs directly from their 
regiments.110 The thirteen battalions expanded to 
sixteen within a year, and finally to nineteen. Three 
were employed in Hungary proper, and one each in 
Siebenburgen, Croatia, and the Voivodina.111 Their 
authority replaced that of the old patrimonial courts and 
the Pandura employed by the Hungarian counties, and their 
presence had long been wished for in parts of Hungary 
where the usual procedure had been to wait until highway 
robbery became epidemic before sending for the army to 
hunt down highwaymen. The gendarmerie provided quiet and 
effective police functions throughout the crownlands—  
reformers had been advocating the creation of a rural 
police force throughout the 1840s— and it served 
increasingly to take over the task of dispersing strikers 
and demonstrators.
If such a role made the gendarmes less than popular 
with the civilians, neither were they admired by the 
army. The gendarmerie was generally recognized as honest 
and highly disciplined, but in 1852 it was placed under 
the ministry of interior, and feelings in the army turned
against what it saw as a rival institution. It was an 
open question, one military observer noted, whether the 
army or the civilians hated the gendarmerie more.112 
Kempen had envisioned the gendarmerie as a force whose 
mission was one of providing public security, but he had 
not seen himself as head of a political police. Yet 
after mid-1852 Kempen found his new command assigned the 
functions of the secret police formerly run directly by 
the minister of the interior.113 By the middle of the 
1850s both Kempen and the emperor were uneasy about the 
use of the gendarmerie for covert political sur­
veillance.114 The military function of the gendarmes, 
though, should not be overlooked. The battalions serving 
in the Hungarian east were faced with bands of nation­
alist partisans who had gradually taken up the more 
traditional trade of simple banditry, and who could rely 
on at least the passive support of much of the peasantry. 
Campaigns against brigandage by both gendarmes and 
regulars became routine. The line between partisan and 
bandit was hard to draw, and the imperial authorities 
remained on edge and continued to reinforce their 
garrisons.115
The enemies of the empire were by no means all 
defeated. Radetzky's armies had smashed the Piedmontese, 
and the marshal and his advisors had attempted to win the
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Lombard peasants for the empire by ruining the local 
nobles, but the 130,000 imperial soldiers now stationed 
in Lombardy-Venetia were more than ever garrisoned in a 
hostile land. The Piedmontese had not been made to feel 
the full consequences of defeat, and Count Cavour, the 
Piedmontese chief minister, was harboring exiles and 
partisans from both Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia. On 6 
February 1853 a series of attacks on Austrian guardposts 
in Milan began, and on 26 February there was an attempt 
to seize the head quarters of the city garrison. Ten 
imperial officers and other ranks were killed; fifty-five 
more were wounded. Seventy-nine Italians captured in the 
raids were hanged on Radetzky's order. The British 
ambassador in Turin primly noted that "the difficulties 
of administering the Lombardo-Veneto would appear . . . 
to be rather increased.1,116 Radetzky immediately set 
about confiscating the estates of those Lombards who had 
gone into emigration, imprisoning all those suspected of 
radical views, and demanding authority to pursue 
terrorists into Switzerland and Piedmont.
The army had learned what observers had said that it 
knew all along from the war in Hungary. No system of 
non-national garrisoning had been operated in the 
Vormarz, but there was now an overriding need to keep 
watch on the Hungarian regiments. They had proven
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themselves unreliable at home, and the authorities were 
aware of the presence of ex-HonvSds, both officers and 
private soldiers, in the ranks. Special attention was 
paid to reintegrating regular officers, and various 
orders of the day reminded officers of their duty toward 
amnestied comrades.117 In some cases recruiting 
districts were shifted to break continuity with the army 
'of 1848. The 2. Infantry, a Pressburg regiment since 
1781, had its recruiting area shifted to Brasso in the 
Siebenburgen area of Transylvania. The 60. was moved 
from Eperjes to Erlau; the 19. had its recruiting 
district shifted from Szolnok to Raab. The district of 
the 33. (Altsohl) was given to the Bohemian 25. Infantry; 
the Galician 12. was recruited in Zips from 1853 to 
1857.118 The Hungarian regiments were moved out of St. 
Stephen's Lands and the Italian regiments were moved out 
of Lombardy-Venetia. Each of the Hungarian regiments had 
left one battalion in its recruiting district before 
1848; the third battalions were now moved about as well. 
Supply, mobilization, and training were made vastly more 
difficult, but the army was now afraid of the Hungarians. 
In other crownlands, regiments like the 15.(Tarnopol), 
the 4.(Vienna), the 57.(Tarnow), or the 18.(Koniggratz) 
might remain at home, but not the Hungarians. As of 
1858, only a single Hungarian regiment, the 62.(Maros-
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Vasarhely) was anywhere in territory (in Agram, in this
119case) belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen.
The treatment of the Hungarian regiments affected 
their morale. There was increasingly little chance that 
Hungarian soldiers would receive any real sympathy or 
understanding from their officers. There had been, not 
surprisingly, a shortage of Hungarian officers joining 
the colors after 1849. Given both the unwillingness of 
Hungarians to seek commissions on political grounds and 
the declining status of a junior officer (pay scales were 
fixed at 1818 levels of a florin a day for a lieutenant, 
despite the inflation of the 1850s), the number of 
Hungarian (and Cisleithanian) officers declined. By 1859 
fifty-two percent of the imperial-royal officer corps was 
made up of men born outside the Monarchy.120 Fewer 
officers in the non-German regiments had any grasp of 
their men's language or problems than before 1848, when 
even if a subaltern of the Hungarian nobility might speak 
French far better than he spoke Magyar, he had at least 
some traditional sympathy with his men and some place in 
their accepted scheme of things. Resentments grew inside 
Hungarian regiments throughout the 1850s. Friedrich 
Engels looked at the Austrian army in 1855 and judged 
that its survival was problematical; any shock might
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dissolve it, and many regiments were only waiting for a 
chance to desert.121
The soldiers and line officers of the imperial-royal 
forces, as distinct from the high command, fought well in 
Lombardy in 1859, living up to the old description of the 
Austrian army as "lions led by asses." Yet two complete 
army corps could not be sent to the Italian front at all; 
they were required in Hungary to guard against any 
possible rising.122 One author noted tartly about the 
Italian debacle that conquered peoples rarely make 
enthusiastic soldiers,121 but the point is less that the 
Hungarians were a conquered nation than that the soldiers 
of Hungarian regiments had been made to feel that they 
were potential rebels and not trusted soldiers of the 
dynasty. Those who had fought with great bravery under 
Radetzky were treated no better than those who had fought 
as rebels under Gttrgey and Klapka, The creation of a 
deliberate system of non-national garrisoning told 
Hungarian soldiers that they were now seen as traitors 
merely awaiting their chance to desert or revolt. An 
extra-territorial system had not existed before 1848, and 
its implementation afterward did not insulate suspect 
nationalities from politics. It introduced instead 
national disaffection as a source of military 
demoralization and only made soldiers of the Hungarian
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regiments aware of their own identity as members of a 
suspect nation.
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CHAPTER 2
ARMY AND DYNASTY: DECAY AND DUALISM
Late in the evening of 3 July 1866 the remnants of 
the Austrian Northern Army streamed away from the field 
at Koniggratz. A handful of units, most notably those of 
Austria's Saxon allies, made the retreat in good order. 
The bulk of the Austrian forces, perhaps 100,000 men, 
pressed toward the fortress of Koniggratz in deepening 
panic. The city commandant feared that the mob swarming 
through the dusk toward his walls was Prussian, and the 
city gates remained barred. The sluices of the Elbe had 
been opened, and as night fell some 60,000 men were 
trapped on a handful of narrow causeways. Theodor 
Fontane could find only one image to rival the chaos 
outside the town of Koniggratz: the shattered Grande 
Armde pouring back across the Berezina.1 In the 
aftermath of the battle perhaps 180,000 men were moved 
back across the Elbe to regroup north of Vienna— an 
impressive, if belated, show of competence by the 
defeated Austrian commanders.2
Yet the army itself was near to collapse, far closer 
than it had been after any of the defeats of the French 
wars. Major Geza Fejervary, sent up from the emperor's 
military chancellery to view the damage, found entire
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battalions coining apart; in many units officers could 
enforce discipline only at swordpoint. Count Karl 
Coudenhove wrote home in despair that his men were, in 
point of fact, no longer willing or able to fight.3 
Only the cavalry, where the spoiling charges of the 
Alexander Uhlans and the Wrangel Cuirassiers had broken 
the ability of the Prussian horse to mount a pursuit to 
the Elbe, and the artillery, which kept up a successful 
covering fire late into the night, emerged from the wreck 
of Benedek's Northern Army with any martial reputation 
left intact.4 On the morning of 4 July drowned soldiers 
floated on the Elbe in sodden clumps, and the hills north 
of Koniggratz were strewn with white-coated dead, the 
victims of superior staffwork and the firepower of the 
needle gun. The survivors of the Northern Army staggered 
on toward Vienna, the political influence of the army 
lost along with all the other wreckage abandoned on the 
field.
The ruin of the Austrian army had been seventeen 
years in coming. Contemporary observers, Friedrich 
Engels among them, had expected the imperial forces to 
make short work of a Prussian army which had seen no real 
action since 1815. The Austrians were, after all, the 
heirs of Radetzky, and Feldzeugmeister Ludwig Benedek, 
commanding the Northern Army, was the hero of San Martino
and the darling of the Liberal press. In defeat the 
court and the army scrambled to find a scapegoat, and the 
anguished Franz Josef spoke bitterly of betrayal.5 Yet 
little had happened in Bohemia that had not gone wrong in 
Lombardy in 1859. The lethargy and indecisiveness of the 
generals, the blithe reliance on the bayonet, the 
restiveness of Hungarian troops, all had been present at 
Magenta and Solferino. The army's effectiveness in the 
field had deteriorated steadily since 1849, and 
Rothenberg's list of its technical deficiencies in 1859 
is exhaustive:
[The high command] repeatedly warned that the 
army was not prepared to undertake a campaign, 
although it is doubtful that they realized the 
extent of the damage done to the army since 
1849...Logistic and supply services were 
insufficient and corrupt and the troops lacked 
engineering stores, rations, and clothing. Infantry 
weapons were adequate, but the artillery was much 
inferior to that of the French. Above all, command 
was in the hands of [generals] who failed to see the 
need for seizing the initiative.6
The brilliant performance of the imperial light cavalry
against the French and the stubborn resistance put up by
Benedek's wing at Solferino7 masked the cold facts of
1859: the imperial forces had been poorly trained,
indifferently led, and had contained large numbers of men
whose loyalty was questionable. The decay of the army
was a function of the victory of 1849, and it paralleled
the overall failure of Austrian policy in the 1850s.
Later in the century Count Taaffe would explain that 
the secret of governing the Monarchy was to find a way to 
keep everyone only mildly unhappy. The regime of the 
1850s pleased no one, and it left everyone dissatisfied 
without creating the spirit of resignation that was 
Taafe's goal. The governments headed by Prince Felix 
Schwarzenberg (1849-1852) and interior minister Alexander 
Bach (1852 - 59) offered something to offend all the 
political factions of the Monarchy, and while it 
introduced a number of liberal reforms— municipal 
autonomy, trial by jury, uniform tariff and taxation, an 
independent judiciary, a reformed civil service— the 
emigres of 1849 still regarded Austria as "a ship loaded 
with slaves...who could be freed only after a 
shipwreck."8
The imperial authorities tried within the limits of 
a non-national state to recognize national and linguistic 
equality. Schwarzenberg and Bach did not aim at 
Germanizing the Monarchy, and laws were gazetted and 
trials held in ten languages.9 The expansion of the 
bureaucracy, where German was the internal language, 
meant that more German was heard, but of course not all 
the bureaucrats were German, and the schools of Bohemia 
turned out sufficient numbers of Czech officials to 
infuriate Bohemian Germans who found "German civilization
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served up to them by Czech officials on a platter of 
state of siege."10 The administrators of the 1850s 
were, however much they might be mocked in Hungary as 
"Bach's hussars" in their cloaked and gold-frogged 
pseudo-Magyar uniforms, by and large efficient and 
honest. Yet imperial policy neither conciliated the 
Hungarians nor won the support of the nationalities who 
had fought against the Magyars in 1848/49:
The [Hungarian] peasants appreciated their 
liberation but persisted in attributing it not to 
Vienna but to Kossuth, and there is little evidence 
that they preferred the relatively efficient but 
alien Bach Hussars to their own traditional 
masters....
The Slovak nationalists found that they had 
got, after all, very little more out of Vienna than 
they had out of Pest...The Serbs fretted against the 
ill-faith which had given them, instead of their own 
self-governing province, an absolutely-ruled 
Department full of Germans and Roumainians.... In 
Transylvania both the Saxons and the Roumanians were 
solid in opposing reunion with Hungary, but both 
were bitterly disappointed with the new 
absolutism... The Croats brooded over Dalmatia, and 
found the yoke of imported foreign officials as 
heavy as the Hungarians did; all the books quote a 
remark made by a Croat to a Hungarian friend: "We 
have got as a reward what you got as a 
punishment."n
The failure of the imperial government to build a 
centralized non-national state was mirrored in the decay 
of the army. The 1850s had begun with great promise. As 
Novara, at Temesvar, and on the Jaegerzeile the army had 
held the Monarchy together. The dull Biedermeier court
of the Emperor Ferdinand had been replaced by one that 
glittered with uniforms. The young emperor, so lately a 
junior staff officer, surrounded himself with soldiers 
and habitually appeared in uniform. There was military 
rule in Verona, Budapest and Vienna itself. Baron 
Ktibeck, late president of the Hofkaimer and now the 
Monarchy's financial expert, attended a dinner at 
Schdnbrunn in the autumn of 1849 and found himself adrift 
in a sea of generals. He confided to his diary that 
Austria was now a military state and that at Schonbrunri 
he had seen the "apotheosis of the army."12
Victory had given the army a pre-eminent voice in 
the councils of state, and when the war ministry, a 
legacy of the failed liberalizing of 1848, was dismantled 
in 1853, the army was freed from the last traces of 
civilian control. In the autumn of 1850 the massed 
battalions of imperial— royal whitecoats— a quarter of a 
million men, commanded by the now-legendary Radetzky—  
helped ensure Austria's diplomatic triumph over Prussia 
at Olmiitz.13 The triumph at Olmiitz, followed in 1853 by 
a successful show of force against the Turks over Ottoman 
threats to Montenegro and then by the occupation of the 
Danubian Principalities during the Crimean War, gave the 
imperial army a series of empty victories. The 
Prussians, humilitated at Olmiitz, undertook to reform
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their armies in order to oppose Austrian "arrogance" in 
the Germanies. The mobilization against Russia had been 
fearfully expensive— sixty million florins overall, the 
whole of the 1854 military budget swallowed up by March 
1854— and the consequences crippled the Monarchy's 
finances for years afterward.14 The Russians were 
outraged at Austria's actions in the Danubian 
Principalities. The newly-crowned Tsar Alexander blamed 
his humiliation at the hands of Britain and France on the 
lack of support— the "armed neutrality"— shown by Franz 
Joseph, and the Monarchy lost any hope of support from 
the Russia that had sent 150,000 men into Hungary to aid 
the Habsburgs in 1849.
The 1850s gave the army its paper triumphs. The 
mobilization of the autumn of 1850 had even made the 
imperial armies seem both powerful and modern. The 
imperial quartermasters had moved 75,000 men, 8000 
horses, and 1800 wagons and artillery pieces to the 
Bohemian front by rail15— a dazzling display of skill.
The Prussian army, which had seen no serious fighting 
since 1815, allowed itself to be cowed by an Austrian 
army so recently victorious on two fronts. In point of 
fact, though, the imperial forces had learned little in 
1848/49. The transport system decayed all through the 
1850s, victim of unbalanced budgets, the sale of rail
lines to private concessions, and the rampant corruption 
which culminated in 1859 with the suicide of the army's 
chief of procurement.16 The tactics that had won the 
day at Novara and Komorn had been wholly orthodox, and 
there was no incentive to change. Victory can ruin an 
army just as surely as defeat, and the imperial 
commanders locked themselves into obsolescent doctrines. 
Perhaps the major change in the structure of the army was 
the dissolution of the light cavalry. Uhlans had been of 
use in Hungary, and the cavalry's seven regiments of 
chevaux-legers were converted to uhlans and given lances, 
creating shock troops at the expense of reconaissance, a 
move exactly opposite to the evolution of military theory 
elsewhere.
The reasoning behind the expansion of the uhlans 
affected the infantry as well. Maria Theresa's Austria 
had been famed for its use of light infantry and 
skirmishing tactics,17 but nineteenth-century doctrine 
stressed close formations and the bayonet. The victories 
of 1848/49 were won with methods commonplace in Archduke 
Charles's day, and Austrian military doctrine centered on 
close columns charging home with cold steel. The 
military leadership of the Monarchy was not given to 
intellectual pursuits, and legend held that the Austrian 
staff could not be interested in the Prussian Kriegspiel
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because one could not properly place bets18— and the 
young emperor insisted that "loyal and chivalrous" 
officers rather than learned ones were the guarantors of 
the army's success.19 Nothing is quite so conducive to 
lethargy as success, and there was no love of military 
learning in the upper reaches of the army. Count Karl 
Grtinne, the emperor's adjutant and the most influential 
military voice in the Monarchy, was scathing in his 
contempt for "military pedants," a reflection of both his 
conservatism and his own lack of military talent.
Benedek, lionized for his exploits in 1848 and 1859, 
insisted that he could conduct a campaign according to 
simple principles; he was, he said, not impressed by 
complex maneuvers.20 Archduke Albrecht, who did keep up 
with the theory of his profession, distrusted innovation 
on political grounds* any major innovation in the army 
ultimately implied social change, and the spirit of the 
army had to remain true to the Dynasty alone.21
The army approached 1866 with a tactical doctrine 
that took no account of the introduction of the 
breechloading rifle or the open-order tactics developed 
by the French in Algeria, in part this was sheer 
conservatism, a refusal to meddle with past success. It 
was also a misreading of the lessons of 1859. At 
Solferino the French, whose infantry had been largely
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armed with smoothbores, had used the superior accuracy 
and firepower of their artillery to allow fast-moving 
French columns to press home bayonet charges into the 
close-packed Austrian formations. The Austrian high 
command had viewed the French success as proof of the 
ability of the bayonet to overcome firepower and had 
neglected the role of the French artillery in enabling 
the infantry to overcome the superior range of the rifled 
Lorenz musket used by the Austrians. The imperial-royal 
service regulations of 1862 designated the bayonet as the 
supreme weapon on the battlefield and abandoned maneuver 
and aimed fire for the cold steel and 61an of pure 
Stosstaktik.22 The results, even in the Danish campaign 
of 1864, were bloody enough. In 1866 the whitecoated 
Austrian battalions charged the Prussian needle-guns and 
died in waves. The Austrian victory at Trautenau (27 
June 1866) cost the Habsburg forces 17.8% casualties 
against 4.2% for the Prussians. The 23.Infantry (a 
former Lombard regiment, recruited at Zombor in Hungary 
since 1860) suffered losses of thirty-one percent.23 
For every Prussian soldier killed in 1866, 2.3 Austrian 
soldiers died, and total casualties amounted to 4.5 
Austrians killed, wounded, and missing for every 
Prussian.24
Conservatism and a misreading of the events at 
Solferino explained part of the reliance on Stosstaktik, 
but some historians, Hans Delbriick chief among them, saw 
the preference for close formations as being grounded in 
the fear of desertion by various national groups—  
Italians, Hungarians and Croats.25 Delbriick's assertion 
was sharply attacked by Heinrich von Srbik, who denied 
outright that the imperial-royal army was devoted to 
close formations out of fear of national disaffection and 
pointed out that the Habsburg armies had a long tradition 
of favoring cold steel and mass.26 The VormSrz army, 
like so many continental forces, lacked the financial 
resources to sustain an interest in Feuertaktik. With 
line infantry limited to twenty training rounds per man 
annually, a reliance on the bayonet was unavoidable.27 
Furthermore, only about ten percent of the infantry 
conscripts of the 1850s were literate, and the quality of 
imperial-royal NCOs was generally regarded as low. It 
was easier to supervise men in close formations where 
attacks could simply be made en masse with the drums 
beating out the pas de charge.
There had of course been concern among the Austrian 
high command in 1859 that disaffection among Italian and 
Hungarian units would lead to large-scale desertions or 
outright mutiny. Count Griinne, the emperor's adjutant-
general, argued that the reserve battalions of all the 
Lombard and Venetian regiments should be sent out of 
Italy immediately upon mobilization.26 Archduke 
Albrecht, commanding general in Hungary, wanted all 
mobilised Hungarian reservists sent out of Hungary, 
though not to Italy, where they were likely to desert or 
defect. Nor did he wish to see any suspect Italian 
troops posted to Hungary.29 And the initial battles of 
the war seemed to bear out fears of desertion. The 45. 
(Verona) Infantry distinguished itself at Magenta, 
winning 32 silver medals and losing 45 killed and 287 
wounded, but also listing 742 men as missing. The 13. 
(Padua) Infantry, being shipped from Hungary to reinforce 
the Italian front, lost 110 men to desertion en route and 
was abruptly shifted to Innsbruck. News of the defeat at 
Magenta and the evacuation of Milan precipitated large- 
scale desertions in the 23.(Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo) 
Infantry.30 Croatian Grenzer units sent to Lombardy had 
displayed a distinct lack of discipline and a tendency to 
go off in search of loot, leading Gunther Rothenberg to 
agree with Delbriick.31 It was long believed that there 
had been large numbers of deserters in 1859 from 
Hungarian units. C.A. Macartney believed that 15,000 
Hungarian troops, six percent of the Austrian forces in 
Italy, deserted during the war of 1859. The 19.(Raab)
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and the 34.(Kaschau) Infantry are supposed to have had 
1200 missing at Solferino— a level of desertion 
tantamount to outright dissolution.32
Yet, as Istvan Deak demonstrated, the actual 
statistics for the campaign of 1859 tell a much different 
story. Casualty returns from Solferino for the 19. 
listed 32 killed, 183 wounded, and €4 missing. The 34., 
all three of whose battalions fought for Kossuth in 
1848/49, fought with enthusiasm at Solferino; the 
regiment suffered 703 casualties, of which 271 were 
missing— "a low figure, considering that the battle was 
lost and that the Austrians listed as missing everyone 
who could not be positively identified as dead."33 In 
other Hungarian units, such as the 48.(Nagykanizsa) and 
the 60.(Eger), there were high figures for all types of 
losses. The 48. lost 62 killed, 347 wounded, 235 
captured, and 161 missing at Solferino, where it held its 
position in the center of the fighting. With two gold 
and seventy-nine silver medals awarded to its soldiers, 
it was one of the most highly decorated units of the war. 
The 60., badly mauled at Magenta, was driven from the 
field by the French at Solferino, losing fifty-six 
killed, 249 wounded, and 548 missing. Many -of the losses 
occurred when elements of the regiment fired on one 
another in darkness and confusion during the general
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rout.34 The imperial-royal army's Hungarian units, Deak 
noted, did not desert en masse in northern Italy; they 
were killed en masse.35
Desertions in large numbers had certainly taken 
place from the Monarchy's Italian regiments, though few 
of these occured at or near the front. The 13.(Padua) 
lost its deserters on the march west out of Hungary; the 
23. (Lodi) and 43.(Bergamo) were stationed on the 
Dalmation coast when problems began. The 55.(Monza) lost 
forty-two men when its reserve battalion was sent from 
Lower Austria to Hungary in midsummer, after fighting had 
ended in Lombardy.36 The Hungarian regiments had shown 
no special tendency to desert despite the assertions of 
some historians.37 Yet it was the perception of 
desertion rather than the reality that seems to have 
affected Austrian decisions about the need for close 
supervision of the troops, and by 1866 there was a deep 
concern for using close formations to monitor suspect 
nationalities.38 The three Italian regiments that 
fought in Bohemia in 1866— the 13.(Padua), 38.(Brescia), 
and 26.(Udine)— distinguished themselves despite heavy 
casualties,39 but when Magyar battalions of the 
67.(Eperjes) and 68.(Szolnok) Infantry were unable to 
advance against Prussian fire at Nachod, it was taken as 
self-evident that Hungarian troops were attempting to
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abandon the field.40 The imperial-royal command was 
more than willing to treat its Hungarian soldiers as 
potential traitors.
Imperial policy demanded an army loyal only to the 
dynasty, but the regiments could not be separated from 
their national groups. Both Friedjung and Prince 
Schwarzenberg's biographer claimed that in the years 
between 1848 and 1866 "an Austrian regiment was a melting 
pot of various nationalities" and that "after 1849 a 
system was introduced whereby each regiment consisted of 
soldiers of different nationalities."41 Both writers 
seem to have confused the regiment, drawn from a local 
recruiting district, with the brigade— the basic imperial 
tactical grouping during the 1850s— made up of six 
battalions of infantry. The battalions of a brigade 
might be of various nationalities, but each battalion 
came from its own regiment, its own recruiting ground.
The brigade allowed the military authorities to keep 
large tactical units together while still allowing them 
to monitor suspect units. And imperial suspicion fell 
impartially as rain. Of the nine regiments recruited in 
Italy in the 1850s only two saw any service in Lombardy- 
Venetia during those years: the 13. (Padua) was at Udine 
for the first few months of 1854 and the 44. (Milan) 
arrived in Padua at the beginning of I86042— although
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the 45. (Verona) saw services at Magenta in 1859 and won 
thirty two silver medals for bravery, a performance it 
would repeat at Koniggr&tz. The German regiments were 
not exempt. The 4. Hoch-und-Deutschmeister had 
distinguished itself in Hungary, but a detachment of 
grenadiers of the 4. had deserted to the mob attacking 
the war ministry buildings in October 1848, and the 
regiment was considered prone to sympathize with the 
Viennese and shipped out to the Tisza in the early 1850s 
to hunt bandits.43
The Hungarians were of course kept out of Hungary.
Of twenty-one Hungarian regiments in 1858, only one was 
serving inside the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen; in 
1862 the number was three of forty-one regiments.44 
Suspicion fell on the Grenzers, the units of the 
Monarchy's Military Border, as well. The Transylvanian 
Grenzer regiments had fought for Kossuth and had been 
"re-organized" in 1849, but in early 1851 they were 
dissolved altogether and their soldiers parcelled out to 
other regiments.45 Szekler cadres of the old 1. Szekler 
Grenzers were moved to Czernowitz and, along with two 
companies of the 31. (Hermannstadt) and three companies 
of the 51. (Klausenberg), converted to a new 5. (Munkacs) 
Infantry. The new regiment received an auxiliary 
recruiting area at Maros-Vasarhely and was further
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diluted in 1852 with 2800 recruits from the zones of the 
32. (Budapest) and the 34. (Kaschau).46
The Croatian Grenzers had been conspicuously loyal 
in 1848, but the Habsburgs had never been disposed to 
shows of gratitude. Loyalty to the dynasty was simply 
assumed; rewards were rarely handed out for mere 
performance of duty. An autonomous Croatian kingdom of 
Illyria was no more desirable than an autonomous Hungary. 
Fiume and bits of eastern Slavonia were added to Croatian 
territory, and the Grenzers were given actual title to 
the land they farmed in their regimental areas,47 but 
Dalmatia was kept separate from Croatia and the major 
demand of the Croats, the union of the Border with civil 
Croatia, was denied.48 The male population of the 
Border was still subject to military justice and 
permanent military service, and the Border and its 
inhabitants were proclaimed an "integral part" of the 
imperial army.49 The economy of the Border was in a 
dismal state, and all observers agreed that improvement 
was possible only if the Border could be integrated into 
Croatia proper.50 The Border was producing only half as 
much grain as civil Croatia in the early 1860s, and a 
deepening poverty in the regimental areas was easily 
transmuted into political discontent.51
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The Croats had very little with which to bargain. 
Jellacic had passed from the scene in the early 1850s, 
and the spirochetes that ate away at his spinal cord 
destroyed the major living link between the Croats and 
the Dynasty. It had also become open knowledge that the 
military efforts of the Grenzers in 1848/49 were notable 
more for loyalty than success. The failure of Jellacic's 
offensive against Budapest had dispelled a number of 
illusions about the fighting ability of the Grenzers.
The Croats had carried the day in the Prater and down the 
Landstrasse during the recapture of Vienna, but they had 
displayed a distressing tendency to break away in search 
of plunder.52 A decade later, Grenzer regiments sent to 
Lombardy impressed Austrian officers as being chiefly 
concerned with "stealing chickens, and exhibited an 
extrodinary concern for their safety during battle."53 
The Grenzers no longer had a place on the modern 
battlefield; the soldier-farmer had been made obsolete 
and was now failing at both professions. The regiments 
of the Border performed their traditional tasks of 
hunting down bandits and facing down local Ottoman 
garrisons, but they could no longer command any special 
mystique. Their major active function was maintenance of 
the Pest-Cordon against a Turkey supposedly infested with 
plague and cholera, so that
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if you dare to break the laws of the 
quarantine, you will be tried with military haste; 
the court will scream out your sentence to you from 
a tribunal some fifty yards off; the priest, instead 
of gently whispering to you the sweet hopes of 
religion, will console you at duelling distance, and 
after that you will find yourself carefully shot and 
carelessly buried in the ground of the Lazaretto.94
The military authorities did not wish to give up
their control over the Border, since military control
provided, at least in theory, a base for future
operations against Hungary. Yet attempts to isolate the
Border from the political life of civil Croatia and the
wider economy of the Monarchy produced nothing but
deepening dissatisfaction and poverty.59 By the end of
the 1850s the Croats, so highly praised for the loyalty
and devotion they had shown a decade before,56 were
considered unreliable. Large numbers of Croats had
deserted in Lombardy in 1859, and the French had hoped to
induce them to rise in support of a French landing in
Dalmatia.97 In 1850 an Austrian observer had warned the
command in Hungary that "South Slav nationalism hides
dangerous tendencies behind a mask of outward
loyalty;"58 by 1859 it was necessary to shift Czech and
German regulars in large numbers to the Border. The
English traveller George Spottiswoode found that "the
mountains swarmed with soldiers," and the army was
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interning in Josephstadt fortress as many nationalist 
suspects as it could find.59
The new attitude of the Croats found political 
expression in the aftermath of the war. The imperial 
government, beset by military disaster and financial 
collapse, harassed by a well-organized and well-financed 
press campaign mounted by the German Liberals and the 
financial community,60 began its retreat from the 
programs of Schwarzenberg and Bach, from a unitary state 
and absolute imperial authority. The October Diploma of 
1860, the first constitutional experiment of Franz 
Joseph's reign, promised an enlarged crown council drawn 
from the monarchy as a whole. Pressure from the German 
Liberals and the Hungarians, both of whom sought more 
from a constitution than a council with no control over 
defense or foreign affairs and with only limited control 
of taxation, forced its withdrawal within a few 
months.61 Its successor, the Silvester Patent of 1861, 
made the diets of the crownlands electoral colleges for a 
central Reichsrat in Vienna. Nine Croatian-Slavonian 
delegates were to be sent to the Reichsrat, and the 
Croatian Grenzers, though under military orders to 
discuss nothing but the election of delegates to the 
central Reichsrat, were allowed to participate in the 
deliberations of the Croatian Sabor. The Grenzers,
rebuffed in their attempts to petition the emperor over 
the status of the Border, sided with the Sabor's block of 
Croatian nationalists, and Grenzer votes gave the 
nationalists in the Sabor a majority against 
participation in the Reichsrat.67 The imperial 
authorities were outraged by the open defiance of the 
Grenzera, and the Border delegates were immediately 
shipped back to their regiments and kept under open 
arrest. All Grenzer officers suspected of nationalist 
sentiments were to be transferred out of Croatia— a 
decision that applied even to Colonel Petar Preradovic, 
the celebrated author of German romances of the Border: 
the author of Das Uakoken Madchen was declared too 
nationalist to serve in Croatia and Slavonia.63 The 
decision to post suspect Grenzer officers to regiments 
elsewhere in the Monarchy gave a number of nationalist 
officers incentive to resign; the most radical took 
service in Serbia, which had attracted the sympathies of 
South Slav nationalists both Orthodox and Catholic. The 
group of ex-Habsburg officers in Belgrade devoted 
themselves to organizing intelligence networks along the 
Border and promoting insurrection in Bosnia in the hope 
of using a Turkish war as the catalyst for the creation 
of a South Slav state.64
The Monarchy's Italian provinces were under constant 
strain from a nationalism that was, despite Radetzky's 
efforts to separate the peasants of Lombardy and Venetia 
from their politically-active betters, deeply rooted.
Yet the population was sufficiently quiet in the late 
1850s for a ninth Italian regiment— the 55.(Como)— to be 
raised. Italian units were posted abroad, most often to 
Bohemia and Hungary. Yet the Italians, as exemplified by 
the performance of the 45.(Verona) at Magenta and 
Koniggratz, continued to give good service. The fleet, 
whose sailors and marines had mutinied in 1848, continued 
to be drawn from Dalmatia and the Veneto. The political 
reliability of the fleet seems to have improved during 
the 1850s— a function perhaps of the ongoing shift of 
naval forces away from Venice to Pola and almost 
certainly of the new life brought to the fleet by the 
Archduke Maximilian, named to the admiralty in 1854. The 
young archduke's influence in improving the training and 
outfitting of the neglected fleet went far towards 
dissolving nationalism into professionalism.65 The 
crews of the outgunned Austrian fleet that devastated 
their Italian opponents at Lissa were, after all, largely 
Italian-speaking.
The loss of Lombardy left the imperial 
administration in the Veneto thoroughly demoralized. The
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fortress towns of the Quadrilateral, Mantua, Legnano, 
Peschiera, and Verona, remained in imperial hands, and 
the ambitions of the Piedmontese were held at the line of 
the Po and the Mincio. The guns of the Quadrilateral and 
the rail net centered on Mantua gave the imperial 
defenses an overwhelming advantage on the frontiers of 
the new Italian kingdom. There were still seven Italian 
regiments after 1859/60, including a new 79. raised at 
Pordenone and an 80. raised at Vicenza in 1860.
Table 2.1 
Italian Infantry Regiments 1848-60
1848
13. Padua
16. Treviso-Venice 
23. Lodi 
26. Udine
38. Cremona-Brescia
43. Bergamo
44. Milan
45. Verona
TOTAL* 8
1857
13. Padua
16. Treviso-Venice 
23. Lodi 
26. Udine
38. Cremona-Brescia
43. Bergamo
44. Milan
45. Verona 
55. Como 
TOTAL: 9
1860
13. Padua 
16. Treviso-Venice 
26. Udine 
38. Rovigo
45. Verona 
7 9. Pordenone 
80. Vincenza 
TOTALS 7
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Yet Benedek, arriving in Italy in 1861, found the 
administration of Venetia, both civil and military, in a 
state of "uncertainty, passivity, and impotence.1166
Little enough had changed in Venice itself. The 
imperial fleet was slowly shifting to Pola, but the 
city's status as a free port brought in sufficient 
merchantmen to fill the docks. Austrian officers and 
their friends still drank at Quadri's, staring across San 
Marco at the partisans of a united Italy drinking at 
Florian's. The imperial administration and the populace 
both spent the 1860s in lethargic anticipation. Benedek 
found the population "hardly conscious" of any connection 
with the Monarchy, ruled "in greater part" by nationalist 
ideas, but simply cultivating their own material 
interests in disregard of the Austrians, in expectation 
of change.67 Such expectations were not merely rumor or 
nationalist propaganda: the Austrian cabinet had informed 
Prince Richard Metternich in Paris in March 1863 that any 
"policy of sacrifices" for Venetia would involve reviving 
"dangerous tendencies among the nationalities at home" 
and was too risky to consider. Both the Prussians and 
the Italians believed that a diplomatic arrangement which 
would cede Venice to Italy in return for their support 
for Austrian occupation of Bosnia and the Danubian 
Principalities was possible. At the beginning of 1866
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circles around General La Marmora, the Italian war 
minister, were using the Vienna Rothschilds to convey 
hints to the imperial government that Venice in return 
for supporting Austria's acquisition of Bosnia,
Wallachia, and parts of Serbia would be an acceptable 
trade.68
Austrian fears in Italy in the early 1860s were less 
of war or revolution than of terrorist attacks by 
Garibaldist irregulars. The imperial ministry of finance 
had informed the Archduke Wilhelm that for fiscal 1860 
the army could get funds only after all the other 
expenses of the state had been met— thus exercising a 
veto on any Austrian action against Garibaldi's coup in 
the Two Sicilies or Garibaldist movements in Umbria and 
the Emilian Marches.69 The 2. Army, the imperial 
garrison in Italy and once the centerpiece of the 
Monarchy's defenses, dwindled from 150,000 men and 5500 
horses in 1861 to 55,000 men and 3000 horses in 1863; by 
1863 the Verona general command was reporting that some 
regiments were down to a bare dozen men in a company.70 
When in 1864 it was feared that 4000-5000 Garibaldisti 
were readying a coup in Friulia, only fifty understrength 
companies could be found for its defense.71 The Polish 
revolt of 1863 revived revolutionary hopes throughout 
Europe, and reports of Italian projects frightened
Benedek into proclaiming martial law in early 1864 and 
threatening to shoot any captured irregulars out of hand. 
Troops were alerted in Carinthia and the Tirol, and the 
outcome was determined as much by the hesitation of the 
Italian government in supporting Garibaldi as by the 
imperial troops who spent endless weeks chasing down 
partisans' lairs in the hills around Udine and Belluno. 
Reports in 1865 of projects against Fiume and Cattaro and 
of increased activity against Venetia being planned by 
revolutionaries in Bologna led to increased patrol and 
counter-intelligence activity, but concrete proposals to 
reinforce the police led to an impasse over the legal 
status of imperial and Lombard-Venetian gendarmerie 
forces.72
The heart of the Monarchy's problem was of course 
Hungary. The Hungarian constitution had been suppressed 
in 1849, and the old Kingdom of Hungary had been 
dismembered. Transylvania was carved away into a 
separate unit, as was Croatia. Hungary proper was 
divided into six military districts based at Sopron, 
Pressburg, Kaschau, Budapest, Nagyvarad, and Temesvar.
The Temesvar military region was joined to the Voivodina 
in November 1849 and transformed into a new crownland 
with Franz Joseph as Grand Voivode, leaving Hungary in 
five parts, each ruled by a military governor and his
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civilian advisor. The punitive regime of FBldmarachal- 
leutnant Baron Haynau, whose armies had broken the 
Hungarian forces in 1849, had served its purpose by mid- 
1850, and the marshal was retired to his newly-acquired 
Hungarian estates, where he spent his last years 
wondering why his gentry neighbors refused to invite him 
to their parties.73 His replacement was Archduke 
Albrecht, who made his formal appearance as governor- 
general at Pressburg in mid-October 1851.74 The new 
regime moved to hand over as much authority as possible 
to the civilian specialists in charge of integrating 
Hungary and its laws into the Monarchy as a whole, but 
martial law officially remained in effect until May 1854, 
and the new gendarmerie was backed by twenty-two 
battalions of infantry designated for internal-security 
duties.75
Albrecht's arrival gave no joy to those Hungarians 
not attached to the court. The Archduke's ten years in 
office saw the creation of much of the economic 
infrastructure essential to the country's later 
development, and the new regime supervised the abolition 
of feudal dues and the transfer of urbarial lands to 
their new peasant owners.76 Nonetheless, the reforms of 
the early 1850s were carried out by the bureaucrats, many 
of them Czechs and Germans imported by Bach's ministry.
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and the decrees of January 1853 converting the 
"provisional" decrees of 1849 into a permanent system 
reiterated Bach's Verwirkungstheorie, under which 
Hungary, by its treason and rebellion, had forfeited its 
constitution and its right to exist as a separate 
kingdom.77
The Archduke, whose rank was first seen as a 
concession to Hungarian sentiments after the rule of 
Haynau and his bourgeois civilian advisor Heinrich 
Gehringer, was "an austere military figure to whom every 
Hungarian was a rebel, actual or potential.1,78 And 
Albrecht made no secret of his belief that he was ruling 
over conquered territory. The suspension of the customs 
barrier between Hungary and the Austrian provinces gave 
the hard-pressed Magyar gentry access to the German 
demand for grain, but credit for expansion and 
mechanization on gentry holdings was available only to 
friends of the dynasty.79 The integration of Hungary 
into the Austrian tax structure meant that Hungary was 
now paying its share of expenses for the whole Monarchy, 
and taxes increased tenfold as Hungary's privileged 
position vanished: the 1847 figures for taxes were 4.3
million florins in direct taxes and 5.3 million florins 
in indirect taxes; the figures for 1857 were 41.5 million 
and 65.6 million florins respectively. The bulk of the
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direct taxes fell on the nobility; the peasantry found 
itself bearing the cost of new taxes on food and 
tobacco.80
There were of course real enemies of the state for 
the governor-general to contend with. In the autumn of 
1851 the gendarmerie uncovered a conspiracy in the 
Szekler towns of Transylvania, organized by an ex-Honvdd 
colonel named Joszef Mack, who billed himself as 
Kossuth's chosen agent and who had established a fairly 
extensive network of terrorist cells across the country. 
The affair was dealt with swiftly, as was a second, more 
comic-opera, attempt at revolt by a radical named Oszlopy 
the following June.81 The executions following the 
suppression of Mack's conspiracy prompted the exiled 
Kossuth to urge his followers to wait for a more 
favorable international alignment, and the skill of the 
authorities in intercepting radical communications 
dampened conspiratorial enthusiasms at home.
Nonetheless, the imperial visit of 1852 was attended 
by a massive military escort, as was the visit of both 
emperor and empress in 1856. In both cases the emperor 
refused to wear the uniform of any of his Hungarian 
regiments; security units enforced a ban on the red- 
white-green national colors while the imperial 
procession, decked in the black-and-yellow of the
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dynasty, passed by.83 Physical opposition to the new 
order was confined to the hinterlands of the east and 
south, where a tradition of banditry kept alive bands who 
fancied themselves as partisans. The 4. Hoch-und- 
Deutschmeister, sent out beyond the Tisza to hunt 
bandits, killed or captured 122 brigands in the last two 
weeks of September 1850 alone,83 and the dreary work of 
ferreting out brigands and self-proclaimed partisans from 
among a sullen population went on throughout the decade.
The nature of Hungarian resistance had been defined 
by Ferenc Deak as early as 1850. Asked to serve on an 
imperial commission on integrating Austrian and Hungarian 
judicial procedures, he informed Vienna that "it is not 
possible to cooperate actively in public affairs."88 
Deak's attitude was shared by the majority of his class, 
and the Magyar gentry withdrew to their estates. The 
imperial authorities were hardly anxious to recruit from 
among a suspect people, but there were few enough 
volunteers for imperial service in any case: when in
June 1850 the authorities began recruiting civilian 
administrators, only nine of 117 applicants were 
Magyar.85
The ruling class of Hungary withdrew from public 
life, leaving the collection of taxes and the levying of 
recruits to the "Bach hussars” and the army. Cynics
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claimed that the majority of the 156,000-man imperial 
garrison in the late 1850s was there to collect taxes, 
and the army and the finance ministry fought a savage 
paper war over who would bear the costs of the endless 
expeditions to collect taxes. Thirty- two million gulden 
were in arrears in Hungary in 1859, a figure raised to 
forty-five million three years later by an exhausted and 
exasperated army command.96 Those Hungarians possessing 
sufficient influence, respectability, or wealth to defy 
the bureaucrats openly did so, confident that a platoon 
of soldiers would be helpless against local passivity and 
obstinance. When the Hungarian Diet assembled in 1861, 
every single deputy was deeply in arrears with his 
taxes.07 The habit of non-payment became entrenched in 
the countryside. Despite the coming of home rule and 
Dualism, sweeps across the countryside by the (now 
Hungarian) gendarmerie and army to collect>taxes were 
commonplace throughout the last thirty years of the 
century.00
The suppression of county authorities and the 
enactment of uniform conscription throughout the Monarchy 
in 1852 put the Hungarian conscript pool in direct 
contact with the imperial authorities. The law of 1852, 
amended again in late 1858,09 set eight years as the 
standard term of service throughout the Monarchy,
followed by a two-year reserve liability. The emperor 
proclaimed that a state "which can raise two hundred 
thousand men without trouble...is not sickening for 
revolution,"90 but the annual intake never reached half 
that figure. Hungarian recruits had been provided by the 
counties, and the local high sheriffs and lords- 
lieutenant had used the army as a dumping ground for 
vagrants, insolent peasants, and petty criminals. The 
conscription laws of the 1850s and early 1860s still 
exempted the Monarchy's propertied classes, but the 
transfer of conscription power from local notables to 
professional administrators meant that more Hungarians 
faced the prospect of military service. The quality of 
Hungarian recruits may well have improved, but the 
conscripts of the Bach era were levied by an authority 
perceived as foreign, and they included men far more 
disposed to protest both their own conscription and the 
imperial regime in Hungary than their VormSrz 
counterparts. The army's methods for dealing with 
recalcitrant private soldiers dated back to Eugene's day, 
and the lash was applied with mechanical indifference.91 
Resistance to conscription became endemic in Hungary, and 
the imperial authorities became convinced that, given any 
opportunity, there would be widespread desertion from the 
Hungarian regiments.
Nonetheless, outright insubordination remained rare. 
Magyar conscripts were difficult to catch, and the army 
believed that Magyar troops could not be stationed in 
Hungary, yet in 1859 and 1866, when chances for open 
defiance appeared, surprisingly few Hungarian soldiers 
availed themselves of the opportunity to fight against 
the Habsburgs. In 1859 Kossuth obliged Louis Napoleon 
and Cavour by forming a Hungarian Legion to fight against 
the Austrians in Lombardy. The Hungarian Legion, built 
around a cadre of about 300 long-time emigres, despite 
appeals by Kossuth to the Hungarian soldiers of the 
imperial-royal forces in Italy, attracted few recruits.
By early July 1859 the Hungarian Legion numbered 4000 
men, but the majority of those were something less than 
volunteers. The French command in Lombardy had simply 
transferred all Hungarian prisoners to the control of the 
Legion. The new legionnaires found themselves given the 
choice of the Legion or French prison camps. The 
Hungarian leadership extolled the "volunteers" in the 
foreign press, but in private they were angry at French 
ignorance. "Hungarian" regiments were by no means all 
Magyar, and the Legion found itself filled with Croatian, 
Swabian, Slovak, Serbian, or Romanian soldiers who had no 
wish to fight for a Magyar vision of Hungary.92 in any 
event, the Legion saw no combat and most of its members
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were only too happy to accept the Austrian offer of 
amnesty after the end of the war.
A number of Hungarians took service with Piedmont, 
and five years after Solferino many were languishing at 
Ancona, sick of being used to fight in Piedmont's 
internal quarrels and busy petitioning Benedek in Venice 
for amnesty and the chance to return home.93 Another 
Legion was raised in 1866 to fight alongside the 
Prussians but met with even less success. Commanded by 
Gyorgy Klapka, the defender of Komorn fortress, it never 
exceeded battalion strength and was made up of emigres 
long exiled from Hungary. When Klapka attempted to move 
into northern Hungary he found the local Magyar 
population apathetic and the Slovak peasantry openly 
hostile. Harassed by the locals and given no support by 
the Prussians, Klapka and his few hundred men fell back 
across Moravia into Prussia. Their sole achievement may 
have been to raise Czech'support for the Habsburgs. 
Frantisek Rieger, leader of the Czech deputies in the 
Reichsrat, pointed out that a Magyar radical victory was 
a threat to the Czechs and offered Czech support to the 
imperial government.94
There had been no revolts in either Lombardy-Venetia 
or Hungary in 1859, despite the fears of many Austrian 
commanders (such as Archduke Albrecht) and the hopes of
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Kossuth and his fellow emigres. Yet when the army began 
to rebuild itself, to think of revenge in Italy or the 
growing possibility of war with Prussia, its leaders were 
faced with a long list of suspect nationalities and an 
eroding financial base. The loss of Lombardy left the 
Monarchy in possession of a Veneto whose population 
expected to be joined to Italy within a few years. The 
Croats were openly suspect, the Magyars sullenly 
obstinate. The Hungarian Diet had been suspended in 
August 1861; by November the country was once again under 
martial law, and the military engaged in a grinding, 
often futile, series of tax-collection campaigns.93 
Faced with discontent at home, the need to defend the 
Monarchy's remaining Italian possessions, and the 
possibility of a war over leadership in the Germanies, 
the army found itself woefully short of manpower either 
to fight abroad or to maintain order at home.
On paper, the imperial-royal army could field a half 
million men upon mobilization. The strength of the 
infantry had been augmented in the summer of 1848 by 
activating each regiment's first Landwehr battalion as a 
fourth regular battalion, and the fourth battalions had 
never been retired. In mid-1852 the infantry had been 
officially declared to consist of sixty-two line 
regiments of four field battalions and a depot battalion
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each.96 This gave the army a mobilized strength of half 
a million,97 but the actual number was far less. The 
Monarchy's financial straits and the difficulty of 
extracting recruits from Hungary made a system of five 
battalions too expensive to operate. In 1855 the depot 
battalions were dissolved and the fourth line battalions 
thinned and returned to the regimental recruiting 
districts to serve as training cadres.99 When in 
September 1859 the decision was taken to enlarge the 
infantry by eighteen regiments, there was a marked 
shortage of soldiers.
The planned expansion envisaged transforming sixty- 
two regiments of four battalions to eighty regiments of 
three battalions and a depot cadre. Each old regiment 
would give up two battalions to the new regiments, and 
units would be shuffled between older regiments to make 
up for the loss of Lombard troops. The 4. Hoch-und- 
Deutschmeister gave up its 2. and 3. battalions to the 
new 72. (Pressburg) and received the 3. battalion of the
14.(Linz). The 48.(Nagy-Kanisza) took in the 
3/52.(Funfkirchen) but sent out its own 2. and 3. 
battalions to the 44., late of Milan, now re-forming in 
Kaposvar. The 44. in turn sent a cadre of officers and 
MCOs from the 2/44. to the 6.(Neusatz). The 20.(Neu- 
Sandec) sent its 2. and 3. battalions to the 67.(Eperjes)
and took in the 3 . 5 6 ( W a d o w i c e ) T h e  Lombard regiments 
were given new recruiting grounds, often in Hungary, 
where Italian troops had long been commonplace. The 
23.(Lodi) was shifted to Maria-Theresiopel, the 
43.(Bergamo) to Versec in the Banat, the 44.(Milan) to 
Kaposvar, the 55.(Como) to Brzezany in Galicia, and the 
11. Uhlans, the only cavalry regiment raised in Habsburg 
Italy, were sent to Przemysl. Most of the Lombard 
soldiers were simply released from service in 1860, 
although some (especially the cavalrymen of the 
11.Uhlans) seem to have served out their terms. The 
expansion could only take place by thinning already 
understrength regiments. The 4.Hoch~und-DeutBcIme±ster, 
brought home to Vienna in triumph in 1854, paraded on the 
Glacis for the emperor and his new bride with a strength 
of eighty men per company. When in 1860 the 2/4. and the 
3/4. were transferred to the new 72., company strength 
fell to sixty.100
The 1860s opened badly for the army. The expansion 
of the infantry meant in concrete terms only a thinning 
of existing resources: eighteen new regimental banners 
implied the costs of eighteen new recruiting districts 
and training depots and competition for a fixed (and 
inadequate) number of warm bodies. The demands of the 
Lombard war had meant an early levying of recruits, and
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the class of 1860 could not be raised.101 There was 
little help to be had from outside sources. Revived 
parliamentary life in Austria was controlled by the 
German Liberals, and memories of October 1848 died hard: 
Liberal hatred of the army was exceeded only by Liberal 
distaste for the Church. The Reichsrat had a willingness 
to pay for a gendarmerie that would keep the mob and the 
Magyars in their places but no sympathy for enlarged 
military budgets.103 The military budget fell from 179 
million florins in 1861 to 118 million in 1863/64; after 
the Danish campaign of 1864 it was cut again to 96 
million.103
In theory, 310-320,000 men reached the age of twenty 
every year in the Monarchy, of which 85,000 would be 
recruited for eight years in the line and two years in 
the reserves. Allowing for a 2000-man naval levy, the 
imperial army at full mobilization could draw on ten 
classes of 83,000 men and a force of 50,000 Grenzers. In 
practice, only those recruits destined for the cavalry 
saw eight years of service. Artillery and engineering 
troops generally served four to six years, and..infantry 
only one and one half to three. After 1855, most of the 
infantry were furloughed after eighteen months and did 
(at most) an eight-week autumn drill for the rest of 
their line obligation.104 Austrian military authorities
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continued to insist that long-service troops alone could 
be properly trained and shielded from outside influences. 
The latter belief was universal, though its empirical 
accuracy has been questioned.105 The eight-year term of 
service and the pressure of finances meant that the 
imperial army would be only minimally trained and 
woefully short of reserves. Indeed, Benedek complained 
from Italy in 1862 that the regiments of the 2. Army were 
"wholly disorganized" and that, with only fifty men to a 
company, no real tactical training was possible. Some of 
his battalions were down to a mere twelve men per 
company, a state of only ghostly existence.105
It was nonetheless true that the Northern Army of 
1866 was fully imperial-royal, drawn from all the 
crownlands of the Monarchy, with Venetian infantry 
alongside Hungarian, Bohemian, and Lower Austrian 
soldiers. Benedek's army was poorly trained and equipped 
and led by men who had learned nothing in 1859, but there 
was little open resistance to the war. Mobilization on 
the Border, where South Slav conspiracies had been 
festering107, was "orderly, if unenthusiastic."10B 
Italian attempts to promote an insurrection on the 
Monarchy's flank were of no significance, and Garibaldi 
spent much of August 1866 in a fit of rage and despair 
over the "shameful apathy" of the peasants of the Veneto,
who gave aid and comfort to the "foreign mercenaries" of 
the Habsburgs.109 A contemporary observer gave a rough 
national breakdown of the imperial army as110
Infantry Cavalry
German 23 12
Hungarian 23 11
Polish 13 13
Italian 7 -
Siebenburgen 7 1
Borderlands 7 3
Mixed — 1
TOTAL: 80 TOTAL: 41
detailed analysis for the end of 1865 gives111
German 126,300 26 %
Czech-Slovak 96,300 19.5
Italian 52,700 10.7
Ruthene 50,100 10.2
Polish 37,700 7.7
Magyar 32,500 6.6
Croat 27,600 5.6
Slovene 22,700 4.6
Romanian 20,700 4.2
Serb 19,000 3.9
Other 5,100 1.0
TOTAL: 492,700
The Northern Army was woefully understrength. The 
Monarchy could raise only 528,000 men in 1866~of which
463,000 (400,000 infantry, 29,000 cavalry, 24,000 
artillery, 10,000 engineers) were combat troops. Ninety* 
four thousand men were needed to man the fortresses of 
the Monarchy, thirty battalions of regulars (25,000 men)
were designated for internal security in Hungary and 
Vienna; 20,000 more were kept in recruiting areas as 
training cadres. Only 310-320,000 men remained available 
for a two-front war. Friedjung estimated that Benedek 
began his campaign with 238,000 men, and the 210,000 
imperial-royal soldiers he commanded at Koniggr&tz were 
roughly equal to the Prussian forces opposing him. 
Archduke Albrecht, commanding in Italy, had only 74,000 
men available at the outbreak of hostilities and only
110,000 available at Custozza to oppose a total Italian 
force of 260,000 under La Marmora.112 Plaschka noted 
that the Northern Army, fighting for hegemony in Germany, 
had two regiments each from lower Austria and Styria and 
one from Upper Austria; the bulk of the infantry was 
drawn from Bohemia, Galicia, Venetia, and Hungary. The 
bulk of the Feldjagers were Bohemian, as were both 
dragoon regiments and a majority of the heavy cavalry. 
Plaschka believed that 1866 was the last truly heartfelt 
merging of peoples for Kaiser and Reich.113
The debacle at Koniggratz was the product of years 
of decay and neglect. The army forfeited the remnants of 
the prestige it had won in 1848, but it is important to 
note that the imperial army was by no means finished as a 
fighting force. Albrecht, named to the disgraced 
Benedek's command, hurried up to Vienna from his victory
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at Custozza, followed by 70,000 infantry and 3000 
cavalry.114 Albrecht mobilized all available units, 
called up another 83,000 recruits, and with 334,000 men 
and 533 guns under his command was prepared to fight 
on.115 The summer of 1866 was not so black as 1740, and 
the archduke was ready to fight on the Danube and raise 
the loyal populations of Bohemia and Moravia.116 Even 
with the conclusion of an armistice with the Prussians, 
the war went on in the south, and 20,000 imperial troops 
a day poured back into Venetia, shattering the morale of 
an Italian army just then rejoicing over small successes 
near Trient. French observers with the Italians, 
expecting a temporary French stewardship over Venetia 
before the Italians took possession, were furious that 
the archduke's men were deploying on "their" 
railroads.117 Albrecht's performance in Italy and the 
crushing victory of the imperial fleet at Lissa saved the 
Monarchy's position as a great power; the unitary 
structure created in 1849 could not be saved.
The failure of the Silvesterpatent of 1861 had been 
manifest in Hungary from the outset, and in 1863 the 
Czechs and Poles had withdrawn from the Reichsrat as 
well. As early as the winter of 1863 groups of Hungarian 
conservatives had presented the emperor with petitions 
calling for "dualism in equality" under which an
indivisible Monarchy would support two parliaments and a 
joint ministry for war and foreign affairs. The ideas 
were Count Gyorgy Apponyi's, and if they failed to 
impress the imperial cabinet, they did impress Ferenc 
Deak, leader of the moderates in the Hungarian Diet, who 
appropriated them for his own.118 Deak's luck, which 
had saved him from Haynau's courts-martial and from 
political obscurity, gave him credit for the ideas behind 
the Ausgleich, the future Compromise of 1867 between 
Hungary and dynasty. As opinion in Hungary turned 
against the exiles of '48 after Kossuth proposed that 
Hungary be joined to Serbia, Croatia, and the 
Principalities in a Balkan federation,119 Deak's voice 
became the dominant one on the Hungarian scene. By the 
beginning of 1866 the police reported to the interior 
ministry in Vienna that the magnates of Hungary were of 
no consequence; no voice other than Deak's counted.120 
Certainly by December 1864 the emperor, at the urging of 
Albrecht, whose tactical eye was always acute, was 
secretly in touch with Deak.121 In April 1865 Deak 
published an unsigned "Easter Article" in his party's 
paper. German translations appeared almost simul­
taneously. No one on either side of the Leitha, the 
little river which served as the nominal boundary between 
Hungary and the Austrian lands, doubted that the article
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was Deak's; few people knew that the Imperial court had 
had advance knowledge of its contents.122
Deak's proposals, generally known as the May 
Program, were a decided retreat from the long-held 
Hungarian insistence on a return to the constitutional 
structure of April 1848. "We stand ready," Deak wrote, 
"to concert our laws with the continued existence of the 
empire."123 A constitutional Hungary would admit that 
it shared a common ruler and army with a constitutional 
Austria and could accept the fiscal machinery needed to 
fund a common defense and foreign policy. The proposals 
produced immediate imperial responses. At the end of 
April the emperor arrived at Pressburg without his usual 
military escort to present gifts to the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences. On 6 June he appeared without notice in 
Budapest to announce the suspension of the military 
courts that had governed since the uproar of October 
1860. On 20 September 1865 the Silvesterpatent was 
suspended pending full conciliation with Hungary, and 
elections for a new Diet were set for November. On 14 
December Franz Joseph opened the new Hungarian Diet; the 
sole item on the agenda was the "revision," by which the 
Magyars meant the re-enactment, of the constitution of 
April 1848.
Deak and his followers, firmly in control of the 
Diet, elected a committee of sixty-seven to conduct 
negotiations. The committee in turn elected a select 
committee of fifteen, headed by Deak and his deputy and 
heir-apparent, Count Gyula Andrassy, to act as its 
executive body. The Deak team was completely in control: 
Andrassy chaired both committees and Deak's draft 
proposals met no challenges. The committee of fifteen 
pressed on with its work despite the Diet recess 
proclaimed at the outbreak of war. Deak's famous 
moderation— his celebrated remark to the emperor that 
Hungary asked for nothing more after Koniggratz than 
before— was a desire to present the Austrians with a fait 
accompli. Win or lose in Bohemia (and Deak was unsure 
which would be better for Hungary124) the Hungarian 
position would be clear. The committee's draft was 
published the same day, 25 June 1866, as the announcement 
of Albrecht's triumph in Italy.
Deak and Andrassy had succeeded in controlling 
events thus far; it was only on the question of the 
future of the army that their hold was not secure. It 
was obvious that the dynasty regarded the army as its 
ultimate guarantor, a point continually reiterated by 
Albrecht, and the Hungarians found it self-evident that 
Hungary could not truly be a nation without an army of
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its own. Demands for a separate Hungarian army went back 
at least to the beginning of the century, and the Diet of 
1839 had called for a force officered by Hungarians and 
commanded in Magyar.125 A minority of Deak's committee 
of fifteen, led by Kalman Tisza, insisted that in the 
aftermath of KoniggrStz the moment had come to create an 
Hungarian army. The Pragmatic Sanction, Tisza claimed, 
required that Hungary and the Austrian lands have only a 
common defense and not a common army.126 Deak and 
Andrassy, with greater realism, argued that the imperial 
authorities would never accept a division of the army; 
such a demand would be an open provocation. If the 
Committee made such a demand, Deak warned, they would 
bring ruin to both themselves and the nation.127 There 
was no way around the right of the monarch to an army 
with a unified leadership, and Deak had no desire to test 
the limits of imperial patience. The majority of the 
committee of fifteen voted to wait on the army issue 
pending the outcome of the political settlement.128
The decision to wait did not mean that Deak and 
Andrassy had decided to make any concessions to Vienna.
In late July Deak informed the emperor that, while 
Koniggratz had not changed his demands, neither would he 
support a second recruit levy in Hungary for the 
continuance of the war.129 The introduction of
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universal service in December found no support in 
Hungary, and Andrassy made violent statements against 
such a "violation" of the "rights of the nation."
Imperial circles knew their limits as well: conscription 
had been an attempt to circumvent Hungarian demands, and 
shortly after the turn of the year it was quietly 
suspended.130
Deak was willing to admit that a unified army was 
the only practical form of military organization in the 
modern world and that a concrete division of the army 
would have a "crippling influence" on any effective 
command in wartime. The imperial government issued a 
royal rescript on 17 November 1866 reaffirming the unity 
of the army and the imperial prerogatives of command, but 
indicating a willingness to compromise over recruitment 
and supply.131 On 9 January 1867 the committee of 
fifteen assembled under Count Ferdinand Beust, the Saxon 
exile now serving as Franz Joseph's foreign minister, to 
present its final report. The final version accepted a 
traditional reading of the Pragmatic Sanction. The 
monarch would have exclusive rights of command over the 
army; the Hungarian parliament would be responsible for 
conscription, quartering, and supply within the borders 
of the Kingdom of Hungary.
I
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Thus far control of the army was restored to the 
status of 1722/23. Article 12 of the finished Ausgleich 
document reserved to the Diet control over recruiting, 
length of service, quartering, and supply. The Consilium 
Locumentale Hungaricum had had as much authority in the 
eighteenth century. Article 13 gave the Hungarian 
ministry veto power over any basic structural alteration 
in the military system that would affect Hungary, thus 
giving the Hungarians power to block any real change in 
the role of the army or its place in the Monarchy.1” 
Article 11 of the Ausgleich expressed the committee of 
fifteen's compromise; its language was sufficiently 
obscure to give hope to those who still wished for a 
Hungarian army:
In accordance with the constitutional sovereign 
rights of His Majesty in regard to the area of 
military affairs, all matters relating to the 
unified leadership, command, and internal 
organization of the army as a whole, and thus also 
of the Hungarian Army as an integral part of the 
common army, are recognized as being reserved to His 
Majesty.133
The acceptance of the report was followed on 18 
February by the appointment of an autonomous ministry in 
Hungary. Two days later the high command spoke out. On 
20 February 1867 the Archduke Albrecht issued an order of 
the day acknowledging the existence of a Hungarian war 
ministry, but insisting that the army was still a unified
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force and inveighing against any expression of 
separatism.134 The language of Article 11--"Befehligung 
und innere Organisation des ganzen Heeres und so aucJi des 
ungarischen Heeres, als integrierenden Teiles des 
gesamten Heeres"— was vague enough to mean anything from 
Hungarian regiments within the army to national guard 
units to regiments of a wholly autonomous force, and 
Albrecht understood enough about Hungarian aspirations to 
realize that such language would be an opening wedge in a 
campaign to divide the army. Over the next two years 
Albrecht devoted himself to arguing at court against any 
concessions to the Hungarians, and he finally took a step 
unheard of for an archduke, publishing a nominally- 
anonymous pamphlet entitled Wie soil Oesterreichs Heer 
Organisiert sein? (How Should Austria's Army Be 
Organized?)135 in which he violently attacked the 
Hungarian leadership for undermining the unified spirit 
of the army.
The Hungarian radicals were quick to use Albrecht's 
opposition to attack Deak and Andrassy for their failure 
to restore a national army. No Hungarian politician 
could afford to seem too accomodating toward Vienna, and 
any concrete work on reform, and restoration of full 
recruiting, stalled. By autumn patience was wearing thin 
in both capitals; another serious confrontation seemed
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±0101106111:. In November -the emperor intervened personally. 
Colonel Friedrich Beck of the imperial oiilltary 
chancellery was sent to deal with Andrassy, and the 
leading generals of the Monarchy were assembled and 
ordered to map out a plan for army reform that would 
maintain the unity of the army without violating the new 
constitutional structure. The emperor was a man of 
limited range, but he was rigidly consistent once 
committed. He had accepted Dualism; he was now 
determined to have both the Ausgleich and a unified 
army.134
Andrassy was under sharp pressure to extract 
concessions from Vienna. Yet Beck, beginning a brilliant 
career as the emperor's confidant, was able to present a 
compelling case. A national Hungarian army would have 
its own Slav and Romanian regiments, and the anger of 
even Palacky's Austro-Slavs over the Ausgleich opened the 
way to demands for Slavic armies within the Monarchy. In 
any case— how long could Hungary stand aloqe? The 
spectre of Russian armies and Slavic insurrections 
hovered over any vision of a separate Hungary.137 
Andrassy was willing to yield on the question of using 
German as the language of service (Dienstsprache) for the 
joint army and went on to promise that he would not press 
for the dissolution of the Border, a zone that the
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Hungarians saw as both infected with Slav nationalism and 
a potential base for intervention in Hungary. He could 
not forego the creation of some kind of Hungarian force, 
and he proposed that under a joint, imperial-royal 
(Kaiserlich-k&niglich— k. -k.) regular army there would 
exist "national" forces— an Austrian Landwehr and an 
Hungarian Honvedseg— controlled by the two ministries. 
Beck reported to his master that Andrassy's position, 
given the state of affairs in Budapest, was reasonable 
and perhaps even courageous.138 Beck did, however, see 
the national guards as a militia on a Tirol model: men 
over thirty already done with reserve service, used for 
internal security duties, and likely to see action only 
as auxiliaries in times of emergency.139 Andrassy's own 
view was obscure, but the Diet was unlikely to accept so 
minor a role for a revived Honvdd.
Albrecht was less easily convinced than Colonel 
Beck. A restored Honved would only glorify the traitors 
of 1848/49, and it would give unreliable elements and 
potential rebels access to training and weapons. More to 
the point, local politicians would feel free to lavish 
funds on the national guards in the name of national 
pride and patronage while stinting the real army, the 
joint imperial forces.140 The generals, convened in 
conference in late February 1868, were in a dangerously
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restive mood. FML Karl Moering argued that the moment 
had come to force a break with Hungary; FML Count Bigot 
de St. Quentin argued that the army, as final guarantor 
of the Monarchy and the dynasty, must act to preserve the 
emperor's role, even against the emperor's wishes.141 
Nonetheless, habits of obedience were deeply ingrained, 
and Cromwell's disease had never infected the Monarchy.
On 23 March the army command reported their acceptance of 
Andrassy's proposals.
The Hungarians' appetite only grew with eating, and 
throughout the balance of the year they made additional 
demands. Affairs had now come down to matters made all 
the more virulent for their symbolic nature. The 
Hungarians sought to re-create the HonvSd of 1849 in 
matters of uniform and organization; Albrecht and the 
military would not countenance serving soldiers wearing 
the costume of traitors. Only in early June, again 
through the efforts of Colonel Beck, was a settlement 
reached. HonvGd organization and uniform would follow 
k.-k. patterns, but its units would be allowed 
distinctive flashes, buttons, and banners. Magyar would 
be the language of command, and soldiers of the HonvSd 
would swear an oath to both king and constitution. By 
mid-June the emperor was able to write Andrassy and
120
congratulate him on his willingness to join in solving 
the army question.
A final issue remained. The Honvdd of course 
contained hussars to support its infantry, but it had not 
been given artillery. The imperial command had followed 
the example of the British after the Sepoy Mutiny: the 
Indian Army, for all its excellent qualities, was not 
allowed artillery. The Hungarians saw the HonvSd as 
their national army, and the opposition in the Diet 
attacked Andrassy for allowing the Honvdd to be treated 
as a second-rate force over the question of artillery.
Yet there would be no concessions here. The imperial 
command was absolutely unwilling to concede cannon to the 
Hungarians. In August 1868 Albrecht took time during a 
tour of Croatia to pray at Jellacic's grave and reiterate 
his views on unity and rebellion. The emperor and his 
high command remained firm: under no circumstances would 
the HonvSd be given artillery.142 Andrassy backed down, 
placating his vocal opposition with a pledge to strive in 
the future for an increased role for the HonvSd.143 
Those Hungarians who sought heavy weapons for their army 
had to content themselves with the twenty batteries of 
gatling guns the Diet provided its army. The gatling 
guns were the subject of a heated debate in military 
circles that finally reached the emperor, who declared
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them to be infantry weapons and not artillery. The 
victory was more than a little hollow. The guns proved 
unreliable and unwieldy, and by the mid-1870s they had 
been withdrawn from service. The Honvdd would have to 
wait another forty years before it had a second chance at 
artillery.
On 5 December 1868 an imperial order of the day 
announced the arrival of the new state of affairs:
Today a new formation, the Landwehr (Honvedseg) 
joins the army as a valuable addition to the common 
defense...[This formation] serves the same end as 
the Army...and I expect that all officers...and the 
generals in particular will do their utmost to 
strengthen the bonds between all the units of My 
Army and that they will strengthen the spirit of 
discipline and order and combat any divisive and 
dangerous influences from the outset.144
Beck had drafted the order with an eye to both Albrecht 
and Budapest. The HonvSd was accepted into the army, but 
it was an "addition" to the defenses of the Monarchy and 
not a separate force. Nominal command was given to the 
Archduke Joseph, one of the members of the dynasty least 
objectionable to the Hungarians, but actual control 
rested with the defense ministry in Budapest. The other 
peoples of the Monarchy, and the Slav subjects of Hungary 
in particular, saw the new arrangement as a threat: the 
Magyar lords now possessed an army. The fathers of
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Dualism, warned the Czech writer Frantisek Palacky, would 
end by being the godfathers of Pan-Slavism "in its least 
desirable form."145
The arrangements negotiated by Beck and Andrassy led 
to a resumption of conscription and the extension of 
universal service. Subjects of the Monarchy were liable 
for twelve years of service, although the annual intake 
was limited by law to 95,000 men— 55,000 from the 
Austrian lands and 40,000 from Hungary. Yet the Monarchy 
lacked the funds to absorb and train so many conscripts 
as first-line troops, and the intake was broken down by 
lot. The unlucky were sent to do three years' service 
with the joint army, then seven years with the reserves, 
and finally two years with either the Landwehr or the 
Honvdd. A middle group did two years on cadre duty with 
the Landwehr or Honvdd, and a lucky third group went 
straight into an Ersatz-Reserve where they would receive 
training only in time of war. The joint army's active 
forces numbered 255,000 in peacetime; wartime strength, 
excluding the Grenzer regiments but including the 
Landwehr and the Honvdd, stood at 800,000— half a million 
men fewer than France, six hundred thousand fewer than 
Russia.146
Dualism and universal service were not popular 
everywhere. The mountain population of Cattaro on the
Dalmatian littoral had traditionally been exempt from 
conscription, and the loss of that exemption provoked a 
revolt in 1869. A badly-managed punitive expedition of 
eighteen battalions found itself unable to cope with 
mountain warfare, and in 1870 conscription was 
temporarily suspended throughout the Krivosije. The 
Czechs were furious that the Magyars had achieved 
autonomy and an army, and nationalist riots and refusals 
to take the military oath took place across Bohemia. The 
military, however, had long known how to subdue unruly 
Czechs. Prague was under martial law from November 1868 
to April 1869, and six battalions of infantry and a 
squadron of cavalry were brought in to overawe the 
Czechs.147
Albrecht had worried from the beginning that Dualism 
would give the two parliaments an excuse to starve the 
army, and in fact the army budget fell from eighty-five 
million florins in 1868 to seventy-five million in 1869. 
The war scare of 1870 brought it up to eighty million 
again, but thereafter, and especially in the depression 
years after 1873, the army found its budget slashed. On 
a percentage basis, the Monarchy spent less on its army 
than any other major power, the same was not true of the 
Hungarian Diet. While the Austrian Landwehr remained a 
cadre force, the HonvSd, which was training almost twice
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as many men, was a favored child. In its first years the 
Honvdd was getting nine million florins a year.
Depression cut the figures to seven million for 1874-76, 
but after 1877 the Honvdd budget soared past the nine 
million level again.148
The organizational capabilities of the Honvdd grew 
apace. By 1870 Honvdd units were participating in joint 
army maneuvers, and after 1873 the Honvdd possessed its 
own divisional and territorial commands. The credit went 
to Baron Fejervary, late of the emperor's military 
chancellery. Archduke Joseph was titular commander of 
the Honvdd, but actual control lay with Bela Szende, the 
longtime Hungarian war minister. In 1872 Fejervary had 
been promoted to Generalmajor and transferred from 
command of the 72. (Fressburg) Infantry to Budapest, 
where he was named Szende's military secretary.149 
Fejervary rapidly and effectively integrated ninety-two 
battalions of Honvdd infantry and forty squadrons of 
cavalry into twenty-eight infantry regiments and ten 
regiments of hussars drawn from seven military districts 
which, unlike those of the Landwehr, were not congruent 
with joint-army corps areas. In 1873 Fejervary was 
responsible for just under 160,000 men; by 1876 he could 
report that 200,000 men were combat-ready and deployed in 
brigade and divisional frameworks. Their training was up
to k.-k. standards, and done from Magyar and Croat 
manuals Fejervary had had translated.180 Five years 
later the imperial command concluded that, in sharp 
contrast to the Landwehr, the Honvdd was a highly-capable 
force181, lacking only artillery to be as good as any 
k,-k. troops. The irony here was that Fejervary was an 
imperial loyalist to the core. His appointment had 
provoked sharp attacks in the Hungarian Diet, where some 
deputies took note of his loyalty to the dynasty and 
declared him unfit to command a Honvdd which represented 
the Hungarian spirit and nation.182 The emperor had 
accepted Dualism and intended to support it; Fejervary's 
own attitude was the same. The loyalist technician 
presided over the creation of a Hungarian national force.
The Habsburgs had long devoted themselves to the 
special skill of conservatives: salvaging what could be 
salvaged from the corrosion of change. Albrecht had been 
gifted with a full measure of his family's talent, and, 
although he had not been able to block the formation of 
the Honvdd, he was able to hold the line around the joint 
army. Allmayer-Beck claimed that after 1867 the army was 
a pawn in factional and national maneuverings— an object, 
not an actor.183 Albrecht's achievement was to keep the 
outside world beyond the doors of the officers' mess.
The archduke's deepest belief was that the officers must
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be kaiBertreu alone— that in the end only the loyalty of 
the imperial officers held the Monarchy together.
Albrecht devoted himself to championing the alt- 
osterrelchisch virtues in the army. There were, though, 
far too few regular officers and NCOs. Even with the 
introduction of reserve commissions for men of education 
who volunteered for a year of training, the ranks of the 
Monarchy's defenders were thin indeed. At the end of the 
1870s there were only 12,055 regular and 5143 reserve 
officers on the army list.154 The einjahrige provided 
some relief, but also, as the story of the army after 
August-September 1914 showed, brought the world of 
partisan politics and partisan nationalism one step 
closer to the army. The post-1867 army saw itself as the 
emperor's army. Yet it found itself increasingly 
beleaguered. The Hungarians had achieved home rule and 
were building their own army; the Czechs would demand the 
same. The army was now subject to the whims of parlia­
mentary control; its foreign horizons dimmed year by 
year. The army had now to deal with the nationalities as 
well as render service to the dynasty. Yet it still had 
its strengths; the measure of its vitality is that it was 
able in the latter half of the 1870s to support one more 
wave of reforms.
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CHAPTER 3
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES:
RUSSIAN THREAT, TERRITORIAL REFORM
On 30 July 1878 four divisions of the Austrian army 
advanced out of Croatia and southern Dalmatia and entered 
the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
imperial-royal forces, numbering some 72,000 men, had been 
sent to occupy the two provinces under the just-concluded 
terms of the Treaty of Berlin. In early summer, Count 
Gyula Andrassy, now the Monarchy's foreign minister, had 
proclaimed that the whole operation could be carried out 
by a couple of squadrons of hussars and a regimental 
band.1 His remark was one of those unfortunate statements 
that return with depressing regularity to haunt bellicose 
politicians. The initial force of four divisions proved 
woefully inadequate, and five additional divisions plus 
various specialist units had to be sent as reinforcements. 
In the two-and-a-half months before the occupation of the 
two provinces was officially declared to be complete {19 
October 1878), nearly a quarter of a million of the 
Monarchy's soldiers had been mobilized for service in 
Bosnia. In early October 1878 imperial-royal forces in 
the field numbered 159,000 men; total Austrian casualties 
for the campaign came to 5198 men killed, wounded, and 
missing.2
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The campaign in Bosnia and the Herzegovina was the 
first war of the Dualist age, and the Monarchy had 
mobilized nearly a third of its wartime strength. The 
imperial-royal forces faced opponents of all kinds, from 
battalions of Turkish regulars to bands of native 
partisans, whose total strength was estimated at 93,000 - 
95,000.3 The Bosnian terrain was inhospitable and the 
local population largely hostile. Yet the imperial-royal 
forces performed quite creditably. Indeed, as Gunther 
Rothenberg pointed out, the Austrian performance in 1878 
compares favorably with that of the German army in the 
same countryside in the 1940s.4 The occupation campaign 
was the Monarchy's major military effort in the half- 
century between the Ausgleich and the First World War, and 
for the Monarchy's military leadership it ended twenty 
years of military humiliation. The successful occupation 
of Bosnia in the face of determined opposition helped 
erase the memory of those disasters, of defeat in the 
field in Lombardy and Moravia, of the fiasco over the 
introduction of conscription in the Krisvosije in 1869.
The post-Ausgleich army had fought and won its first 
battles. Yet the Monarchy's Balkan entanglements meant a 
continuing threat of hostilities with Russia. Throughout 
the 1880s the army had not only to face the political 
consequences of the Ausgleich and growing nationalist
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sentiment at home but to plan for a major war in Galicia 
against an enemy vastly superior in numbers.
Relations between Russia and the Monarchy had been 
strained since the Crimean War. The Monarchy might have 
been expected to repay Russian aid in Hungary in 1849 with 
military support, but the Monarchy had instead declared 
its armed neutrality and temporarily occupied the Danubian 
Principalities. The decay of Ottoman power in the Balkans 
highlighted the potential for conflict between the two 
states. The Monarchy preferred that the Turks remain in 
control of their European possessions, but should Turkish 
rule collapse, its diplomats feared either a Russian 
policy of outright territorial expansion or the creation 
of independent Balkan states under Russian protection and 
control, states which would also exert a destabilizing 
influence on the Monarchy's South Slav populations.5
Yet hostility had not yet seemed inevitable at the 
end of the 1860s. Russian foreign policy under Prince 
Alexander Gorchakov had sought in many ways to accomodate 
the Monarchy. Early in 1867 Gorchakov approached Count 
Revertera, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, with 
the offer of an agreement that would give the Russians the 
right to occupy Ottoman-ruled Bessarabia in exchange for 
Austrian control of either Albania or the Herzegovina.6 
The idea of coordinating the Balkan policies of the two 
states found a ready audience among the military circle
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around Archduke Albrecht, where this was seen as a gesture 
of amity that might lead to an alliance directed against 
Prussia.
The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War put a halt 
to any entente between Russia and the Monarchy. On 31 
October 1870 the Russians, taking advantage of Prussian 
involvement in France, announced their decision to 
remilitarize the Black Sea, closed to Russian warships 
since 1856. Fifteen years after their humiliation in the 
Crimean War, the Russians had contrived to return to the 
Balkan scene with a unilateral flourish. There was an 
immediate flurry of panicky talk in both Vienna and 
Budapest. Some Hungarian circles, led by Count Gyula 
Andrassy, argued for immediate military action against the 
Russians.7 Franz Baron Kuhn, the Monarchy's war minister, 
saw the Russian actions in the Black Sea as a prelude to a 
Russian march into the Balkans and sought unsuccessfully 
to convince the emperor to order an immediate attack into 
Russian Poland to seize Warsaw.8 Even Albrecht, a 
proponent of a Russian alliance, was worried enough by the 
Russians' unilateral action to order staff studies done 
for a war against Russia.9
Albrecht was nonetheless unwilling to give his 
support to Kuhn's and Andrassy's desire for a 
confrontation with the Russians. He remained convinced 
that a Russian alliance was both possible and desirable,
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and as late as 1875 he would visit St. Petersburg in an 
attempt to interest the Russians in an alliance directed 
against the Germans.10 Albrecht's position was seen as a 
personal affront by Andrassy, who had been named foreign 
minister in the autumn of 1871, and early in 1872 Andrassy 
had begun to complain to the emperor that Albrecht was 
attempting to make foreign policy on his own. Albrecht 
and his supporters responded by pointing out that, with 
its huge and restive Slav population, the Monarchy needed 
the friendship of the Russians and that Andrassy's 
policies were based on Magyar bitterness over Russian 
intervention in Hungary in 1849 and not on any concern for 
the interests of the Monarchy.11
Beyond any considerations of foreign policy, much of 
the military leadership believed that the Monarchy's army 
was completely unready for war with the Russians. There 
had been doubts about the army's readiness for war in the 
summer of 1870, and, after the decision had been made to 
remain neutral in the Franco-Prussian War, Franz Joseph 
had ordered a special investigation into the combat­
readiness of the army. The problem, the report indicated, 
was not manpower. In six weeks the Monarchy could have 
put 600,000 men into the field. The problem, as in 1859 
and 1866, was logistics. The imperial-royal forces would 
have been hard-put to feed, clothe, and provide transport 
for themselves. Albrecht, attacking the unwillingness of
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the Reichsrat to fund the army, claimed that any reserve 
units mobilized in 1870 would have been untrained and 
without arms.12 Despite the eagerness of Andrassy and 
Kuhn for a confrontation with the Russians, Albrecht 
contended that the army could not fight a major war.
Albrecht's views, published as an anonymous pamphlet 
on "Das Jahr 1870 und die Wehrkraft der Monarchie” in the 
late autumn of 1870, were of course politically motivated. 
The archduke attacked the Hungarians and the German 
Liberals of the Reichsrat for allowing the combat­
readiness of the army to decay, and he was wholly opposed 
to Hungarian desires for a war with Russia. Yet, despite 
his position that the army was unready for a major war, he 
was more than willing to mobilize against Bismarck's 
Prussia. Albrecht's desire to fight a war of revenge in
Germany did not wane until late in the 1870s, though his
views, especially after the appointment of Andrassy as 
foreign minister, represented an ever-smaller minority 
among the emperor's advisors.13 The archduke did not wish 
to give up his cherished vision of Austro-Russian forces
driving to the gates of Berlin, of the black-and-yellow
standards of the Monarchy going up over the ruins of 
Potsdam. Nonetheless, Albrecht was well aware that the 
army had its own Balkan policy, one which, while differing 
sharply from the official foreign policy of Andrassy and
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the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz, was likely to lead to 
conflict with Russia.
The army's interest in the Balkans had initially 
centered on the problem of defending the Kiistenland, the 
Monarchy's long, narrow strip of littoral that ran down 
the eastern shore of the Adriatic from Istria through 
Dalmatia. The terrain was mountainous and desolate, and 
much of the population had little use for any governmental 
authority. There were few roads, and the Kiistenland 
lacked any strategic depth. As long ago as the mid-1850s 
the aged Radetzky had argued that the Monarchy would need 
Bosnia to make Dalmatia secure— a point of view that Baron 
Beck, the head of the emperor's military chancellery, had 
been arguing since the mid-1860s. The loss of Venice in 
1866 had left Trieste and Fiume as the Monarchy's only 
seaports, making the acquisition of a defensive hinterland 
for the Kiistenland imperative.14
The military were well aware of the decay of Ottoman 
power in the Balkans. The last Turkish garrisons had left 
Serbia in the early 1860s, and local revolt had become 
endemic throughout the western Balkans. By the beginning 
of the 1870s the collapse of Turkish authority seemed all 
too likely. During his tenure as Hungarian premier, 
Andrassy had argued that the Monarchy should work for the 
cession of Bosnia to Serbia, a move that would separate a 
grateful Serbia from Russian influence.15 The military,
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more concerned than Andrassy with defending the Dalmatian 
provinces, was unwilling to see an enlarged Serbia, since 
it would serve as a focus for South Slav nationalism. By 
extending the Monarchy's sway inland the military hoped to 
channel Slav nationalism into acceptably pro-Austrian 
sentiments.
Throughout the Ausgleich negotiations Albrecht had 
supported the creation of an autonomous South Slav 
province based on the lands of the Military Border/6 and 
in reaction Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership had 
feared that the military's interest in the South Slavs was 
part of a plan to use the Grenzers of the Border and the 
Slav populations of Turkish Croatia to put political and 
military pressure on Hungary.17 The Magyar leadership had 
refused to ratify the military budget in 1869 unless the 
Military Border was dissolved/8 but even after the 
incorporation of the Border into civil Croatia in 1871 
Andrassy and his fellow Magyar lords believed that the 
army, led by Albrecht, was carrying out its own policy in 
the Balkans in an effort to use the South Slavs against 
Hungary.
Andrassy and the Hungarian leadership wanted no more 
Slavs in the Monarchy, no increase in the Monarchy's 
Slavic population that might upset the political balance 
of Dualism. Andrassy's preference as foreign minister was 
to support continued Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The
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policies of Feldzeugmeiater Baron Franz Rodich, the 
governor of Dalmatia, were designed to undermine Turkish 
authority in Bosnia. Rodich, acting with the support of 
Beck and Albrecht, devoted himself to establishing contact 
with Croatian nationalists in Bosnia and offering 
financial support and protection to Catholic missionaries 
preaching pro-Habsburg doctrines among the Croats across 
the Turkish border.19 When Beck persuaded the emperor to 
tour Dalmatia in the spring of 1875, Rodich arranged to 
have Franz Joseph greeted by hand-picked deputations of 
both locals and Bosnian refugees who petitioned for 
Austrian protection. Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton 
Mollinary, the imperial-royal corps commander in Zagreb, 
was convinced that Rodich was actively encouraging revolt 
in Bosnia.20 The Monarchy's military leadership had 
serious reservations about a direct conflict with Russia, 
but it was prepared to carry on an active policy of 
destabilization in the Balkans despite the risk of Russian 
involvement that an Ottoman collapse would bring.
Andrassy's own position in the mid-1870s was 
considerably less confrontational than it had been during 
the Black Sea crisis. He had been unable to interest the 
British in cooperating with the Monarchy against the 
Russians,21 and by 1873 he had yielded to Bismarck's 
pressure for a rapprochment with Russia. Andrassy saw 
Germany as both the Monarchy's natural ally and as
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supporter of Hungary's special position within the 
Monarchy, and, despite his personal misgivings,22 he had 
joined Bismarck in agreeing to a show of amity in the 
Dreikaiserbund of 1873. the Dreikaiserbund itself 
provided for little more than consultations among the 
three signatories in the event of threats to the peace, 
but it had created a channel for Austro-Russian 
discussions on the future of the Balkans. When rebellion 
erupted in the Herzegovina in the summer of 1875, both 
Andrassy and Gorchakov sought to localize its effects and 
induce the Ottoman authorities to reform their 
administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The revolt itself was the product of local 
conditions, not foreign intrigues. There had been 
widespread crop failure in 1874, and the Turkish 
authorities in the Herzegovina had called in troops to 
collect delinquent taxes, provoking an uprising that 
spread across both provinces.23 Andrassy's policy of 
maintaining Ottoman authority was rapidly overtaken by 
events as the Turks were unable to put down the revolt.
Nor was the Dalmatian military command disposed to help 
the situation. Andrassy had secured imperial 
authorization for the Turks to use the Monarchy's Adriatic 
ports to move both troops and supplies into Bosnia, but 
all through the summer of 1875 Rodich was allowing 
chartered steamers to put in at Cattaro and unload
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shipments of rifles and ammunition for the rebels across 
the border.24 Andrassy complained to the emperor about 
"this enterprise of the military" and attempted to have 
all imperial-royal units made up of South Slav soldiers 
transferred out of Dalmatia.25 Nonetheless Rodich, well 
aware that Andrassy would not consider any direct Austrian 
intervention so long as the Turks had any control over the 
situation,26 continued to aid the rebels. Supported by 
Beck and Albrecht, he allowed the rebels to use his 
territory as a haven safe from Turkish pursuit and 
established caches of arms and supplies for the 
Bosnians.27
The success of the Bosnian rebels, and the uprisings 
that broke out in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876, made the 
collapse of Turkish authority seem ominously near. The 
governments of Serbia and Montenegro, prompted by domestic 
pressures, began to move toward war with the Turks.
Belgrade and Cetinje seemed, much to the disquiet of the 
Monarchy's diplomats and soldiers, to be filled with pan- 
Slav journalists, streams of Russian envoys, and 
representatives of Russian "relief organizations" who were 
busily dispensing funds to the Bosnian rebels.28 More 
disturbing still was the* arrival in Belgrade of Russian 
volunteers and adventurers, many of them army officers, 
for service with the Serbian army against the Turks. By 
the beginning of summer it was clear that the Serbs and
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Montenegrins were about to go to war with the Turks, and 
Gorchakov and Andrassy met to confer on Balkan policy. In 
July 1876, just after Serbia and Montenegro declared war 
on the Turks, the two foreign ministers met at Reichstadt 
and reached agreement. In the event of a Turkish defeat—  
something both men expected— the Monarchy would occupy 
parts of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Russia would obtain 
Bessarabia and Batum on the Black Sea. In any case, 
neither party would intervene directly in the fighting.
The agreements— the Reichstadt Accords— were primarily 
verbal and quite vague; neither minister had a clear 
understanding of exactly how much of Bosnia and the 
Herzegovina had been promised to the Monarchy.
Nonetheless, both states were now deeply involved in the 
fate of European Turkey; neither could permit the other to 
be the sole beneficiary of an Ottoman collapse.29
The Serbian and Montenegrin armies had been expected 
to win an easy victory over the Turks. By September 1876, 
though, the Ottoman forces had managed to inflict a series 
of sharp defeats on the Serbs, forcing them to ask for an 
armistice guaranteed by the European powers.30 There 
suddenly existed the possibility that the Turks, already 
victorious over the rebellion in Bulgaria, might be able 
to reassert full control over Serbia and Montenegro. The 
Russians were unwilling to tolerate the loss of prestige 
involved in having two states which had been the object of
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much diplomatic and financial patronage crushed, and they 
were equally unwilling to give up their promised 
territorial gains. By the end of 1876 they were preparing 
for a war with the Turks. Bolstered by further agreements 
with the Monarchy in January and March 1877 over the 
disposition of Bessarabia and Bosnia, the Russians 
declared war on 24 April 1877.
By early summer the Russian armies were on the 
Danube. Yet at the Ballhausplatz suspicion was growing 
that the Russians were likely to ignore their agreements 
with the Monarchy and impose a victor's peace. At the end 
of July 1877 Andrassy, though sharply opposed by Albrecht 
and Beck, was arguing in favor of using the army to 
threaten Russian supply lines in Romania.31 He was 
willing to accept the military's view that a Russian war 
would be long and bitter and would in all likelihood end 
in the destruction of at least one combatant,33 yet for 
the four months that the Russian armies were stalled 
before the Turkish citadel of Plevna, Andrassy continued 
to urge the military to support at least the threat of 
action against Russia.
On 15 January 1878 Franz Joseph presided over a 
ministerial council with Beck and Albrecht in attendance. 
The Russians had taken Sofia on 4 January and were moving 
across Rumelia toward the western approaches to 
Constantinople. Russian peace terms, first announced in
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December, included the creation of a large Bulgarian 
client state and contained no mention of the cession of 
Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the Monarchy. Andrassy was 
convinced that war was at hand and he wanted only 
technical advice from the military.33
The military offered Andrassy two plans, offensives 
launched from either Transylvania or Galicia. The plans 
did not derive from the study prepared by Albrecht during 
the Black Sea crisis of 1870, but from staff exercises 
done in 1874 for Feldzeugmeister Baron Franz John, the 
chief of the general staff.34 Albrecht and Feldmarachal- 
leutnant Baron Anton Schonfeld, the new chief of the 
general staff, supported the idea of an offensive from 
Galicia or the Bukovina as the more technically sound of 
the two options, but their advice came hedged with 
warnings: the Monarchy could not support a long war, and a 
second front was likely to erupt if the Italians scented 
blood. Furthermore, a war against Russia would leave the 
Monarchy vulnerable to any demands Germany, as a potential 
partner for either side, might choose to make. A 
protracted war would also lead to domestic difficulties, 
to unrest among the Monarchy's Czech and South Slav 
subjects.33 Albrecht's position was supported by Count 
Bylandt-Rheidt, war minister since 1876, who argued that 
mobilization alone would cost 310 million florins for the
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first ninety days. The Monarchy could not afford that, 
let alone bear the costs of a major war.36
Andrassy continued to press for action throughout 
February, but on 24 February he was informed by the 
emperor that there would be no mobilization. The Monarchy 
would accept the German call for a conference on the 
Balkans at Berlin. Andrassy was authorized to Beek 
parliamentary approval for sixty million florins for 
"special military requirements," a euphemism for the costs 
of occupying Bosnia and the Herzegovina, but there would 
be no war. Franz Joseph was prepared to enforce the 
Monarchy's claim to Bosnia, but not to risk a major war. 
The Congress of Berlin fulfilled the Monarchy's hopes.
The Russians were forced to abandon their designs for a 
greater Bulgaria powerful enough to dominate the Balkans, 
and on 13 July 1878 the Monarchy, supported by both 
Bismarck and Britain, received a European mandate for the 
occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
The army was able to complete the occupation of the 
two provinces in just over ten weeks. However, any 
satisfaction over the actual occupation was short-lived. 
The flow of Russian aid to Serbia and Montenegro in 1875- 
76 and the Russian designs reflected in their demands on 
the Turks at the end of 1877— a greater Bulgaria 
garrisoned by Russian troops, Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
under Ottoman control, Serbia and Montenegro given a
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common border— had given the military a disheartening 
vision of the future. Despite Bismarck's efforts to link 
Russia and the Monarchy with Germany in at least nominal 
friendship and despite Albrecht's desire for a Russian 
alliance, the army was now aware that its next major 
opponent would in all likelihood be Russia, and the army 
was far from convinced that it could sustain a war with a 
major power.
Discussion of the imperial-royal forces' combat­
readiness had begun as long ago as the late summer of 
1870, in the aftermath of the Monarchy's decision not to 
intervene in the Franco-Prussian war. The weaknesses in 
the army's supply and transport systems and the unreadi­
ness of the reserves discovered by the investigating 
committee established to look into the state of the army 
had served as a basis for Albrecht's polemics against the 
unwillingness of the Reichsrat to support the army, and 
those discoveries had led to the establishment of a 
special commission on mobilization for various wartime 
scenarios.37 The commission's work was slowed by the 
bureaucratic fights between the war ministry and the 
general staff that plagued the army throughout the early 
1870s,36 and it was not until 1874 that recommendations 
for mobilization were ready in preliminary form and not 
until 1876 that new mobilization instructions were fully 
ready.39 By that time, however, Serbia and Montenegro
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were at war with the Turks, the Monarchy was preparing to 
occupy Bosnia, and the possibility of conflict with Russia 
had become clear. In mid-1876 Count Arthur Bylandt- 
Rheidt, the Monarchy's war minister, began talks with 
Baron Schonfeld, the chief of the general staff, on 
implementing measures for more rapid mobilization, and in 
November 1876 Schonfeld established a special department 
under Feldmarschalleutnant Baron Anton Vlasits of the 
general staff's planning section to develop mobilization 
plans for concrete situations, meaning plans for a war 
against Russia.40
Staff studies developed in 1874— -the studies which 
formed the basis for the plans offered to Andrassy in 
January 1878— suggested that war with Russia would begin 
with a clash in Galicia.41 The Monarchy's forces would be 
hopelessly outnumbered in the field, and the solution 
first suggested in 1874— a quick spoiling attack into 
Russian Poland— became the foundation of Austrian war 
plans for the next forty years. The war plans finalized 
in 1880 assumed that the initial level of enemy forces 
would be thirty-four Russian divisions— twenty-two on the 
Galician front, twelve in the south. They would be 
opposed by twenty-five and a half imperial-royal 
divisions— twenty in Galicia, five and a half in the 
south.42 The initial disparity of forces would be 
worsened if troops had to be kept on alert against the
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Italians. Schonfeld warned that even an ostensibly 
neutral Italy would have to be watched if war came in the 
east. In the event of serious tensions or open 
hostilities, anything up to a third of the Monarchy's 
forces could be tied down on the Italian front.43 The 
Monarchy, if it fought alone, would be fighting against 
vastly superior numbers.
The only solution seemed to depend upon speed of 
mobilization. The imperial-royal forces would have to 
depend on an aggressive defense, on exploiting interior 
lines of communication. Yet in the mid-1870s the 
Monarchy's railway net, at just under ten thousand 
kilometres of track, was barely sufficient for such a 
role. The rail lines had only come under government 
control after the financial crisis of 1873, although Beck 
and the war ministry had long argued for nationali­
zation.44 The military did manage to have two new lines 
built into Galicia and to have the five existing lines 
double-tracked,45 but it was obvious that, given the 
limitations of the rail net, any attempt to reinforce 
rapidly the Galician front, especially if the order of 
battle had to be shifted and secondary fronts opened, 
would lead to chaos.46 Too many units were stationed too 
far from their recruiting zones and home depots.
There was no deliberate policy of non-national 
stationing of units. By the late 1870s half of the
Hungarian infantry regiments were on Hungarian territory. 
Yet the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen were extensive; 
to be "at home" for an Hungarian regiment did not 
necessarily mean being near the regiment's recruiting 
district. The 2.(Fogaras) was at Kronstadt, the 
51.(Klausenberg) at Peterwardein, the 33.(Arad) at 
Karlstadt, the 60.(Erlau) at Budapest. The same pattern 
was true all across the Monarchy. Being in its own 
crownland did not mean a regiment was in or near its 
recruiting district. A Bohemian regiment such as the 
73.(Eger) might be stationed at Theresienstadt, or the 
Galician 55.(Brzezany) at Lemberg. Of the eighty 
imperial-royal infantry regiments, only ten were stationed 
in their respective recruiting districts in 1877.47 Early 
in 1881 Schonfeld presented Albrecht with a "Memoir on the 
Revision of Mew Scenarios Respective to a Russian War" 
that listed the hindrances that this kind of stationing 
presented to "a more rapid and effective opening of the 
campaign and thus to an energetic conduct of the war."48 
There was, Schonfeld pointed out, no relationship between 
the corps commands and their component regiments. For 
XIII.Korps (Zagreb) or III.Korps (Graz) to be brought up 
to wartime strength, their designated regiments would have 
to be assembled from all across the Monarchy. This would 
be a transport nightmare, and with the post-1878 necessity 
for keeping a large occupation force in Bosnia, the order
155
of battle was permanently distorted. Only a territorial 
reorganization of the army, Schonfeld argued, would allow 
for an effective mobilization and rapid reinfocement of 
the Galician front.
Albrecht's own views were rather complex. The 
Archduke agreed with Schonfeld on the need to restructure 
the army. Schonfeld's "On the Combat-Readiness of the 
Various Armies* Parallels Between a Territorial System and 
Our Own"49 had argued that the Monarchy had chosen to rely 
on a small field army to buy time while it mobilized, yet 
nonetheless failed to provide trained reserves or cadres 
for corps or division-level mobilization. Albrecht agreed 
that there were far too few first-line battalions, and the 
Monarchy, unlike any of the other great powers, was 
counting its second-line formations, its reserves, as part 
of its operational army. At the beginning of hostilities, 
only thirty-two of the forty divisions existing on paper 
could actually take the field.50 Yet he was hesitant 
about a full program of territorialization. Albrecht 
distrusted the Hungarians on principle. Nothing had 
happened in thirty years to give him faith in the Magyars, 
and the archduke had no wish to see the Magyar lords with 
their own independent army. Throughout his tenure as 
inspector-general, Albrecht had concerned himself with the 
education and training of the army and its soldiers, and 
he was not at all sure Schonfeld or the more "modern"
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generals understood just how heterogeneous the Monarchy 
and its army really were.
In April 1881 Albrecht presented the emperor with a 
memorandum on his own views.51 A greater "stabilization" 
of the army and its garrisons was needed, Albrecht argued, 
but a fully territorial organization was not possible.
The army, Albrecht stressed, was, except for the dynasty 
itself, the only unifying element of the Monarchy (”ausser 
der Dynastle, das einzige Band der Reichszusaimenge- 
horigkeit"). An army where regiments were raised and 
garrisoned permanently in their recruiting districts would 
degenerate sooner or later into a collection of provincial 
militias (Provinzialmilizen) with no sense of the Monarchy 
as a whole. Albrecht had a sharp awareness of the dangers 
of exposing the army to local politics, and he found 
nationalism to be a "dangerous tendency growing day by 
day." But his concern was less with the possibility of 
subversion and revolt than with the slow decay and 
spiritual dissolution of the army.
Albrecht accepted Schonfeld's view that the complex 
linguistic map of the Monarchy gave a certain safety to 
territorializations no territorial corps would be all of 
one language, and no single corps could form an 
independent army.52 The Archduke's own point was that the 
Monarchy was divided into cultural as well as linguistic 
zones. The backlands of Ruthenia or Transylvania were
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separated from Bohemia or Lower Austria not only by 
language but by decades, if not centuries, of cultural 
development.
Albrecht's own conservatism was a kind that freed him 
from the prejudices of the bourgeois age: he believed 
unguestioningly in the superiority of the Dynasty and the 
aristocracy which served it, and from his eminence as a 
Habsburg and an archduke national prejudices and national 
claims to superiority were utterly irrelevant. The Magyar 
lords were all rebels at heart, he believed, but unlike 
Franz Ferdinand a generation later he never extended that 
belief to a hatred of Hungarians. He was very much his 
father's son and very much a man of the first years of the 
nineteenth century, if not the eighteenth. Every people 
had its special qualities, and the strength of the 
Monarchy derived from knowing how to recognize and combine 
those qualities inside the army. The "polyglot 
composition of the army" was its strength, Albrecht 
declared. One could find nowhere else in Europe "a better 
J&ger than the Tiroler or Inner-Austrian, a finer light 
cavalryman than the hussars of Hungary, a more cold­
blooded cannoneer than the Bohemian, a more fearless 
sailor than the Dalmatian."*3
Nonetheless, whole provinces and peoples were 
intelligenzlos, lacking educated classes. The Monarchy 
was not so badly off as Russia, where seven conscripts in
ten were illiterate, but neither was it France, where even 
with the presence of recruits from Brittany and Guyenne, 
illiteracy was at only 5.5%— nor was it Germany, where 
only 0.2% of new conscripts could not read and write.*4 
Twenty-two percent of all conscripts in the Monarchy were 
illiterate in the 1880s. At the end of the decade forty- 
two percent of all Hungarian recruits were illiterate, and 
as late as 1900 so were nineteen percent of the recruits 
from Lower Austria itself. The state of affairs worsened 
mile by mile in the eastern provinces. In Galicia only 
thirty percent of all adults were literate. In the 
Bukovina literacy was at twenty-nine percent; in Dalmatia 
it was twenty-two percent.** For all Albrecht's faith in 
the courage of the ordinary infantryman and his bayonet, 
he was not fool enough to believe that one could do 
without technical specialists. The "rawest peoples"
(rohesten Volkstammen) of the Monarchy could provide no 
technical NCOs. If the mountains of the Monarchy provided 
no cavalry, that could be remedied. The cavalry had 
always been concentrated where it was most needed. But 
there would be no engineers or gunnery NCOs from Ruthenia 
or the depths of the Alfdld. The poverty of the east was 
hideous enough. A Galician, social reformers pointed out, 
could do only a quarter of the work of an average European 
worker, and had access to less than half of what his 
counterparts in the West ate.56 The lack of education
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meant that any units recruited and garrisoned on a purely 
local basis would suffer from a critical lack of 
engineers, gunners, and logistics staff.
The army of the Monarchy, like all others, depended 
on the quality of its officers. The officers of an army 
set its tone, imparted its spirit, and gave it its sense 
of purpose. The occupation of Bosnia, Albrecht wrote, had 
been a good thing for the spirit of the army* the 
officers and men had experienced an arduous but successful 
campaign against an elusive and tenacious foe together.
The officers of the Monarchy, whatever their nationality, 
had fought for a common purpose. The Monarchy's officers 
had of necessity to be above nationality, to be 
professionals committed only to the Dynasty; there was no 
other course open to a multinational state, or 
"formation," as Albrecht put it in one insightful 
moment.57
Albrecht feared that territorialisation would reduce 
the officer corps to a kind of epauletted proletariat.
The officers of a regiment would be permanently on 
station, and Albrecht foresaw the stagnation of morale and 
skill. A young lieutenant posted to a regiment would in 
all likelihood remain there for the greater part of his 
career. A Hungarian, Polish, or Croatian officer posted 
to Budapest, Lemberg, or Zagreb would be subject to 
national agitation, yes, but an officer posted to a
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garrison in the Carpathians or deep in the Hungarian 
steppe would be cut off from the world. What professional 
skills, what breadth of outlook would survive a decade of 
isolated parade squares and empty horizons?
Territorialisation, Albrecht continued, was no 
panacea for the army's difficulties. It could not be 
complete— and was indeed complete nowhere in Europe. The 
regiments had been drifting homeward ever since the 
Auagleich, but fifty-one regiments and eighteen battalions 
of Jagera, 169 of 450 battalions, or about two-fifths of 
the army, were outside their recruiting districts. Some 
areas were too unsettled for the use of purely local 
troops. Just then a sharp little campaign was being 
fought to introduce conscription in the Bosnian hills, and 
such areas would require a leavening of soldiers from 
elsewhere. Other areas could not support the number of 
troops needed for garrisons. After all, Vienna supported 
the 4. and Budapest the 32. Infantry, but in 1881 the 
infantry complement of the Budapest garrison was drawn 
from six line regiments (IR 6, 32, 33, 67, 68, 70) and the 
40. Feldjager battalion. Vienna's garrison was drawn from 
seven infantry regiments (IR 17, 34, 38, 47, 52, 58, 63) 
and the Tirol Jagera.58 Still other places, Bosnia, the 
Tirol, Dalmatia, would need extraterritorial units to 
maintain any balanced corps composition. The Archduke
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estimated that at least a quarter of the army, and perhaps 
more than a third, would continue to be extraterritorial.
Albrecht was not opposed to territorial garrisoning 
on principle. He recognized that speed of mobilization 
was critical, and he was not averse toward moves to bring 
the regiments closer to their reserves and depots. Nor 
did he believe that the army had to be stationed according 
to some policy of divide et intpera. National tensions 
needed to be recognized, but stagnation was a more 
pressing danger. Of all imperial institutions, he 
thought, the army alone was concerned with the Monarchy as 
a whole. The most important of all questions was the 
unity of the army, its sense of being the defender of an 
empire and not a province. It was not enough to be simply 
loyal; the army had to transcend national and local 
feeling altogether. The Bosnian campaign had, he 
believed, given the army a sense of common purpose, a 
feeling too valuable to be thrown away in dozens of 
isolated garrisons. Psychological and spiritual unity 
was, in the end, far more valuable than the gain of a few 
days in mobilization.
Albrecht concluded with his own set of proposals for 
territorial reform in an appendix on "The Weaknesses of 
the Infantry and their Remedies."59 Each recruiting 
district would provide two regiments of three battalions 
each. One regiment would remain at home and the second
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would be employed elsewhere; every three to four years the 
regiments would alternate. Reservists of both would do 
their training and annual maneuvers at home, under the 
supervision of a joint recruiting staff. The army, with 
close attention to population changes, should then be able 
to field fifteen corps of two divisions each.
The Archduke's proposals were immediately countered 
by Beck, who, as Schonfeld's health failed, was emerging 
as his successor as chief of the general staff.60 Late in 
April 1881 he produced a "Study on the Means of Removing 
the Defects in Garrisoning and Order of Battle which 
Hinder the Rapid Mobilization and Strategic Concentration 
of the Army."61 Like Albrecht, Beck recognized the 
problems posed by the heterogeneity of the Monarchy and 
its peoples. He also raised the issue of how much reform 
would cost. The army had initially asked for sixty 
million florins to cover the costs of the Bosnian campaign 
and had then asked for fifteen million more.62 The 
Reichsrat, angered by what it saw as the army's endless 
need for money, had tried to slash both the military's 
budget and peacetime strength. Count Eduard Taaffe, the 
emperor's chosen Kaiserminister, had been hard-pressed in 
1879 to secure a defense bill that maintained the army at 
its current levels of manpower and spending.63 Total 
reform might be too expensive to be politically possible.
Beck accepted the need for rapid mobilization as the 
basis for all discussion. In the 1870s he had argued that 
a Russian war would be long and bitter, and his assessment 
had not changed. Yet he did believe that any future war 
would have to be brought to a rapid conclusion. Win or 
lose, the finances and internal political and national 
structure of the Monarchy could only support a swift war. 
Territorial garrisoning was the only way to ensure a swift 
mobilization. Yet, like Albrecht, he saw the limits of 
territorialization. No troops were raised in Bosnia yet, 
and a large extra-territorial garrison would be needed 
there. Vienna, with its status as Haupt-und-Rezidenz 
Stadt and its growing socialist movement, required six 
more regiments than could be locally raised.
Beck also stressed the incoherence of the army's 
order of battle. Peacetime military districts did not 
correspond to wartime commands. Two corps commands were 
based in Prague and would compete for staff during 
wartime. The staffs assigned to Krakow, Trieste, and 
Innsbruck were no more than skeletons. Administrative and 
wartime command functions overlapped everywhere. If 
peacetime commands were assimilated with wartime zones, 
substantial savings could be made in both time and money. 
Such consolidations could be carried out without appealing 
to the politicians for more funding. In point of fact, 
the order of battle could then be expanded. With total
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mobilization, the Monarchy could field 1.1 million men, 
but these would face 2.6 million Russians and quite 
possibly 900,000 Italians as well. Any expansion of the 
order of battle was valuable.64
There were. Beck pointed out, eighty line infantry 
regiments. With the consolidation of administrative units 
and a territorial basing, these could be converted to 132 
regiments of three battalions each, yielding thirty-two 
divisions of four regiments, or sixteen corps of two 
divisions. Beck followed Albrecht's idea of having two 
regiments per recruiting district, one of which would be 
extraterritorial. Transfers between home and abroad would 
prevent stagnation. Each existing field artillery 
regiment would give up a battery to serve as cadres for 
artillery to support the newly enlarged infantry, and here 
Beck saw the only problem: given the widely varying 
cultural levels of the Monarchy's provinces, there would 
be a shortage of technically-competent troops. It would 
be some time before the territorialised army could have 
sufficient artillery support.
Both Beck's and Albrecht's views had been made known 
to the general staff in the early spring of 1881. In the 
first week of March Bylandt-Rheidt had ordered staff 
studies done on various reform proposals.65 The only 
proviso handed down by the minister was that nothing be 
done that would entail altering the basic system of
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conscription; the basic Wehrgesetz had been put through 
after hard fights in 1867/68, and those parliamentary 
battles had been too vicious to begin again. The general 
staff planners produced their own views within a few weeks 
of Beck's and Albrecht's. Their "On the introduction of a 
Territorial Organisation of the Army," like Beck's 
memorandum, sought to combine territorialisation with 
expansion.es
The staff proposal began by assuming that the purpose 
of territorialisation was to hold the movement of men and 
supplies to a minimum. The major assumption was that 
recruiting would become possible in Bosnia in the very 
near future. The staff, like Beck, saw no point to the 
current chaos of military and general (administrative) 
commands but saw "fatal political consequences" in trying 
to adapt areas of unequal size and composition into 
territorial units. The solution seemed to be a 
decentralised system of independent corps commands each 
responsible for its own recruiting.
The staff paper envisioned fifteen corps areas that 
would support two divisions each. The units within each 
zone would be permanently integrated into higher tactical 
formations. The regiments would be kept permanently as 
part of active divisions, thus enhancing their ability to 
be mobilized rapidly and sent to the front. The 
territorial zones would be supplemented by sixty newly
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raised over-strength mobile battalions which would serve 
in those areas where extraterritorial units would be 
required. Thirty one mobile battalions would be assigned 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the adjacent Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, 
and Dalmatia; twenty-nine would be used in Vienna,
Budapest, Trieste, and the South Tirol. The mobile forces 
would be attached to local divisions for tactical and 
training purposes, but their officers would be rotated 
rapidly through the new battalions— a move the staff hoped 
would help prevent stagnation among the officer corps.
The reorganized army would contain 119 regiments of 
three battalions each, the sixty mobile battalions, 
fourteen JSger battalions raised in the corps zones, and 
ten battalions of Kaiserj&gers from the Tirol. An 
additional field artillery regiment would be formed by 
separating one battery from each of the thirteen existing 
regiments. The staff hoped for further expansion of the 
rail net, and railway service units, recruited throughout 
the Monarchy, would be expanded and placed directly under 
the control of the general staff. Other independent 
technical units, such as the fifteen battalions of 
pioneers and engineering specialist units for mountain 
service in Tirol and Dalmatia, would be under local 
control. Recruiting and administration would be 
decentralised, and each corps command would be responsible 
for raising and training troops in its oyn area.
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The staff proposal did not mention the costs involved 
in setting up the new system. For example, the costs of 
repatriating regiments to their home districts were never 
mentioned. The staff was aware of the confines of the 
defense budget and had chosen to ignore them. Even one­
time expenditures such as transport costs in returning 
units to their recruiting districts, costs that could 
quite clearly be justified, were seen at a ministerial 
level as an open challenge to the politicians. No reform 
could be undertaken that would alter the arrangements of 
1867/68, and no reform would be acceptable that would 
require increased expenditures. The war ministry thanked 
the staff for its work, but Bylandt-Rheidt informed the 
planners that, alas, "on political grounds" their designs 
had to be rejected.*7
Late in May a series of conferences on reform were 
held at the war ministry with the emperor as chairman.
Beck and Albrecht were present as were Bylandt-Rheidt, 
Feldzeugmeister Baron Johann Philippovic, who had 
commanded XIII. Korps in the Bosnian campaign and was now 
commander of the Vienna garrison, and Generalmajor Count 
Franz Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister. No Hungarian 
representatives were present. The agenda of the meetings 
covered the proposals of Beck, Albrecht, and the general 
staff as well as a list of issues drawn up by the emperor: 
the permanent maintenance of corps formations, territorial
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and administrative boundaries, the number and strengths of 
divisions and corps, command relationships in the major 
provinces, numbers of regiments per recruiting district, 
location of regimental districts, garrisoning of Jager 
battalions, recruitment for the artillery, and assignment 
of technical and specialist units.68
Albrecht, pointing to the experiences of 1866 and the 
difficulties encountered in 1878, argued that the 
peacetime army had to be divided into established corps. 
Philippovic answered by drawing on the findings of the 
commission of inquiry into the occupation campaign.69 The 
current division of the army into line regiments and 
reserve commands was, he argued, the only "wholly sound 
basis" for army organization. While some reorganization 
was desirable, any radical restructuring would entail, if 
nothing else, assuming European peace in the next two 
years, an assumption Philippovic was not prepared to make.
Beck objected to Philippovic's assertions. He 
repeated the arguments made in his earlier memoranda and 
pointed to the experiences of foreign armies. Germany, 
France, Russia, Italy, and even Turkey had found 
territorial organization to be the most effective form of 
military administration. Beck's arguments were based on 
Schonfeld's work of late 1880 and early 1881 on a 
Maximal fall, a worst-case scenario for a Russian war. The 
key to Austria's war-fighting capability would be a quick
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combination of forces in Galicia. That much was basic.
And at present a quick combination could not be achieved.
In case of war there would have to be a massive 
reshuffling of regiments before the army was ever ready to 
take the field. Eleven regiments would have to be brought 
from Bosnia and the Herzegovina, refitted, and shipped to 
the front. A whole list of dismal examples could be 
cited* the 24.Division, based at Przemysl, would have its 
technical staff and supply depot at Brvinn in Moravia; the 
artillery assigned to VI.Korps (Kaschau) was at Wiener- 
Neustadt. All the Jager battalions designated for the 
Bohemian commands were in the Bosnian mountains. In fact, 
only twenty percent of the infantry and sixteen percent of 
the Jagers would be available upon the outbreak of war.70 
The numerical situation vis-^-vis Russia would only worsen 
with mobilisation.
Mobilisation Day 
10 20 30 40 50
Russia
Infantry 116,000 240,000 492,000 684,000 776,000
Cavalry 42,000 53,250 73,200 82,400 98,400
Guns 280 960 1,760 2,360 2,680
Austria-Hungary
Infantry 72,000 194,500 438,300 476,100
Cavalry 9,000 24,300 39,600 39,600
Guns 390 1,380 1,452
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On the fortieth day of mobilisation Russian superiority on 
the Galician front would amount to nearly a quarter- 
million infantry, 40,000 cavalry, and over 900 guns.71
Welserheimb, the Landwehr minister, indicated that 
all this was obvious. A system of territorial corps was 
the quickest, most efficient mobilisation scheme. So much 
went without saying. What was not obvious was how such a 
system could be reconciled with or adapted to political 
realities. Above all, how could the transition to such a 
system be paid for? The Monarchy's forces were still 
using the time-honored expedient of saving money by 
keeping large numbers of men on furlough. The Monarchy 
had already been subjected to the contempt of its German 
ally for this and other military economies. When the 
Austrians proposed to save money in 1879 by sending 18,000 
men on extended leave, Bismarck pointed out that they 
could save still more money by sending 100,000 home, or, 
better yet, achieve real economies by disbanding the army 
altogether.73 The Monarchy had oqly one ally, and, as 
Albrecht insisted, one could not rely on that ally's 
promises. There was no point in drawing up reform plans 
that could not be funded. Welserheimb's point was that an 
abortive reform, or a half-done one, would be worse than 
simply learning to live with the present system. And it 
took no imagination to envision the Germans' contempt for 
their ally if the Reichsrat rejected as too expensive a
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plan to make the Monarchy's forces ready for a major 
conflict.
Bylandt-Rheidt was inclined to support the staff's 
call for mobile units separate from the territorialized 
corps formations. A corps system, he pointed out, would 
facilitate the attachment of Landwehr units to the line 
army. Welserheimb had estimated that 80,000 
Landwehr/Honved troops could be integrated into the line, 
providing the equivalent of three new divisions. The 
mobile battalions would give the army more flexibility in 
dealing with contingencies while the bulk of the Landwehr 
and the Honved could be assembled in brigades and trained 
alongside the regulars for their wartime duties of manning 
garrison depots and guarding lines of communication, thus 
releasing more regulars for the Galician front.
Territorialization would make it easier to integrate 
the Landwehr into line formations; there was no 
disagreement on that point. In reality, though, the 
Landwehr was made up of two very different components, the 
Landwehr of the Austrian crownlands, the Hungarian Honved, 
and could not be treated as simply part of the regular 
army. Welserheimb saw his own task as overseeing the 
integration of the Austrian Landwehr into regular 
formations, but his counterpart in Budapest took a very 
different view. Bela Szende, the Honved minister, spent 
much of his time protesting to the imperial-royal war
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ministry that the Honved was not part of the regular order 
of battle and should never be considered as such.
Treating it as such implied that it could be used outside 
Hungarian territory without the assent of the Hungarian 
Diet, a clear violation of the terms of the Ausgleich. 
Szende's latest protests had inspired Bylandt-Rheidt to 
retort that the role of the Diet was to provide the 
necessary laws for the use of the army as determined by 
the emperor and his war minister.73 At the moment, 
though, neither the emperor nor Bylandt-Rheidt was 
prepared to argue the terms of the Ausgleich with the 
Hungarians. The emperor informed Phillipovic and 
Welserheimb that one could not treat the Landwehr and 
Honved— especially the Honved— merely as reserves. The 
"national" formations were not an integral part of the 
field army, and, despite the military difficulties raised, 
their special constitutional position had to be 
recognized.
Albrecht brought the conference back to technical 
issues by calling for discussion on the number of 
territorial corps to be formed. The archduke now took 
territorialization for granted; one simply had to make it 
work. The obvious thing was to match the corps boundaries 
with the crownlands, to structure the army to avoid 
conflict and duplication of effort with civil authorities. 
To that end he proposed a structure of thirteen corps,
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nine of two divisions each and four "front-line" corps 
zones of three divisions each, plus an independent corps 
in the Tirol and a joint army-navy command in Dalmatia.
His change of heart was part of a shift on Albrecht's part 
toward a belief in the need for a decisive encounter early 
on in any new war. Like Beck, Albrecht had come to 
believe that the Monarchy could not survive an extended 
war. He did, however, sound a note of caution. The 
Monarchy was unlike any other state in Europe, and even 
with territoral reform no one at the conference table 
should be so naive as to believe that it would ever be 
able to mobilize as fast as the Germans.74
The archduke's views were shared by, and to some 
extent created by, Beck, who, as the archduke aged and his 
eyesight failed, had become Albrecht's advisor and 
confidant. Beck himself had already moved to a belief in 
the primacy of rapid mobilization and a decisive initial 
encounter. In part this was simply acceptance of 
conventional strategic wisdom in Europe, of beliefs drawn 
from studies of 1859 and 1866, from a partial 
understanding of the Franco-Prussian War, and an absence 
of any understanding of the American Civil War. The 
conventional wisdom was that the coming of the railroad 
meant that, since troops could be assembled and moved to 
the front at speed, war itself would be no less rapid.
The doctrine of rapid decision highlighted the
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weaknesses of the Monarchy's army, and it ran counter to 
the intuitions of both Albrecht and Beck. Yet its 
corollaries had a definite appeal for Beck and the staff. 
The reforms necessary for rapid mobilisation were logical 
enough, since the imperial order of battle was totally 
chaotic. More importantly, a rapid decision in the field 
would place few strains on the political structure of the 
Monarchy. The Monarchy had been capable of fighting on 
after Koniggr&tz, and Albrecht for one had been willing to 
fight the Prussians on the Danube or in the streets of 
Vienna. Yet the attitude of the Hungarians had been the 
key in forcing the emperor to make peace. The Monarchy 
might survive a defeat: in Napoleon's day Francis 1 had 
become rather skilled at salvaging the Monarchy after 
military disaster. But the Monarchy would not survive a 
protracted agony.
Beck, officially chief of the general staff since 
early June 1881, was aware as well that any corps system 
would benefit the military to the exclusion of the war 
ministry. The corps would absorb the ministerially 
controlled reserves administration, and the decentralized 
corps would be responsible to the staff. For Beck, given 
the long fights over the powers of staff chief and war 
minister in the early 1870s and his own efforts to be 
directly subordinate to the emperor,75 territorialisation 
was a personal victory. Beck, always the consummate
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military courtier, seems to have won the archduke over to 
his views.
Bylandt-Rheidt had received an imperial order to set 
up a ministerial committee to work out the details of 
territorialisation. He had informed the emperor at the 
outset that there was no way to hold the line on costs.
The staff proposals on new troop formations alone would 
cost at least 900,000 florins. Thus the key instruction 
relayed by Beck from the emperor, that any new system be 
no more expensive that the old, was immediately void. The 
committee was ordered to observe the present limits on 
recruit contingents, to match military and political 
boundaries, and to make only the absolute minimum number 
of changes in the cavalry and the specialist units.
The committee had been chaired by FML Baron Vlasits, 
chief of the general staff's planning section, and Vlasits 
had assembled the chiefs of the railway, topographic, and 
recruitment sections of the staff into a working group 
that was overseen on occasion by Beck himself. The 
ministerial committee began its work in late July 1881 and 
issued its report in mid-April 1882.76 The committee also 
met, with Beck presiding, to consider the lessons of the 
latest (November 1881-late May 1882) rising in southern 
Dalmatia and Bosnia itself. Three divisions and naval 
support had been required to put down the revolt and begin 
to enforce conscription, and Beck impressed on the
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committee the need for substantial mobile forces which 
could be kept on extra-territorial duty in Bosnia.77
The ministerial committee's final report was based on 
the two goals of rapid mobilization and maintenance of a 
strong extra-territorial force in Bosnia and the 
Herzegovina, though it also set out two variants by 
Albrecht and Beck (Projects A and B) that called for an 
expansion of the number of infantry regiments in the order 
of battle. These projects called for an infantry 
establishment of 120-132 regiments organised half as cadre 
units with a minimal peacetime strength and half as 
reinforced mobile units, though in March 1882 Albrecht 
also suggested a structure of three cadre battalions and 
one overstrength mobile battalion per regiment.76 
Requirements for Bosnia, Dalmatia, and the South Tirol 
would take eight to nine battalions from each corps, which 
meant that most regiments would field one extra­
territorial battalion at any given time.79
Project A called for fifteen corps commands of two 
divisions each; each division would be made up of fifteen 
battalions. Project B called for sixteen corps commands 
of two divisions each; the battalion strengths of the 
corps would vary from twenty-seven to thirty. There was 
also a less ambitious Project C, a proposal which had 
Bylandt-Rheidt's personal support. Project C called for 
fifteen corps of two divisions, with Trieste as a special
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separate region. The thirty infantry and eight cavalry 
divisions of the army would be territorial so far as 
possible, even for units designated for other corps in 
wartime. There would also be ten Landwehr divisions, 
three from Cisleithanian lands and seven from Hungary.
Each of the existing eighty line regiments would give up 
one battalion to form twenty new regiments. The reformed 
army would consist of one hundred regiments, each of four 
battalions plus a small recruiting depot cadre. Project C 
had the advantage of being less expensive than the other 
proposals, and on 11 May 1882 Bylandt-Rheidt formally gave 
Project C his endorsement with only one change— the total 
number of reformed regiments was raised to 102.80
On 22 May 1882 copies of the ministerial committee's 
draft report on Project C were circulated to all section 
chiefs of the general staff, and on 3 June the work was 
declared complete. Bylandt-Rheidt estimated that, if 
implementation of the reforms began in September 1882, the 
army would be ready for a trial .mobilization under the new 
system by March 1883 and full mobilization by May 1883.81 
On 10 June Bylandt-Rheidt presented the committee's report 
to the emperor, and two days later imperial sanction was 
given to reforms based on Project C. On 17 June Bylandt- 
Rheidt officially informed the Landwehr and Honved 
ministers; on 28 June the Hungarian government was 
presented with the details of the army reforms. Final
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authorization was given by Franz Joseph on 30 June. The 
changes were slated to begin on 9 September, two weeks 
after the end of the annual summer maneuvers.82
The garrison changes entailed by the reforms were not 
inexpensive. The staff estimated that changes within the 
Monarchy proper would cost 280,700 gulden and that 
transport in and out of South Tirol, Dalmatia, and the 
occupation zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina would cost a further 
294,300 gulden, a total of 475,000 gulden for transport 
costs alone.83 Thirteen regiments would be sending 
battalions to the occupation zone. Two battalions each 
from twenty-one line regiments and four J&ger battalions 
would be coming home. The least expensive change would be 
in moving the 9. Jagers from Briick-an-der-Mur to Judenburg 
in Styria— a mere 200 gulden. Moving three battalions of 
the 21. (Ceslau) from Prague to Riva in the South Tirol 
would be the most expensive— 11,000 gulden. The total 
costs of the changes— transport, relocation, and the 
establishment of twenty-two new line regiments— came to 
over 700,000 gulden, which had to be met from the mere
78.000 gulden in the 1883 army budget for "orderly 
development of the army" plus an extraordinary grant of
650.000 gulden.
The Monarchy was now divided into fifteen corps 
commands, each responsible for conscription and training 
within its zone.04 The corps commands were established as
Corps Command HQ
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
Krakow
Vienna
Graz
Budapest
Pressburg
Kaschau
Temesvar
Prague
Josefstadt
BrUnn
Lemberg
Hermannstadt
Zagreb
Innsbruck
Sarajevo
I.Korps had originally been headquartered at Sarajevo; the 
title was soon shifted over to the Krakow region, perhaps 
in symbolic recognition of the primacy of the Galician 
front. Each corps contained two divisions of two 
territorialised regiments each. The 2.Division, at
II.Korps (Vienna), was made up of the 3. (Kremsier) and
4.(Vienna) Infantry. The 29.Division, with IX Korps at 
Josefstadt, was made up of the 42.(Theresienstadt) and the
36.(Jungbunzlau).
Imperial-royal regiments had long since borne 
honorific titles, the most famous being the 4.Hoch-und- 
Deutschmeister. They now joined, at Albrecht's 
suggestion,89 their recruiting district names to the 
honorifics in an effort to harness local patriotism to 
regimental spirit. Thus the 1.Infantry was now the Kaiser
Franz Joseph Infanterie-Regiment Troppau Nr.l; the 4. was 
now the Hoch-und-Deutschmaister Infanterie-Regiment Vienna 
Nr. 4. Territorial titles were also an effort to emphasize 
unity in the twenty-two new regiments. Battalions 
separated from older regiments or JUgera converted to line 
infantry were not always in "national" units. Seven 
battalions of Jagera were attached to other-language 
regiments. Seventeen Hungarian battalions found 
themselves in Austrian units; one Moravian and one 
Bohemian battalion found themselves in Galician regiments; 
a Carniolan battalion was attached to a Croat regiment; a 
single forlorn battalion from Lower Austria was sent off 
to Hungary,66 But territorial titles were a way of 
instilling unit pride; the new regiments had no battle 
honors or famous honorary colonels-in-chief yetf and a 
territorial title was a substitute for a regimental 
history or a famous patron.
The actual transfers and reorganisation went 
smoothly.67 By mid-1883 the Monarchy's infantry had been 
territorialized. Extra-territorial units were still 
stationed in Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, South 
Tirol, and in Vienna itself. At the end of 1883, though, 
almost nine soldiers in ten of the imperial infantry—  
eighty-nine of 102 regiments— were serving in their 
recruiting districts. The new system kept reservists with 
their regiments. Regiments could alternate one battalion
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at home with three detached, or three at home with one 
detached; reservists would always train with their 
designated regiments.98 Only the cavalry, grouped 
permanently in wartime formations on the frontier to face 
any surprise descent by Russian forces, were expected to 
do long extra-territorial service, and even here, two- 
thirds of the Monarchy's mounted troops were, given the 
nature of cavalry recruiting, in or near home.89
The changes did accomplish one desired end: 
mobilisation time against Russia fell from forty-five days 
in 1881 to thirty-five in 1883. By the end of the decade, 
the new system, coupled with expansion of the railway net, 
brought the time down to just over three weeks.90 It was 
a change from the plans of 1881, when the staff had had to 
admit that the infantry would not have its logistics train 
or full artillery support until day seventeen of 
mobilization, while the Russians would have nineteen 
infantry divisions and twenty cavalry divisions fully 
ready in Galicia by day fourteen.91
Yet the reforms did not alter the basic weaknesses of 
the army. The number of regiments had been raised, but 
not the number of recruits. The census of 1880 had 
provided figures showing that a larger army could 
certainly be raised, but there was no political will to 
change the annual conscript quotas. The imperial 
authorities had fought hard for the defense bill of 1879,
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which had done little more than maintain existing levels 
of financial support, despite the increased involvement of 
the Monarchy in the Balkans.” The next proposed 
expansion of the army, a decade later, provoked a major 
crisis with the Hungarians. Nor was there more money for 
the army. In 1892 a study by the general staff put the 
Monarchy fourth among the five great powers in total 
defense spending since 1867.93
Total Defense Spending 1867-1892 (in French francs)
The Monarchy, one English historian noted, spent the 
equivalent of 13.2 million pounds on its military 
establishment in 1880, and 13.6 million in 1900. In the 
same period Germany's defense budget grew from 20.4 
million English pounds to 41 million. Russia, the 
Monarchy's planned principal adversary, enlarged its 
military spending from 29.6 million pounds to 40.8 
million.94 One British officer, writing at the height of 
the Balkan crisis, believed the imperial-royal forces to 
be "very formidable" and led by a competent and highly- 
motivated officers corps.95 Yet though the army of the 
Monarchy was capable of fighting well, its weaknesses in
France
Russia
Germany
Austria
Italy
23.15 billion
22.43
14.21
7.00
6.82
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manpower, logistics, and funding had not been remedied by
territorial reform. The army was better sited to mobilize
after 1883, but it was no more capable of fighting an 
extended war than it had been in 1876.
In the event of war with Russia, the army would find
itself confronted with a vastly superior adversary.
Despite the territorial reforms, the army was well aware 
that it could not fight such a war alone. By the mid-1880s 
the Monarchy was nominally allied with Romania and Italy, 
but the alliances existed only on paper, an affair of 
German sponsorship. It was quite clear that neither was 
reliable, and that the "allies" still coveted Transylvania 
and the South Tirol. The army had come to be dependent on 
the German connection to hold off the Russians. The war 
plan of 1881 counted on forty German divisions of infantry 
and nine of cavalry to move against the Russians.96 Yet 
despite talks between Beck and his opposite number Count 
Helmuth von Moltke, there were no binding plans for joint 
operations. Albrecht of course was not surprised: he
suspected the Germans of, in true Prussian fashion, 
plotting some treachery that would abandon the Monarchy to 
the Russians. Beck spent much of the 1880s trying to 
extract definite promises from the Germans, and in 1887/88 
the Germans finally let it be known that they would engage 
only seven corps and four reserve divisions against the 
Russians— a cut of about forty percent from earlier
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expected levels. The problem had not been wholly 
unforeseen. The war plan of 1881 had noted that even with 
French neutrality, Germany would need fifteen divisions of 
infantry and three of cavalry to cover the French 
frontier. The French, if they chose to fight, could bring 
forty line and twenty-four reserve infantry divisions into 
quick service against Germany.97
The conclusions were not hard to draw. In any two- 
front war the Monarchy would have to rely on its own 
resources, and those were few indeed. In December 1886 
Albrecht wrote the emperor that, in truth, little could be 
done to make the army ready for a major war. Existing 
resources could be more efficiently utilized, but without 
radical changes in the political sphere, few real 
improvements could be made. Such changes were highly 
unlikely— and, ultimately, undesirable for their internal 
consequences.98
Abroad, the Monarchy faced superior Russian armies.
At home, the army was now explicitly territorialized, the 
troops in daily contact with their neighbors from civilian 
life. As Albrecht had predicted, the cultural disparities 
within the Monarchy became increasingly visible. At a 
period when other European powers were shortening terms of 
service for their conscripts in order to maximize the 
number of trained reservists, the general staff 
emphatically rejected any such scheme for the Monarchy.
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The period of active service, the staff insisted, was 
short enough as it was. Any effort to lower it to two 
years would keep the military from having time to train 
the less-developed nationalities in basic technical 
skills."
The quality of the Monarchy's officer corps remained 
generally high. The Monarchy did not produce any stellar 
names— any Moltkes or Roons— but its officers, especially 
in the artillery, had been solid and competent. Yet there 
was a shortage of regular officers. The limited budget 
kept pay low, and the imperial-royal officer, while held 
in some regard in social circles, could command nothing 
like the prestige of his German counterpart. The Monarchy 
commanded the services of some 17,000 regular officers in 
the 1880s, and with its low pay and slow promotion 
attracted few more. The regulars were in great measure 
what the Habsburg ideal called fort non-national 
professionals serving their emperor with a loyalty that 
mirrored that of a Catholic order. "The word service," 
wrote one army commentator, "has a magical power in our 
Army...[and] the Army, animated by the dynastic idea, 
alone represents unity in our state, and is the rock upon 
which the whole edifice of the State rests.”100 But in 
the last half of the 1880s the Monarchy came more and more 
to rely on reserve officers, whose numbers grew from 5840 
in 1885 to 12,171 in 1892.101 Reserve officers, drawn in
large part from the one-year volunteer cadets, lacked the 
purely dynastic and professional allegiances of the 
regulars. They were not subject to the language 
requirements imposed on the regular officers, and by the 
end of the century there were regiments where the reserve 
officers were wholly unable to speak with their men. A 
hundred years before, officers, as Wellington said about 
the British army, could not be expected to speak with 
their men; in an age of nationalism they had to for their 
own purposes and welfare.103 The military authorities 
tried to avoid the demoralisation that Albrecht had feared 
by shifting its regular officers around the Monarchy with 
some frequency. The reserve regiments fell to reserve 
officers drawn from the universities and not the military 
academies, and it was these officers who began to insist 
upon an increasingly "national" tone in the attitudes of 
both Landwehr and Honved units.103
There had been a homeward drift of the Monarchy's 
regiments throughout the 1870s, and after 1883 almost nine 
in ten of the Monarchy's infantrymen were based in their 
own recruiting districts. During the arguments over 
territorial reform the problems of national tension and 
nationalist agitation had been largely brushed aside. All 
the authors of territorial schemes, from Albrecht and Beck 
down, had admitted that national problems would affect a 
territorialized army. Yet the issue had received no real
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attention. The Russian danger was of prime concern, and 
rapid mobilization was the order of the day. There seemed 
in fact to be no immediate nationalist threat. The 
Hungarian leadership, uneasy about Russian involvement in 
the Balkans, had backed the army bill of 1879, while Count 
Taaffe's ministry, with the Czechs and Poles in the 
Reichsrat gathered into the conservative "Iron Ring" 
coalition, had temporarily quieted the Slavs. In 1882/83 
the national horizon had been, if not clear, at least a 
lighter shade of grey.
The calm would last only a few more years. The army 
bill of 1889 would call forth a resurgence of Magyar 
obstructionism and separatism, and Taaffe's proposed 
language ordinances of 1890 set off violence in the 
streets of Prague between Czechs and Germans. The Magyar 
oligarchs might hope the joint army could keep the 
Cossacks from the streets of Budapest, but they also saw 
it as an obstacle in the way of a separate Hungarian 
national army. In Bohemia the army was increasingly seen 
as an instrument to keep peace in the streets, and the 
idea that one had to be German or Czech, that one could 
not be Bohemian, was shouted at the conscripts with 
disturbing frequency by civilian crowds. The army had 
been reorganised to face the Russian foe with greater 
speed. That much had been achieved, but Albrecht and Beck 
had had to admit that all such reforms were limited: there
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were sharp limits on what could be achieved with the 
resources at hand. The emperor's soldiers, officers and 
men, regulars and reservists, were chief among those 
resources. One could expect professionalism and loyalty, 
and the Monarchy's armies gave that to the end. But the 
army was now subject quite overtly to national demands.
As national peace broke down in the 1890s, it would be the 
territorialised army that would feel the sharpest strains.
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CHAPTER 4
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES: CRISIS IN BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY
As the army of the Monarchy looked back from the 
years just before 1914, the 1870s would take on a golden 
tinge in its collective memory. It was true that the army 
had acquired a new enemy in the east, and the growth of 
Russian power could be neither minimized nor ignored. Yet 
the army had fought a successful campaign in Bosnia and 
the Herzegovina, and a generation of the Monarchy's 
officers would look back on the Bosnian campaign as a time 
of shared purpose and positive achievement. The Balkan 
crisis had even prompted the Hungarian leadership to offer 
its public support to the army during the negotiations 
over the army bill of 1879. The territorial reforms of 
1881-83 had given the army extra time to mobilize against 
a foreign threat, and the army's professionalism and 
loyalty were taken for granted. Throughout the arguments 
over territorial reform there had been no doubt cast on 
the loyalty of the multinational army.
The army had devoted itself during the 1870s to 
technical concerns that had culminated in the reforms of 
1881-83. Those reforms were in part a reflection of 
domestic stability. There had been no systematic 
separation of regiments and homelands before 1848, and
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after 1867 the regiments had slowly begun to return to 
their home areas. The territorial reforms overseen by 
Bylandt-Rheidt had given official sanction to 
territorialization, and official complacency mirrored 
domestic peace. Yet from the mid-1880s on, the army was 
increasingly involved in suppressing domestic unrest in 
the Cisleithanian lands. The end of the 1880s saw the 
beginnings of a twenty-year struggle between the imperial 
government and the Hungarian leadership over the nature of 
the army. The 1880s began with Czechs and Germans rioting 
against one another in the streets of Prague with new and 
bitter intensity, and with troops and workers facing one 
another in the streets of Vienna. The era would reach its 
climax twenty years later in a constitutional crisis that 
saw the army preparing to endure another round of civil 
war in Hungary.
Count Taaffe, named Austrian minister-president in 
1879, once observed that his government would keep peace 
by keeping all the nationalities a little bit unhappy.
Like so many policies pursued in the Monarchy, this was at 
best a short-term expedient. Yet Taaffe's maneuvering 
kept Cisleithanian politics in precarious stability for 
fourteen years. The emperor's chosen KaiserminiBter was 
adept at juggling liberals and conservatives, Poles,
Czechs and Germans. The chambers of the Reichsrat, 
though, were not the streets of the Monarchy. Taaffe, who
served as his own interior minister, received daily 
reports from all the cities of the Monarchy on the growth 
of nationalism, socialism, anarchism, and anti-semitism. 
There were riots in Prague in 1881 over the creation of 
separate German and Czech universities, and the 
gendarmerie had to make armed forays to rescue German 
students from Czech lynch mobs.1 The government's 
language ordinances of 1880 mandating linguistic equality 
for German and Czech in public affairs provoked violence 
between Bohemian Germans, who were outraged at the thought 
of losing civil service jobs to bilingual Czechs and 
Bohemian Czechs who sought to have Czech declared the 
official language of the province. In a very few years 
governments in the Cisleithanian lands would fall over the 
issue of how many courses in German and Slovene would be 
offered in an obscure provincial high school, but for now 
Taaffe was convinced that the nationalities could be 
managed. In the early years of Taaffe's regime the threat 
of social radicalism rather than the threat of nationalism 
kept lights burning deep into the night in offices in the 
Innere Stadt.
The army saw itself as the shield of the dynasty, and 
it remained available to the government as the ultimate 
guarantor of the social order. In the autumn of 1882 the 
Vienna garrison was called out when the police failed to 
quell large-scale riots in the working-class areas in the
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west of the city. Ten months later troops of the city 
garrison were sent into Alsergrund, Vienna's Ninth 
District, to put down widespread riots and arson; fighting 
went on for several nights while soldiers cleared the 
streets at bayonet point.2 Yet the military leadership of 
the Monarchy exhibited remarkably little enthusiasm for 
armed repression.
The military leadership relied on loyalty to the 
dynasty and to superior officers, on devotion to the 
ideals of hierarchy and obedience, to hold its polyglot 
army together. It saw socialism, for all its ability to 
transcend national lines, as ultimately promoting national 
division within the Monarchy by undermining faith in 
dynastic loyalty and the traditions of deference.3 The 
army had little sympathy for socialism or social protest. 
No imperial-royal officer would have considered, as 
Boulanger did in France, ordering his troops to share 
their rations with striking workers. Yet the army was not 
willing to impose order with the mailed fist alone. The 
troops of the Vienna garrison were called out to disperse 
crowds by force throughout the 1880s and 1890s, but the 
"assistances" given the civil authorities were restricted 
in scope. Army regulations specified that the use of 
force beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense 
required the joint authorization of both the local 
commander and the ranking civil authority. Troops were
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given no special training in dealing with civil disorders, 
and in fact service regulations called for the 
concentration of troops in defensive positions in the 
event of outbreaks and regarded patrols by small units as 
unduly provocative.4
Internal security is a job rarely popular with 
regular officers. British officers in Georgian times 
hated having their men called for riot duty as much as 
they hated having their units sent to build roads in 
Scotland.5 The officers of the Third Republic saw riot 
and strike duty as one more trick devised by the 
politicians to ruin the status of the army; the army had 
to play "the role of workingman's villain [thus] 
shattering the image of a body above class and political 
faction."5 American officers in the 1870s and 1880s 
expressed the same fears; they had no wish to be seen as 
the hirelings of mine and rail owners, and they loathed 
the thought of being used not to defend the nation but to 
do a policeman's job.7 The feeling was common among 
contemporary Russian officers as well. A soldier's job 
was something more than that of a policeman, and for all 
the legendary willingness of the Cossacks to charge into 
crowds with sabres bared, few of the tsar's officers 
relished the thought of giving up the relative certainties 
of warfare for the uncertainties of crowd control.®
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The army of the Monarchy was called upon to render 
numerous "assistances" in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, but it should be noted that the 
military moved with some circumspection. Rothenberg 
claimed that the Monarchy and its army "maintained 
internal security by means no more ruthless than in other 
states of the day."9 One might argue that the Monarchy 
was actually far more reserved in its use of armed force 
than some other states. There was violence between troops 
and crowds, and bayonets were bloodied and rifles 
sometimes fired, but the Monarchy had no Bloody Sunday, no 
Pullman Strike, no Fourmies Massacre.
Whether from unwillingness to use indiscriminate 
force, scrupulous obedience to regulations, or a distaste 
for an "unprofessional" and morale-sapping role, the 
regulars of the Monarchy did not provide a mailed fist at 
the ready disposal of Taaffe and his successors. The 
force immediately available to the authorities, and most 
amenable to use, was provided by the gendarmerie. A call 
to the local garrison for "assistance" presented the local 
authorities with the problem of dealing with the military 
and its own ethos and command structure, as well as 
providing an admission that the civil authorities were no 
longer able to cope on their own. The local gendarmerie 
detachment, however, came directly under civil control and 
could be deployed immediately.
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At its foundation in 1849 the gendarmerie had 
consisted of one thousand men organized into sixteen 
detachments.10 During the 1850s it served both as a rural 
guard and a political police in Venetia, Vienna, and 
conquered Hungary, and it grew to four thousand men in 
1854 and finally to nineteen thousand by 1859. After the 
loss of Lombardy and Venetia it had been reduced to 7900 
men, and in 1867 it was divided into separate Austrian and 
Hungarian services. Early in 1870 the Landwehr and Honvdd 
ministries relinquished control of the gendarmerie to the 
interior ministries of the two halves of the Monarchy.
Baron Kempen, the first commander of the gendarmerie, 
had tried to build an elite force on military lines, and 
his cadres had been trained by NCOs hand-picked from the 
ranks of distinguished regiments.11 Kempen organized the 
gendarmerie battalions on an army model and subjected them 
to military discipline. Even after their transfer to the 
control of the interior ministries, the gendarmerie 
regiments maintained their military appearance and 
training. Ministerial ordinances stressed that, while the 
gendarmerie was under the supervision of the ministry of 
the interior in all service and financial affairs, its 
organization, discipline, and equipment remained 
military.12 The Austrian gendarmerie in the 1880s was 
made up of 133 officers and 8120 men divided among 
fourteen local commands:
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(Innsbruck)
4. Moravia (Briinn)
5. Galicia (Lemberg)
6. Styria (Graz)
1. Lower Austria (Vienna)
2. Bohemia (Prague)
3. Tirol-Vorarlberg
8. Upper Austria (Linz)
9. Dalmatia (Zara)
10. Silesia (Troppau)
11. Salzburg (Salzburg)
12. Carniola (Laibach)
13. Bukovina (Czernowitz)
14. Carinthia (Klagenfurt)
7. Istria (Trieste)
Unlike the Royal Hungarian gendarmerie, which rapidly 
became the agent of local landlords and the ruling party 
in Budapest, the Cisleithanian service retained the high 
reputation Kempen had sought to create, and its 
capabilities were regarded as close to those of regular 
army units. The Austrian gendarmerie was indeed able to 
undertake purely military missions: in 1880-82 it saw
combat service in Istria and Dalmatia against the revolts 
in the Krisvosije.13
The Cisleithanian gendarmerie continued to grow 
throughout the remaining years of the century— 146 line 
officers, 21 staff officers, and 9300 men in 1895 rose to 
181 line officers, 25 staff officers, and 11,900 men in 
1904.14 The growth reflected the rise of social and 
national unrest in the 1890s; the addition of a staff 
section for planning suggests both the increasing 
importance of the gendarmerie as a security force and the 
need to plan for the careful deployment of units that,
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while self-consciously elite, by no means possessed 
overwhelming force. The list of major gendarmerie 
deployments against labor unrest is indicative of the 
decline of Taaffe's era of carefully-balanced peace:
Leoben, Donawitz, Seegraben (1889); the Vocklabrucker coal 
fields throughout 1889-91; Gablenz, Reichenberg, and 
Teplitz (1890); Ebenfurt, Hochwolkersdorf, ZUckmantel, and 
Prossiwitz (1890); Mahrisch-Schoberg (1893); Polnisch- 
Ostrau and Falkenau (1894); and defense of the Briirer 
coalfields and local government buildings and major 
firefights with anarchist groups (1896).15 By the end of 
the century the gendarmerie also served to hold the line 
against nationalist disorders.
The gendarmerie was more responsive to governmental 
desires than the army and, as an arm of the police, it was 
a less provocative symbol than the army, whose open 
dynastic orientation evoked memories of 1848/49. The 
gendarmerie was the major element in restoring order in 
Vienna and northern Bohemia in 1897, in Prague, Lau,
Prerau, Holleschau, and Mahrisch-Weisskirchen in 1899, and 
in riots by Italian and German student groups in Innsbruck 
in 1901 and 1904.16
The frequency of calls on both the gendarmerie and 
the army increased sharply in the early 1890s, largely 
because of growing violence between Czechs and Germans. 
Count Taaffe had been adept at balancing the demands of
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political parties, but the conflicting demands of Czech 
and German nationalists in Bohemia did not allow for an 
equilibrium constructed from the dissatisfaction of all 
parties. Taaffe's government had tried since 1880 to 
reach a permanent accord with the Czechs, but by refusing 
to declare German as the "official language" of the 
Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy and by ordering that 
all verdicts handed down in the provincial courts of 
Bohemia and Moravia be given in the language of the 
parties involved, the government had deeply angered the 
Bohemian Germans.17 The dispute over the language of 
judicial opinions in Prague and Brtinn drove the German 
deputies into a boycott of the Reichsrat. The Czechs were 
unwilling to make any gestures of conciliation, and the 
radical Young Czechs insisted on both a special 
constitutional status for Bohemia and full linguistic 
equality, which the rise in Czech population relative to 
the Germans would soon convert into dominance. The 
arguments went on in the streets as well. Insults and 
ink-wells were hurled in the Reichsrat and the Bohemian 
Diet; paving-stones were thrown in the streets of Prague 
and Briinn. The years immediately before 1890 saw the 
growing presence of gendarmes and soldiers on Bohemian 
streets as civil government became even weaker.
William Jenks noted that in the 1880s "no serious 
student of the Habsburg sickness looked beyond Bohemia for
signs either of possible improvement or of the. . . 
agonies of dissolution. . . An unresolved war between 
Germans and Czechs was a malignancy that threatened the 
very essence of the Austrian state."18 It was Taaffe's 
attempt to work out a compromise settlement in Bohemia 
that brought down the Iron Ring in the end. Agreements 
reached between Czechs and Germans in January 1890 under 
government sponsorship were put before the Bohemian Diet 
the following May. The German deputies had ended a four- 
year walkout to attend. The Young Czechs, whose radical 
stance had excluded them from the negotiations for a 
Bohemian settlement, attended with every intention of 
provoking violence. The Bohemian Diet collapsed into 
chaos and fistfights; the session was prorogued and the 
chamber cleared by the police.
Prague then erupted into demonstrations far more 
violent than those seen in 1868. Czech mobs attacked 
German shops and passers-by, imperial eagles were pulled 
down from public buildings, and statues of the emperor 
were defaced. Count Thun, the imperial governor, found the 
civil police wholly overwhelmed and called out the 
gendarmerie and the garrison. Prague and much of the rest 
of Bohemia came under a state of siege. The Prague 
garrison, its infantry component made up of elements of 
five line regiments and a FeldjSger battalion, all 
Bohemian19, was able to clear the streets and restore
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order at bayonet point, but the city would remain under a 
state of emergency throughout most of the decade. Count 
Thun, who had been cheered on his appointment as the 
Staathalter destined to preside over the arrival of 
Bohemian autonomy, found his name a byword for rule by 
military force. The mood in Bohemia, symbolized by a 
German boycott of the Bohemian Exhibition of 1891 and by a 
bomb attack on the emperor's rail coach outside 
Reichenberg20, continued to deteriorate.
The Reichsrat elections of 1891 devastated the ranks 
of the conservative Old Czechs, destroying one of the main 
supports of Taaffe'8 coalition. The victorious Young 
Czechs, the new victors in Bohemia, were of no mind to 
cooperate with the government, and both Taaffe and the 
emperor thought the Young Czechs too radical to be part of 
a government coalition. Taaffe carried on for another 
year, trying to keep the system in balance, but by the 
autumn of 1893 his final attempt at conciliation, an 
effort to expand the franchise in the Cisleithanian lands, 
collapsed. The Iron Ring was replaced by a stopgap 
ministry of technicians, and its achievements would be 
largely forgotten in the furor of the 1890s. Taaffe had 
held his coalition together by an elaborate game of 
keeping all his plates in the air. His fall left both his 
successors and the commanders of the security forces only 
the fragments of political peace.
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The deepening German-Czech conflict also encouraged 
national unrest elsewhere in the Monarchy. The nego­
tiations for the army bill of 1889 had brought forth a new 
flowering of Magyar nationalism. Magyar nationalism both 
provided an example for the Young Czechs and derived part 
of its intransigence from Magyar fears that the Czechs 
might achieve their own Ausgleich. In Carinthia and 
Styria there emerged Slovene pressure on the provinces' 
Italians and Germans. The Alpine Germans, the backbone of 
the Monarchy, began to be restive, and Fan-German 
sympathies were violently expressed in Linz, Graz, and 
Vienna. The crowds cheering the Pan-German leader Georg 
von Schonerer down Vienna's Landesgerichtstrasse to his 
imprisonment for destroying the offices of Neues Wiener 
Tageblatt21 marred the celebration of the emperor's 
birthday and offered the unpleasant and distasteful 
spectacle of a Viennese crowd cheering for a Prussian 
king. The possibility that the Germans of the Monarchy 
could become disaffected was a disheartening omen for 
peace in the Cisleithanian lands.
Taaffe's immediate successor lasted a little less 
than two years in office. Prince Windischgratz, grandson 
of the hero of 1848, attempted to deal with the Bohemian 
problem by maintaining the state of siege in Prague and 
extending the Landwehr term of service. Yet it was not 
the unrest in Bohemia that brought down his ministry.
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The Windischgratz ministry fell over an utter triviality, 
a symbol of the decay of affairs in Cisleithania. Funds 
had been earmarked for the construction of a Slovene 
Untergymnasium in the village of Cilli in southern Styria. 
German Liberals, aghast at the thought of allowing 
Slovene-language classes in a town thought to be a German 
stronghold, withdrew their support from the government.
The emperor and his advisors determined to have no more 
governments dependent on parliamentary whims and declared 
that Austria would be governed by extra-party technicians. 
The Slovenes of Cilli got their Untergymnasium in the next 
year's budget; the town itself remained a German enclave 
until its remaining inhabitants were driven out or 
slaughtered by the advancing Red Army in the spring of 
1945.22
The state of secondary education in a provincial town 
of south Styria was an issue of the greatest triviality, 
but it proved that government in the Cisleithanian lands 
was no longer able to function on a parliamentary level. 
The Austrian half of the Monarchy would be largely 
governed in the future by bureaucrats. The dynasty had 
always leaned heavily on its non-national administrators 
and its army; in the mid-1890s these seemed to be its only 
sustaining forces.
The ill-fated Windischgratz was replaced by Count 
Casimir Badeni, the long-time imperial governor of
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Galicia. Badeni had earned a reputation for efficiency 
and a strong hand. He had kept the Ruthenes in line, kept 
Russian terrorists from using Galicia as a sanctuary, and 
championed the fortification of the Russian frontier. 
Moreover, he had the support of the bureaucrats and the 
army. The Badeni ministry was charged with rebuilding 
Taaffe's coalition of Slavs and conservatives in order to 
maintain social peace and to reach an equitable and 
workable truce in Bohemia. Badeni was first able to force 
through an extension of the franchise in an attempt to 
reach those peasants as yet uncorrupted by nationalism. 
Like the emperor, Badeni believed that the nationalism of 
the middle and lower-middle classes was the force that 
could wreck the Monarchy.
In the early spring of 1897 Badeni set out to 
conciliate the Czechs. The Reichsrat elections of March 
1897 had been another resounding success for the Young 
Czechs, and Badeni hoped to win the more moderate of them 
to the side of the government. The state of siege was 
lifted in Prague, press censorship was curtailed, pardons 
were granted to a number of convicted radicals, and Count 
Thun was removed as governor. In April new language 
ordinances were issued for the civil service in Bohemia 
and Moravia. Effective 1 July 1901 all imperial civil 
servants in the two provinces would be required to know 
both Czech and German; local courts would be obliged to
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hear cases in the language of the plaintiff; and internal 
administrative correspondence would be conducted in 
whichever language the original paperwork concerning an 
issue had used. Badeni defended his decrees as being 
vital to the welfare of the Monarchy, and he joined Czech 
spokesmen in pointing out that no more was being required 
of German bureaucrats than Bohemian landowners required of 
their gamekeepers.”
The German parties, almost to a man, refused to 
accept decrees handed down by a cabinet dominated by 
Poles. Five of the key ministries, including Interior, 
Finance, and Foreign Affairs, were held by Poles24— and 
that allowed Czechs to displace Germans. One of Taaffe's 
Polish ministers had long ago warned the recalcitrant 
German Liberals that the Monarchy could be governed 
"without the Germans;" the German parties believed the 
Monarchy was now being governed "against the Germans."25
Violence erupted throughout Bohemia and spread to the 
alpine provinces. The Reichsrat, its sessions disrupted 
by the increasingly violent actions of German deputies, 
was yet again cleared by the police. The gendarmerie had 
to be called in to clear mobs off the Ringstrasse in 
Vienna. The city garrison was called out, and troops were 
in the streets in Salzburg, Graz, Linz, and Prague as 
well. The level of violence rose all through the summer, 
and later writers described the temper in the Austrian
212
lands as "revolutionary" and reminiscent of 1848.26 By 
late summer, with the army in the streets and the 
decennial negotiations with Hungary impending, the idea of 
declaring martial law throughout Cisleithania and ruling 
through military governors-general was in the air.
The Vienna garrison, drawn from the 4.(Vienna), 61. 
(Temesvar), 64.(Broos), 66.(Ungvar), 68.(Budapest), 71. 
(Trencsin), 84.(Vienna), and 1. and 4. Bosnians, was able 
to clear the capital's streets with well-timed appearances 
and the application of rifle butts. Other garrisons were 
less fortunate. Riot duty is always wearing, and few 
things erode morale more rapidity. The Prague garrison 
had been on constant call since Taaffe's day, and the 
demands had taken a toll. The 28.(Prague) Infantry was 
moved out of the city in 1893 and sent to Linz and then on 
to Trient in 18 9 5 . 27 Rothenberg claimed that the 28. had 
become "unreliable,"2® though he did not cite any specific 
instances of disaffection, and some units of the 28. 
remained in the city.29 The 28., an almost wholly Czech 
regiment, may have shown nationalist tendencies or it may 
have been simply exhausted by riot duty. Constrained to 
use minimum force, it may have been battered by the crowds 
and sent away to recover its morale. After all, there 
could be nothing pleasant about living in daily contact 
with a population that might be hurling brickbats at 
soldiers or attacking patrols. In any case, the transfer
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of the 28. was not a harbinger of military unreliability.
In 1897 the Prague command was faced by outbreaks of 
rioting on a scale unknown since 1848. Czech mobs took to 
the street to attack Germans and destroy property owned by 
Germans and Jews. Count Coudenhove, the new governor, 
called out the city garrison. The troops were from the 
28., as well as the 73.(Eger), 88.(Beraun), 91.(Budweis), 
and 102.(Beneschau) as well as the 7.Dragoons and 22. 
Feldjagers. All were Bohemian units, and most were 
largely Czech. Although I Korps (Krakow) and II Korps 
(Vienna) had been alerted in case reinforcements were 
required, the local forces served quite admirably.30
While the Prague garrison was able to maintain order 
in the city, its counterpart at Graz was far less 
fortunate. Styrian Germans had never forgotten the Cilli 
affair, and the riots against the Badeni Ordinances gave 
German nationalists a chance to settle scores not just 
with the Slovenes but with political rivals as well. On 
20 November 1897 violence broke out between rival crowds 
of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists, the latter 
made up largely of students. A full third of the city's 
195 policemen were sent to disperse the crowds, but the 
police were driven off by rioters armed with paving-stones 
and clubs. Socialist leaders were unable to calm their 
followers, and the Christian Socials had no wish to calm
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theirs. The city authorities then requested aid from the 
Graz garrison.
The garrison was not a large one. Graz was the 
headquarters of III Korps, but its barracks were occupied 
only by the 7.(Klagenfurt), 27.(Graz), and 2.Bosnian 
infantry and the 5.Dragoons (Marburg).31 All were Styrian 
or Carinthian units except the Bosnians, and the Bosnians 
would take the blame for all future events. The Bosnian 
regiments had been raised in the mid-1880s after the 
suppression of the conscription revolts in the Occupied 
Provinces and the Krisvosije.32 Conscription had been 
exceedingly unpopular, and attempts to levy troops had 
sparked a year-long revolt.33 Nonetheless, Bosnian units 
were soon raised, and Bosniaken were considered to be fine 
military material, a reputation they would maintain and 
enlarge after 1914. For the moment, however, they could 
not be kept in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was unwise to keep 
armed natives in a newly conquered zone with a centuries- 
long history of violence and instability, and they had 
been moved into the Monarchy proper to relieve line 
regiments with battalions detached to the 
Okkupationsgebiet. Rothenberg believed they had been 
brought in as outsiders to quell urban riots,34 but their 
appearance in Vienna (1892) and Budapest (1891) probably 
reflected convenience as much as anything else. The two 
capitals, with garrisons of half-a-dozen infantry
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regiments and assorted cavalry, artillery, and support 
units, were convenient places to park new regiments. The 
capitals' garrisons required more men than could be raised 
locally, and Bosnians in fezzes seemed no more unusual 
than swaggering mustachioed hussars on the cosmopolitan 
streets of Vienna. The 2. Bosnians had arrived in Graz in
1896. They were a long way from their depot at Banjaluka, 
and the good people of Graz were violent nationalists.
On the night of 20 November 1897 two companies of 
Bosniaks were sent into Graz to restore order. Repeated 
appeals by local Social Democratic officials for the crowd 
to disperse failed to produce any result, and toward 
midnight the Bosniaks made a bayonet charge to clear the 
streets. By 2 a.m. order was restored, but one rioter was 
dead and four badly wounded. The violence ended for the 
moment, but the Bosniaks had become an immediate target 
for popular hatred. They were reviled as outlanders and 
"Muslim mercenaries". The latter term was particularly 
galling to the army, since it was usually prefaced with 
achwarzgelb, black-and-yellow, the dynasty's colors. The 
students and burghers of Graz began to sport blue 
carnations, the symbol of German nationalism, and attack 
the black-and-yellow of the dynasty.
On 26 November a socialist crowd attacked the offices 
of the city's Christian Social newspaper. The Bosniaks 
were called out again, supported by the 5. Dragoons and
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the 27.(Graz) Infantry. Bosnian troops dispersed the 
crowd, but it soon reformed, counterattacked behind a 
barrage of paving stones, and was only then driven off at 
bayonet point. A half-squadron of dragoons, penned in the 
Auerspergplatz by a hostile mob, battered their way out 
with the flat of the sword. FML Anton Succovary, 
commanding III Korps, had to deny publicly press reports 
spreading throughout Cisleithania that his cavalry had 
made repeated sabre charges into the crowds. The edge of 
the sword, Succovary insisted, could only be used in self- 
defense or upon his direct, and as yet ungiven, order.35
On 27 November the Christian Socials came out to seek 
revenge, and fighting erupted in the city's Hauptplatz. A 
socialist group, fleeing from patrols of the 7.
(Klagenfurt) Infantry, was stopped from looting wine shops 
by the arrival of more of the 7. On their return to the 
Hauptplatz they were confronted by a company of Bosniaks. 
Paving stones began to fly, and the Bosniaks fixed 
bayonets and charged. One platoon, clearing out side 
streets, was cut off in the Murgasse and beset by stones 
and roof-tiles hurled from surrounding buildings. The 
battered Bosniaks gave ground down the alleyway. When the 
situation became dangerous, their lieutenant ordered a 
volley. The rioters scattered, leaving one man dead, 
another dying, and twenty wounded. The arrival of cavalry 
reinforcements drove off the rest of the crowd. The men
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of the 7. gave chase to the edge of the Stadtpark, but the 
officers of the regiment chose to forego entanglements in 
the unlighted park. Bayonet fights in a darkened wood 
hardly seemed worthwhile.
The official report from Succovary to the war 
ministry was succinct enough:
On the night of the 26/27th as well as the 
27/28th assistances were rendered against street 
demonstrations caused by students and workers. On 
the first night no major clashes took place. Last 
night four companies of one hundred men each and one 
squadron were employed. A group of Bosnian- 
Herzegovinian Infantry Regiment Nr. 2, belabored by 
stones in the Murgasse, opened fire, killing one 
civilian and wounding others; order was restored 
thereafter. Assistances were concluded between 0100 
and 0300 hours. At 1600 hours today, upon request of 
the governor, six battalions and one squadron under 
Generalmajor Siglitz were held ready on the 
Hauptplatz and in barracks. Reports to follow after 
full investigation.3*
The Bosniaks were of course absolved from any 
wrongdoing. The official report37 made clear that the 
officers of the garrison had used force quite cautiously. 
Given the level of threat, Succovary and his junior 
officers had not even taken advantage of moments when army 
regulations38 would have permitted sabre charges and aimed 
fire. Nonetheless, the Bosniaks became the object of 
virulent local hatred. At a Sunday concert in early 
December crowds greeted the men of the 7. as "German 
brothers" and offered them beer and cigarettes. The 
Bosnians, on the other hand, were subject to both verbal 
and physical abuse, and the regiment was marched back to
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barracks by officers unwilling to order a charge with 
bayonets and rifle butts into well-dressed Sunday 
promenaders. The mayor of Graz was informed that the 
Bosniaks would be kept out of sight as much as possible 
and, most humiliating to Succovary and the garrison 
command, sent out only in tandem with German units.39
The garrison officers, from German and Bosnian 
regiments alike, were excluded from Graz society; shops 
and restaurants became unwilling to serve officers. All 
over Graz the Styrian equivalent of the "no redcoats 
wanted here" that faced Kipling's Tommy Atkins began to 
appear in shop windows.40 The local press attacked the 
"provocative presence" of "foreigners"--off-duty Bos­
niaks— in the town. Any brawl between a Bosniak and a 
local in a tavern became an unprovoked attack by bayonet- 
wielding "Turks" on peaceful German citizens.41 German 
nationalists spoke of events in Graz as a "neu 
Tiirkenkrieg" and promised more violence.42
The furor over the Bosniaks in Graz reached the floor 
of the Reichsrat in early December. The government had 
suffered the humiliation of Badeni's fall in November; the 
Polish strongman had become, after Ficquelmont and 
Metternich, the third Austrian minister in history to be 
driven from office by public clamor.43 The attempt to 
govern "against the Germans" had failed, and once more an 
interim bureaucratic cabinet was appointed to pick up the
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pieces. On 7 December the imperial war minister, the 
delightfully named Krieghammer, rose to defend the honor 
of the army and the competence of III Korps' commanders:
Insofar as the polyglot composition of the 
Austrian army is concerned, I can assure you that 
every regiment, wherever its men are recruited, will 
carry out its duty against the internal and external 
enemies of the Monarchy, and in this regard it makes 
no difference whether a regiment comes from the north 
or the south or what tongue it speaks. In the army 
every nationality is held in equal value and equal 
regard. No officer recognises any differences among 
the nationalities.44
Krieghammer's assurances were both heartfelt and 
true. The army remained loyal and supranational; its 
ability to cobble together a functioning system out of 
disparate nationalities was a model for the Monarchy's 
ruling class, men like Badeni or Taaffe or Krieghammer, 
who saw themselves as servants of the dynasty and not a 
nation. Yet the limitations of the army were also 
evident. The army had performed with discretion and 
loyalty throughout the 1880s and 1890s. But it could only 
restore order, not create the conditions for peace. It 
could clear the streets and keep hostile nationalities 
apart, but it could not be used to govern. The Budapest 
oligarchy could solve its problems with recalcitrant 
peasants or insolent Croats and Romanians by ordering the 
Honved to fire on a crowd, but Cisleithania could not be 
governed by ordering the army to fire on the Czech or 
German middle classes. In the autumn of 1898 crowds of
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burgers pelted the unlucky Graz garrison with rocks and 
garbage, and the emperor, in an uncharacteristic display 
of truculence, demanded to know how the troops had allowed 
themselves to be humiliated and why their officers had 
failed to order the use of firearms.45 It was, however, 
politically impossible to fire on the middle classes, on 
well-dressed crowds of property-owners, students, and 
professionals. In a parliamentary era, one could not 
shoot down the people who made up the backbone of the 
state. So long as no political solution could be reached, 
the army would remain a useful instrument, but one fated 
to be abused by the crowd and battered by both 
parliamentary deputies and paving stones.
Political problems do not exist in isolation; they 
feed off one other. German and Czech intransigence fueled 
each other, and by the end of the 1890s disquieting 
linkages were forming all across the Monarchy. Magyar 
successes in 1867 had inspired Czech nationalists to 
demand autonomy for Bohemia. Every Czech success 
threatened the privileged, not to say dominant, position 
of the Magyars in the Monarchy, and every Czech demand 
provoked the Magyar oligarchs to pre-empt any hope of 
Czech victories over Vienna by making their own demands.
The successes of the Magyars in acquiring the Honved 
provoked Young Czechs to demand their own autonomous 
units. The Hungarians, agitated by the success of Czech
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linguistic demands, moved to defend themselves from 
Slavdom by increasing their campaign to Magyarise the 
minorities. Demands that Magyar be accorded greater use 
in Hungarian regiments were met with a Czech campaign 
calling on Czech recruits to respond in Czech instead of 
army German on the parade ground.46
Hungary had been quiet during the 1880s; the Russian 
threat had been a powerful impetus to cooperate with the 
imperial authorities in strengthening the army. The 
increased Russian troop strength in Poland was just as 
menacing at the end of the 1880s, and there was little 
outright hostility to the army. Nonetheless, the 
Hungarian leadership used the debates over the army bill 
of 1889 to pressure the imperial government for 
concessions. The initial demands were largely symbolic, a 
matter of Count Kalman Tisza, the Hungarian premier, 
covering his left flank against his more vocal opposition. 
Yet they became the opening moves in a game that very 
nearly brought down the Ausgleich.
In the midst of the 1889 debates Hungarian deputies 
began to demand that Hungarian regiments be commanded in 
Magyar and that Hungarian regiments be granted the right 
to carry Hungarian flags and bear Hungarian emblems on 
their uniforms. Such demands had an obvious emotional 
appeal, and Tisza's opposition used them as a stick to 
beat the premier and his more moderate Liberals. Tisza
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had devoted no little time and effort to building a 
working relationship with his counterparts in Vienna, and 
he had no wish to provoke a crisis. He was nonetheless 
all too aware that he was constrained to exact concessions 
from the imperial authorities. In any case, he agreed 
with his opponents that a greater role for Magyar in the 
Hungarian regiments would aid the ongoing effort to force 
Hungary's Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs to adopt the 
language of their masters, and so Tisza brought up his own 
series of linguistic demands during the army bill 
negotiations.
The imperial government was vulnerable to Hungarian 
pressure in 1889. That spring saw a sharp increase in 
Russian troop movements in Poland, and the army wanted its 
annual intake of conscripts raised above the levels 
negotiated in 1879. The army requested an enlargement in 
joint (imperial-royal) army conscription from 89,000 men 
to 103,100. The number itself was not large, but the 
army, which had been unable to win parliamentary approval 
for adjusting recruiting quotas according to population 
growth, was desperate for manpower, and it was willing to 
bargain for even a few thousand extra recruits. The 
general staff and the war ministry were aware that 
Hungarian rapacity, fed by nationalism and the imperial 
weakness revealed by the Czech-German conflict, was
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growing, but there was no alterative to negotiating with 
the Magyar leadership.
Tisza arrived in Vienna in the fall of 1889 with his 
hand strengthened by the increasing level of furor in the 
Hungarian Diet and by riots in the streets of Budapest 
demanding greater "equality" in military affairs for 
Magyardom. He was not prepared to advance the demands of 
the more vocal members of the Diet for full use of Magyar 
as the language of command in the Hungarian regiments, let 
alone the demands of opposition leaders like Count Albert 
Apponyi and Ferenc Kossuth for expansion of the Honved 
into a national Hungarian army. Tisza had called out 
aging survivors of the Ausgleich negotiations to argue 
against the demands of Apponyi and the younger Kossuth. 
Andrassy himself was brought into the Diet to proclaim 
that the demands for a Hungarian national army were 
dangerous not only to the Monarchy but, in the face of 
Russian sabre-rattling in Poland and Bulgaria, dangerous 
to Hungary as well. The architects of the Ausgleich, 
Andrassy said, had not pressed for military separatism, 
and such a course was doubly dangerous now.47
Tisza did not find the negotiations with the imperial 
government very difficult. In return for his support for 
the army bill he was able to return to Budapest with what 
he felt was an appropriate number of concessions. Magyar 
one-year volunteers were no longer required to be fluent
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in German, and, symbolically, the title of the joint army 
was to be altered to show Hungary's status. The army was 
now designated k.-und-k., kaiserlich-und-koniglich, 
imperial - and - royal. The added article represented the 
self-governing status of the Kingdom of Hungary within the 
Monarchy.48 The Hungarians had asked for the change as 
long ago as 1875: Bela Szende, then Honvdd minister, had 
petitioned Vienna to adopt k.-u.-k. gemeinsames Heer or 
simply das Heer for the army's title.49 In any case the 
und had been creeping in. The imperial war ministry had 
protested in 1873 that k.-u.-k. was being "smuggled in" by 
the Hungarians and the popular press, and the common usage 
of the term both within and without the army subverted its 
joint and dynastic status.50 The concessions, like so 
many arguments based on symbols, left no one happy in the 
end. The army disliked any concession to Hungarian 
demands for separatism, and the Hungarians resented still 
being linked in an imperial designation.
The position of the military on both symbolic and 
linguistic concessions was straightforward. The army was 
the single major joint institution in the Monarchy.
Division of the army seemed tantamount to division of the 
Monarchy. At best, the Monarchy would be a mere personal 
union, the Austrian lands and the Kingdom of Hungary held 
together only by the person of Franz Joseph. At worst, as 
the Archduke Albrecht had predicted, the Monarchy would
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dissolve into a welter of fissioning parts. Linguistic 
parity for Magyar was a first and fatal step toward 
separatism. The "independence" parties in Hungary did 
not, the army believed, seek merely to protect the 
national identity of Hungarian troops, but to enforce 
Magyar domination within Hungary.
There were in any case purely military objections to 
any Hungarian demands for language concessions. Only 
thirty-six of the Monarchy's 102 regular infantry 
regiments spoke one tongue, and of the forty-one regiments 
raised in Hungary only seven were purely Magyar­
speaking.51 The military consequences of linguistic 
parity were quite obviously unfortunate: increased 
difficulty of communication within the army and decreased 
speed of mobilisation. There were already HonvSd staff 
officers who spoke no German.52 There was simply no way 
to reconcile military necessity with two official 
languages of command.53
The Magyar position was not quite so simple. Tisza 
was a firm supporter of the terms of the Ausgleich as they 
stood. He had been Andrassy's chosen successor, and he 
had inherited a healthy fear of the Russians. He had 
become skilled at using the Honved to keep the minorities 
in line at bayonet point, and he had no wish to force 
issues in the joint army. Yet the army bill debates of 
1889/90 had been Tisza's swan song. He had made himself
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seem insufficiently radical to the followers of Apponyi 
and Ferenc Kossuth, and, by the spring of 1890, he found 
himself vilified in the Diet and by the opposition press 
and resigned the premiership in disgust after fifteen 
years in power.
His Liberals remained in control of the government, 
but there was no firm leadership to defend the Ausgleich 
arrangements. The opposition held the high ground of 
political symbolism, exploiting Magyar fears of the 
nationalities, emotional bonds with the revolution of 
1848, hatred and fear of Slavic (i.e., Czech) successes, 
and pride in Hungarian sovereignty. All factions agreed 
that the use of Magyar in Hungarian regiments was vital to 
Magyarising the nationalities, and Apponyi's faction 
disdained the joint army as a foreign occupation force and 
hoped to see the Honved and the Hungarian joint regiments 
merged into a national army. Ferenc Kossuth added 
antidynastic sentiment to a disdain for the army as an 
institution.5<
The early 1890s saw a rapid growth of opposition 
sentiment in Hungary. Opposition to the Liberals, to the 
party which had supported the Ausgleich, grew as memories 
of 1849 faded. The joint structure of the Monarchy came 
to seem, as Norman Stone had it, a "luxury".55 The Czechs 
were forcing the Germans from dominance in Bohemia, and 
the Magyars could hardly do less. The arrival on the
political scene of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had 
become Franz Joseph's heir-apparent following the suicide 
of Crown Prince Rudolf, did little to inspire confidence 
in the future of Dualism. Other members of the dynasty, 
notably Albrecht, had been hostile to Hungary in the past, 
but the new imperial successor manifested an open and 
total hatred for all things Magyar. Albrecht had despised 
the Hungarian political leadership but believed that the 
ordinary Hungarian soldier, if properly led and fairly 
treated, would be loyal to the Monarchy and the emperor. 
Franz Ferdinand openly doubted the loyalty of all 
Hungarian officers56 and proclaimed that all Hungarians, 
cabinet minister, prince, cardinal, burgher, peasant, 
hussar, servant, were each and every one revolutionaries 
and potential traitors.57 The Liberals depended on the 
Ausgleich; Dualism seemed likely to pass away with the old 
emperor.
The final Ausgleich negotiations of the century 
arrived in the wake of the Badeni riots in the Austrian 
lands. The opposition parties had taken advantage of 
Hungary's celebration of one thousand years of nationhood 
to proclaim 1896 a year of political truce, and it was 
only to be expected that, after such a well-publicized 
display of graciousness, 1897 would be a bitter year for 
both the ruling Liberals and the imperial government.
There was growing sentiment on the part of the
professionals and small businessmen who made up the 
backbone of the opposition parties in favor of a separate 
Hungarian customs area58, and the long-playing crisis 
across the Leitha had its repercussions in Hungary. 
Bohemian "state rights" were seen by the opposition as a 
prelude to a tripartite Monarchy, and there was an impetus 
to extract concessions from Vienna before Prague could win 
any victories that would incite the nationalities in 
Hungary or diminish Hungary's role in the Monarchy. There 
was no hope of unseating the Liberals in any sort of 
ordinary election; Tisza had built up a party structure 
that gave them an unassailable edge even without himself 
as premier. In any case government controlled both the 
location of polling places and the counting of ballots.
The "electoral geometry" designed to keep the 
nationalities in their place kept the Magyar opposition in 
its place as well. Yet there was capital to be made. The 
imperial government had shown its weakness in Bohemia, and 
the opposition stood to gain support by scourging the 
Liberals for their failure to take full advantage of 
imperial disarray.
The demands made in the Hungarian parliament after 
1896 reflected a deep strain of national arrogance as 
well. In the late spring of 1897 the Young Czech press 
began to demand that Czech recruits called up for service 
but not yet in uniform, conscripts in limbo between
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arrival at a barracks and the issue of the blue-grey 
soldier's plumage, be allowed to respond to commands in 
Czech.59 The harried imperial authorities were having 
none of it, however. Conscripts who chose to answer zde 
instead of hier at roll call were threatened with martial 
law and military courts, as were those politicians and 
journalists who egged them on. The Young Czechs retreated 
before a display of imperial determination, and the Czech 
failure, well-publicized in Budapest, was a goad to 
Hungarian nationalists: the Magyars would be able to win 
the sort of symbolic victory that had eluded the Czechs.
The first demands of the opposition parties, the so- 
called '48 parties, concerned the economic provisions of 
the Ausgleich. The economic treaties between Hungary and 
the Austrian lands expired at midnight on 31 December
1897. The '48 parties had devoted themselves to a policy 
of obstructing the renewal of the Ausgleich treaties 
throughout the year, and their demands on the government 
had driven the Liberals away from any productive 
negotiations. On New Year's Day 1898 the opposition 
parties announced that Hungary was no longer integrated 
with the rest of the Monarchy’s economy; Hungary was free 
to establish its own customs zone and erect protective 
tariffs. The government, however, managed to force a one- 
year "temporary" renewal through the Diet, and early in 
the year the Austrian and Hungarian premiers signed a
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memorandum of understanding which extended the economic 
clauses of the 1887 agreements pending some definitive 
action on the part of the Hungarians.60 The opposition's 
position was that the agreement was totally illegal and 
that the country was being governed ex lex, outside the 
law. The opposition managed to block the 1899 budget and 
recruiting authorizations and announced that, should the 
imperial authorities attempt to collect taxes or levy 
recruits, the king would be in violation of the 
constitution and his coronation oath.61
The imperial government now found its ability to 
maintain the army under attack. Recruiting in Hungary was 
a problem under the best of circumstances. Hungarian 
poverty kept the physical quality of conscripts below that 
of their Cisleithanian counterparts, and the army had to 
take an older age group in order to find a sufficient 
number of physically acceptable men.62 Opposition 
successes in 1898 meant that the recruit levies for 1899, 
1900, and 1901 had to be met by a painfully hammered-out 
set of emergency measures and annual bills. Time-expired 
men were retained in service, and men from the 
Eraatzreserve were called up to active service.
Hungarian obstruction also came at a time when the 
army, dissatisfied with the recruit quotas of 1889, was 
preparing to plead for more men. War minister Krieghammer 
had hoped to use 1899 to ask for more recruits; he was now
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forced to try emergency measures to keep the army manned 
at all, even at the level of 1889.63 In the autumn of 
1902 Krieghammer, despairing in an attempt to gain formal 
approval for using the Eraatzreserve as a permanent source 
of peacetime manpower for the joint army, finally asked 
for an increase in the recruiting quotas. The joint army 
would receive annual levies of 125,000 men— 71,562 from 
the Austrian lands and 53,438 from Hungary. The proposal 
was the spark that ignited five years of crisis in 
Hungary.
The upheaval in Hungary is conventionally known as 
the crisis of 1905, the year of greatest drama. Its 
origins may have been in the demands of the opposition, of 
the professional classes and small businessmen, for a 
protective customs zone and a separate national bank64, 
but by the end of 1902 it had evolved into a fight over 
the nature of the army. Contemporary observers understood 
that the army was at the center of opposition demands65 
but were unaware of the depth of the crisis or its 
severity. In 1902 the army attempted to expand its 
recruit quotas to keep itself effective against the 
numerically superior Russians and found itself under 
attack at every turn by Magyar nationalists.
In October 1902 the war ministry presented the 
Hungarian Diet with a request for a substantial increase 
in recruiting; Hungary's share would be 16,292 more men—
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10,727 for the joint army, 3000 for the Honved, and 2565 
for the supplementary reserve. No one doubted that 
Hungary's population could support the increase. There 
were even inducements— new NCO schools and military 
hospitals for the Honved— designed to win favor among the 
nationalists. Yet the '48 parties had been battered by 
Liberal electoral chicanery in 1901, and the army bill 
seemed to be the perfect emotional issue on which to build 
popularity and recoup their fortunes. And, as one 
opposition spokesman pointed out, "Our king is well along 
in years, and we must use these few [remaining] years to 
take advantage of his attention to the law and his oath. 
Every Hungarian knows that dark days are coming for our 
country. . . "6S
The opposition was prepared to seize the moment, and 
on 27 January 1903 the Party of Independence presented the 
government and the imperial authorities with a list of 
military demands: Hungarian officers to serve only in
Hungarian regiments; all officers in Hungarian regiments 
to be fluent in Magyar; Magyar to be the language of 
command and service in Hungarian regiments; Hungarian 
regiments to bear Hungarian national crests and flags; 
regiments raised on Hungarian soil to swear allegiance to 
the Hungarian Constitution; active service to be reduced 
from three years to two; and Hungarian regiments to be 
stationed only in Hungary in time of peace.67
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The military and the imperial government found the 
demands totally unacceptable, but they were frighteningly 
popular in Hungary. They had an immediate appeal to 
national emotion, and, by asking for a reduction in the 
terms of active service, the opposition parties Btood to 
gain a major body of support on purely practical lines.
The military could see only disaster ahead. Taken as a 
body, the opposition demands called for the creation de 
facto of a separate Hungarian army, stationed only in 
Hungary and commanded in Magyar, loyal to the Hungarian 
constitution— meaning loyal to the Magyar oligarchy and 
not to the dynasty, flying national red-white-green flags 
instead of Habsburg black-and-gold. The opposition 
demands called for a return to the state of affairs of the 
spring of 1848 and the first heady days of "reforms." The 
end, the military leadership believed, would be the summer 
and autumn of 1848 againi reform would be followed by an 
attempt to assert Hungarian independence, and civil war 
would follow.
The opposition demands had seized the emotional high 
ground in Hungarian politics, and there was a steady flow 
of Liberal politicians away from government positions and 
toward more strident nationalism. Obstruction in the Diet 
prevented a succession of short-lived ministries from 
doing anything to reach a lasting agreement with Vienna.
A four-month bill allowing the government to levy recruits
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expired in April 1903 and, without any renewal possible 
over opposition obstruction, Hungary was once again ex lex 
as of 1 May 1903. By June the emperor was ready to go 
outside the halls of the Diet to find a premier, and in 
late June Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary, the long-time Ban 
of Croatia, was named premier. Khuen-Hedervary had made a 
name for himself as an iron-fisted viceroy in Zagreb, but 
his tenure as premier was no happier than that of Badeni, 
another viceroy who found the capital more troublesome 
than the provinces. The Magyarone aristocracy of Croatia 
were no more than kept puppets, and the Honved was always 
at hand to deal with Croats who took to the streets. The 
politicians of the Diet were arrogant, anarchic, and free 
from the threat of viceregal police. Khuen-Hedervary, 
used to issuing orders, was unable to reach any
compromises and unwilling to yield on any point because of
personal pride. By mid-August 1903 he found himself 
increasingly isolated and powerless, and he handed in his 
resignation.
There was now no chance of securing a recruit bill in 
1903, let alone securing Hungarian agreement to any
expansion of the army. Hungarian conscripts of 1900 due
for discharge on 1 October 1903 were informed that they 
would be retained indefinitely. In mid-August the emperor 
visited Budapest but found no one willing to form a
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ministry. By September he took the occasion of cavalry 
maneuvers at the Galician village of Chlopy to speak out:
I have determined to satisfy myself once more 
concerning the instructional establishments, 
leadership, and conduct— -as well as the overall 
constitution and readiness— of all my troops. . . I 
must and will maintain their existing and proven 
arrangements. My Army in particular— whose solid 
framework is being threatened by one-sided ambitions 
wholly ignorant of the noble ambitions it has to 
fulfill for the welfare of both state-regions of the 
Monarchy— must know that 1 will never relinquish the 
rights and powers which are granted its Supreme 
Warlord. Joint and unified as it now is shall my 
Army remain— the strong power for defense of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against every foe.68
On 22 September the emperor informed Khuen-Hedervary
and, through him, the entire Hungarian leadership, that
his position was inflexible. He did, however, hint that
there existed the possibility of some negotiated changes
in the administration of the k.-u.-k. army. The emperor
pointed out that, while he had always defended the
Ausgleich and the rights of the Hungarian nation, he could
not diminish his sovereign rights under the Ausgleich, nor
would he agree to any measure that would weaken the army
and thus be detrimental to both partners in the
Monarchy.69
The Liberal leadership met in Budapest a week later 
to work out a compromise on the army question. A working 
group of nine, headed by ex-premier Kalman Szell and Count 
Istvan Tisza, son of Kalman Tisza, was formed, and on 18 
October the committee issued its recommendations:
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Hungarian emblems should be given greater prominence; the 
Hungarian military commands should correspond with local 
civil authorities only in Magyar; Magyar should be used in 
all military courts convened in Hungarian regiments; 
Hungarian troops should, insofar as military necessity and 
administrative requirements allowed, be commanded by 
Hungarian officers; all Hungarian officers should be 
transferred to Hungarian regiments; and Hungarian cadet 
schools should be expanded. The committee went on to 
recognize that the language of service and command was a 
prerogative of the crown and "for grave political reasons 
affecting the larger interests of the nation" refrained 
from seeking changes.70 Within a week, the emperor 
accepted the proposals as a basis for negotiation and 
authorized Count Istvan Tisza to form a cabinet. The 
rights of the crown had been recognised; Franz Joseph felt 
the rest of the proposals to be purely administrative 
matters open to discussion.
Tisza was not a popular man in Vienna. He was no 
less a nationalist than his fellow Magyar lords, and he 
had once dismissed a report on Hungarian affairs by an 
Austrian minister-president as "the dilettante opinion of 
a distinguished foreigner."71 He was nonetheless the only 
Hungarian leader not afflicted by the chronic 
shortsightedness of his class, and he had no patience with 
the anarchic grandstanding that party politics had become
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since his father's death. Tisza was willing to accept the 
personal costs of the premiership— accusations in the Diet 
and the opposition press that he was a traitor to Hungary 
and no more than the bought agent of the court— and his 
high-handed methods had some success at checking the chaos 
beginning to permeate political life. In March 1904 Tisza 
bludgeoned through temporary recruit and budget bills, 
allowing the army to release some reservists and time- 
expired men and finally permitting the government to pay 
some of its bills. He was adept and ruthless in shutting 
off political opponents, and he was no less hard-fisted in 
dealing with disorder beyond the Diet. The Honved was 
called out in early 1904 to break a major rail strike, and 
on Tisza's orders recalcitrant strikers found themselves 
forcibly enlisted in the Honved and subjected to military 
law.
Nonetheless, the situation in Hungary continued to 
deteriorate. Tisza's insistence on parliamentary order 
provoked greater discontent within Liberal ranks and drove 
once-loyal deputies deprived of their time-honored rights 
to filibuster and shout imprecations closer to Apponyi and 
Ferenc Kossuth. Violence had begun in the streets as 
well. In October 1903 a wreath commemorating the rebel 
generals executed at Arad in 1849 appeared on the Kossuth 
monument at Szeged, supposedly delivered in the name of 
the third-year men of the local garrison. Military police
of the 46. (Szeged) sent to remove the wreath found 
themselves opposed by civil police sent by the county 
authorities to defend it. In the ensuing fight two 
civilians were seriously wounded.” Fights between 
soldiers and civilians, or duels between officers and 
satisfaktionsfahig Magyars, had never been uncommon in 
Hungary; they now became epidemic. Violence in the 
streets was reflected in the Diet, and Magyar deputies 
proved no less fond of smashing furniture than their Czech 
counterparts. When Tisza proclaimed to his constituents 
that a joint army was required for Hungary's security and 
that order in parliament was vital if Hungary was not to 
go the way of the disintegrating Cisleithanian lands, the 
opposition leadership arranged a display of violent 
physical displeasure. The proud opposition leaders, 
including an ex-premier, had themselves photographed 
smiling proudly in the ruins of the Diet chamber, pieces 
of shattered benches and desks clutched in their hands 
like swords of honour.73
In mid-December 1904 Tisza dissolved the Diet and 
announced new elections for January. He seems to have 
hoped that the electorate would reject the 
irresponsibility of the opposition or, alternatively, that 
the opposition, if confronted with a serious chance of 
power, would moderate their demands. In either case,
Tisza seriously miscalculated. The opposition had long
since captured the emotional issues of the campaign, and 
Tisza's role in breaking parliamentary "freedom" to 
obstruct business had driven a large number of local 
notables, the men who ran the county administrations, into 
the opposition camp. The election campaign was marked by 
serious outbursts of violence, and Cisleithanian troops, 
as opposed to the Honved, which usually enforced the 
government's will at the polls, had to be called in.74 
The election itself was held four days after "Bloody 
Sunday" in St. Petersburg, and the massacre of Russian 
workers, graphically and widely reported in the Hungarian 
press, was linked to reports in Independence Party papers 
that the emperor had offered k.-u.-k. troops to help the 
tsar shoot down the workers of St. Petersburg.75 Tisza 
himself remained oddly passive throughout the campaign, 
and for the first time in living memory the considerable 
repressive apparatus of the Hungarian government was not 
brought to bear on voters.75 The combined opposition 
parties won 231 seats to the Liberals' 159, a massive 
repudiation of the policies of Tisza and the supporters of 
the Ausgleich.
The victors assumed that, having broken the dominance 
of the Liberals, they could dictate terms at the Hofburg. 
Ferenc Kossuth was granted an audience (in Magyar) with 
the emperor, who indicated his willingness to go forward 
with the proposals drawn up by the Committee of Nine
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headed by Tisza and Kalman Szell in October 1904.77 The 
younger Kossuth showed some personal tact before the man 
who had been his father's arch enemy, but the younger 
Andrassy announced that there could be no hope of an 
increase in the recruit quota, and that he, Andrassy, 
would join a new government only on the basis of an 
independent customs zone and a full implementation of 
Magyar language of command.78 Gyula Justh, one of the 
younger leaders of the Party of Independence and newly- 
appointed speaker of the Diet, informed the emperor that, 
even if Magyar became the language of command in Hungarian 
regiments, Hungary still demanded an independent national 
army, a point of view expressed again by the Diet in an 
address to the throne offered that spring.79
Late in March Feldmarschalleutenant Heinrich von 
Pitreich, the imperial war minister, and Admiral Count 
Rudolf Montecuccoli, the chief of the naval staff, arrived 
in Budapest to meet with the new majority leadership on 
military questions. Montecuccoli was the architect of the 
remarkable growth of the k.-u.-k. fleet, and he hoped to 
avoid any crisis that would slacken the flow of funds and 
men for his new and cherished navy. Pitreich was known as 
a moderate on "superficial" issues such as flags and 
emblems, and was ready to compromise. His own view was 
that externals were of limited importance. Hungarian 
troops had sported distinctive dress since Theresian
times, and they would be no less brave or loyal for having 
St. Stephen's crown on their uniform buttons in place of 
the double eagle. A willingness to compromise on small 
things, Pitreich held, was the key to saving the larger 
goal of a unified and enlarged army.80 Pitreich's 
willingness to be flexible was unable to win over the 
parties of the victorious coalition. The new majority 
rejected any growth in the military budget and insisted on 
Magyar as the language of command in all Hungarian units. 
By May it was obvious that the new Diet was firm in its 
position and that no government could be formed that would 
be acceptable to the crown. The flow of emissaries from 
Vienna to Budapest, and from government offices to those 
of Ferenc Kossuth and Count Apponyi, came to an abrupt 
halt. Late in May Franz Joseph decided upon a new 
expedient! a non-parliamentary ministry.81
Non-parliamentary ministries were nothing new west of 
the Leitha; the Austrian lands had long been governed by 
cabinets of technicians. In Hungary, though, a cabinet 
could not be purely "colorless” politically; it had also 
to be identifiably Hungarian. The choice of premier, 
announced on 28 May, was Feldzeugmeistsr Baron Fejervary, 
commander of the Royal Hungarian Life Guards. Fejervary 
was 72, with a long and honorable history of service to 
the dynasty. He had been decorated for bravery under fire 
at Solferino and had gone to service both in the emperor's
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military chancellery and as commander of line regiments.
He was a loyalist to the core, but his "Hungarian" 
credentials were no less impressive. In 1872 he had 
served as deputy to Bela Szende, the first Honved 
minister, and from 1884 to 1904 had been Honved minister 
himself. The Honved existed as a fighting force largely 
due to Fejervary's untiring efforts.” The old general 
was not averse to a separate Hungarian customs area, nor 
was he a friend of the nationalities or the lower 
classes.83 Even at the nadir of its popularity, the 
Fejervary government was willing to send the gendarmerie 
and the Honved out to the Dunatul to smash harvesters' 
strikes at the behest of many of those same magnates 
(including Apponyi) who branded Fejervary a traitor®4 and 
to use regular cavalry against striking miners at 
Fiinfkirchen.85 Hungary, Fejervary said, could be governed 
only with a club, but it had to be painted the national 
red-white-green.66
Initial reaction to his appointment justified Henry 
Wickham Steed's report in the London Times that, in 
leaving retirement to take up the premiership, Fejervary 
was "sacrificing his brilliant past and comfortable 
present, and. . . condemning himself to spend the 
remaining years of his life as an object of hatred."®7 
The Budapest press announced his arrival by headlining 
"The Bodyguards Are ComingI" and by treating his
appointment as a kind of royal coup. The Fejervary 
government never shook off its military stigma. To its 
enemies it remained the Trabantenregierung (Magyar: 
Darabont-kormany), the Life Guards' Regime. On 20 June, 
the day before Fejervary was to be presented to the Diet, 
the coalition leaders issued a statement terming the new 
government illegal and unacceptable.88 The next day 
Fejervary faced the Diet, read out the proposed program of 
his ministry in the face of mounting unrest and abuse from 
the deputies, and then produced a royal rescript 
proroguing the Diet. Legally, the Diet had now forfeited 
its place as a legislative body; any enactments it might 
make were invalid, illegal, and could be treated as acts 
of rebellion.89 The cabinet members left the platform for 
their offices. The deputies, left alone, raised a cheer 
for Norway, which had declared itself independent of 
Sweden two weeks before.90 The deputies went on to vote a 
resolution of "national resistance" calling on all county 
and local governments to refuse to collect taxes or to 
call up recruits. The coalition ordered the proclamation 
printed and sent out to all local officials, and a 
"steering committee"— in effect, a government-in-exile—  
was set up to make policy.91 The '48 parties, in refusing 
to govern or to allow the functions of government to 
proceed, had finally emulated their fathers and
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grandfathers: they were, not to put too fine a point on 
it, in rebellion against their king.92
The melodrama in the Diet was great fun for observers 
from the Viennese popular press; it was less amusing for 
observers in the k.-u.-k. army. The generals knew
rebellion when they saw it, and they had no intention of
being caught off-guard as their counterparts had been in 
1848. The army was the ultimate guarantor of the 
Monarchy, and by midsummer 1905 the operational planning 
bureaus had begun to draw up contingency plans for a 
military solution to the crisis in Hungary.
In four decades of Dualism there had been any number 
of imperial officers who wished to repay Magyar insolence 
with a march on Budapest. Such was the stuff of talk over 
the late-night brandy in the officers' mess. Yet the 
emperor had firmly defended the Ausgleich settlement, and 
there was no desire at the top to replace the Dualist
structure by force, to give choleric colonels and majors
their chance to cross the Leitha and "sort the bastards 
out." When Crown Prince Rudolf suggested in 1886 that 
anti-military and anti-Dynastic riots in Budapest be put 
down by a military government, Archduke Albrecht rebuked 
him for showing such immaturity.93 Baron Max-Vladimir 
Beck, Austrian minister-president from 1906 to 1908 and 
cousin of the chief of the general staff, bluntly told his 
old pupil Franz Ferdinand to give over his dreams of
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shattering the Magyar oligarchy by force: it was no
longer 1849, and no conquest of Hungary was conceivable.94
The plans that emerged in the summer of 1905 were put 
together by the Operations Bureau of the general staff and 
later collected in the Kriegsarchiv as Fall U. (Fasz.
182). Glaise-Horstenau's biography of Beck claimed that 
in case of major disturbances in Hungary, the 4. Infantry 
Division (Briinn) and cavalry from the 15. Dragoons would 
occupy Budapest, while the 25. Division, based on Vienna, 
would join the Styrian 5. Dragoons to secure the 
connections between the two capitals.95 Yet until 
Rothenberg and Peball published a precis of the Fall U. 
documents in 1969, the level of force expected had not 
been analyzed by historians of the Monarchy. The 
description given by Glaise-Horstenau implied an 
occupation, an extension of the "assistances" rendered the 
civil power. The documents in Fall V. bear out Baron 
Beck's point that Hungary could only be pacified with 
shattering levels of force. Fall U. is a plan for a full- 
scale civil war.
Fall U, is not a single coherent plan, but rather a 
collection of plans. And it lacks the appended 
information that such a plan would generate later in the 
century— consideration of casualties, of foreign political 
ramifications, and, most importantly, how it would be 
funded. The basis of Fall U. is a study of "A Military
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Solution of the Hungarian Question" dated Raab, February 
1904 and signed by Generalmajor Moritz von Auffenberg, 
commanding the 65. Infantry Brigade. Building upon this 
is a longer "Study U.," dated Vienna, 13 August 1905, 
undersigned by Colonel Heinrich Krauss-Elislago, chief of 
the Operations Bureau, and annotated by FML Oskar 
Potiorek, deputy chief of the general staff. There is 
also a manuscript on "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by 
Force of Arms," signed by Oberstleutnant Artur von 
Mecenseffy of the Operations Bureau and dated Vienna, 19 
July 1905. The Mecenseffy study has various appendices 
containing drafts of imperial proclamations on public 
order to be issued in both Hungary and Cisleithania and 
orders for the commanders of IV., V., VI., XII., and XIII. 
Korps in case the staff plans became operational.
Auffenberg's work, the basis of the other two
proposals, is dated February 1904. The other two studies 
are dated July-August 1905, though the Mecenseffy 
manuscript has an undated appendix on "Kriegsfall U.—  
General Mobilisation. Appendix to the Wartime Order of 
Battle Effective 1 April 1905." Rothenberg and Peball 
could not determine an exact date for the start of staff 
planning96, but the addition of an Hungarian appendix to 
mobilisation orders effective in April and the completion 
of Mecenseffy's work in mid-July suggest that work began
before the presentation of the Fejervary government to the
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Diet and may have begun as a staff question not long after 
Pitreich and Admiral Montecuccoli returned from Budapest 
at the end of March.
Auffenberg's work was in any case a "private" matter. 
Sometime in late 1902 Auffenberg had surveyed the 
Hungarian situation and begun to draw up plans for an 
armed intervention. His work was something more than a 
pipe-dream of "sorting the bastards out". Auffenberg 
claimed later that he had resolved to look at the state of 
affairs in Hungary "with the conscientiousness of an 
historian and with the care of an imperial soldier fearful 
for the future of the Dual Monarchy."97 But this is quite 
disingenuous. Auffenberg had been made Generalmajor in 
1900, and he was very much the ambitious officer. He was 
courting Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his party, and 
Auffenberg was sending along lengthy observations on the 
state of the army and the situation in Hungary to the 
Archduke's retinue at the Belvedere in Vienna. He hoped 
to use Franz Ferdinand's patronage to win his marshal's 
baton, and indeed by 1911 he would be the Belvedere's 
choice for war minister.98 The Archduke found in 
Auffenberg's reports exactly what he wanted to hear: 
reports from an officer with both line and staff 
experience that argued for shattering the Magyars by 
force.
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Auffenberg's goal was the "complete and fundamental 
reduction of Hungary and the permanent establishment of a 
promised new order;"99 his means were speed and force: 
"offensive d outrance, an offensive carried out to the 
final consequences of the opportunity."100 Auffenberg 
proposed to mobilise the Cisleithanian troops of the 
Monarchy plus Romanian and Croat troops of the Hungarian 
regiments against the HonvSd, unreliable Hungarian units, 
and elements of the civil population armed and led by 
nationalist radicals. His own figures, inconsistent both 
within the plan and arithmetically, give totals of 371 
battalions, 198 squadrons, and 150 batteries/1202 guns 
(Appendix II: Order of Battle) or 399 battalions, 212 
squadrons, and 144 batteries/1136 guns (Part IV:
Operations Plan) available for disposition in three 
armies. A main force (Danube Army) of 194 battalions, 102 
squadrons, and 80 batteries drawn from II., III., VIII., 
IX., and XIV. Korps would move out in two columns, Vienna- 
Pressburg-Esztergom and Graz-Szombathely, to link up on 
the Danube at Budapest. A northern army (144 battalions,
84 squadrons, 54 batteries) would move Przemysl-Eperjes- 
Kassa, split through Eger and the line Ungvar-Munkacs and 
reunite on the Tisza. A small southern army (33 
battalions, 12 squadrons, 16 batteries) would leave the 
line Belovar-Esseg, move to Pecs and then divide, one 
column occupying Kecskemet while the bulk of the southern
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forces would reach the Danube and move north to join the 
Danube Army.101
The key to the problem was Budapest itself, and 
Auffenberg proposed to strike hard for the capital. 
Auffenberg saw concentrations of "reliable" artillery at 
Pressburg, Odenburg, and Komorn {although supported only 
by five "reliable" battalions of infantry) and groupings 
of loyal units around the capital— two battalions of the 
23. (Sombor) and three battalions of the 3. Bosnians in 
Budapest, plus two battalions of the 76. (Odenburg) at 
Gran and one battalion of the 69. (Stuhlweissenburg) plus 
one squadron of the 12. Uhlans at Stuhlweissenburg.102 
The western approaches to the capital were vulnerable, and 
Auffenberg proposed to strike at the heart of national 
resistance before forces in eastern Hungary, with its 
heavy concentration of "unreliable" troops along the line 
Kaschau-Miskolcz-Debreczin-Grosswardein, could be raised 
and Honvdd units moved west or the loyal garrisons 
overwhelmed.
Initial Hungarian opposition would, Auffenberg 
estimated, come from 170 battalions, 150 squadrons, and 
200 guns. He assumed from the outset that the HonvSd 
would be openly hostile, and that, if given time, the 
Magyar political leadership would attempt to arm the 
populace and set inactive or reserve officers at their 
head. He did not expect whole HonvSd regiments to mutiny
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instantly but foresaw instead an ongoing flow of Honved 
troops to the enemy. The same would be true of regular 
Hungarian regiments. Auffenberg counted ninety-two 
battalions of twenty-three regiments as unreliable, and to 
those he added one hundred squadrons of hussars. Fifty- 
four squadrons of Honvdd hussars, about eighty battalions 
of Honvdd infantry, and 150 to 200 guns, or about 1/4 of 
the Hungarian artillery, to make up his total.103
Auffenberg was not concerned with the political 
consequences of his plan. He regarded the Slovaks as 
broken by the Magyars and thus likely to follow their 
masters' lead.104 Beyond that, Auffenberg's concerns 
were purely technical. The Russians were distracted in 
Manchuria, the Magyars were moving toward rebellion, and, 
looking out from brigade headquarters at Raab, Auffenberg 
saw the time at hand for a final settling of accounts with 
Budapest. In any case, Auffenberg could not afford to 
dwell on political matters. Even had they been within his 
competence, he could not afford to bring them to the 
attention of the patron he was courting. The archduke was 
always ready to have his prejudices confirmed, but he was 
known to dislike meddlers.
The general staff could afford no such inhibitions.
Any military settlement in Hungary involved more than 
sending in troops. Disturbances in Hungary covered a 
range of possibilities, from passive resistance by local
251
authorities to widespread rioting to outright rebellion. 
Suppression of disturbances by military force would have 
effects not only on the local population but on the 
regiments of the k.-u.-k. army drawn from Hungary as well. 
The "Solution of the Hungarian Crisis by Force of Arms” 
drawn up by Mecenseffy was concerned in large part with 
the problem of isolating the army from the political 
effects of an intervention. Mecenseffy's introduction 
pointed out:
We are concerned with, to face facts, the 
suppression of the revolutionary attempts, and also 
with the suppression of possible risings which might 
spread to part of the Army. In order to prevent the 
latter, the most important task of the army 
leadership lies in. . . the management and 
maintenance of discipline in the army. Whether this 
can succeed, since the uninterrupted subversive 
activity of the Party of Independence has been 
indecisively and passively regarded for months, is 
another question.105
The operational possibilities envisioned by 
Mecenseffy and the staff were not terribly different from 
those seen by Auffenberg. All five corps bordering 
Hungary (I, II, X, XI, and XIII) would be mobilised, with 
VIII. and IX. Korps acting as a strategic reserve. There 
would follow a concentric advance into Hungary proper.
Units from I. Korps would advance to Turocz-Szt. Marton, 
Sillein, and the valley of the Waag; X. Korps would move 
via Ungvar-Nagy Mihaly and Kaschau; XI. Korps would move 
troops to Maramores-Sziget, Huszt, and Munkacs; XIII.
Korps would move troops up to Nagykanisza and Pecs; II.
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Korps at Vienna would send out eight to ten battalions 
with a strong artillery component by ship to Pressburg and 
Komorn. Cavalry would move to Komorn by land, screened by 
the guns of the Danube Flotilla. The western lines of the 
Hungarian rail net would be seized by advance units.
Troops designated for occupation duties would be mobilised 
behind the forces making the initial move into Hungary and 
could be rapidly fed into areas secured in the initial 
coup de main.106 Transport capability at the Vienna 
docks (Donaukanal, Winterhafen, Brigittenauer Lande, 
Donau-Ufer, Kaisermiihlen), estimated for early September 
would be 2320 men (or 1890 men plus 130 horses, or 1890 
men and 60 guns)—  or 2650 men if the ships of the 
Pressburg-Vienna local run were taken from trade.107
Mecenseffy divided the Hungarian units of the joint 
army into "reliable" and "unreliable" categories on a 
simple basis: units with more than fifty percent Magyar 
personnel were automatically regarded as unreliable.
Joint army units plus the inherently unreliable HonvSd 
forces in the five Hungarian corps area included 150 
battalions, 120 squadrons, and forty-four batteries with 
fifty percent plus Magyars, and sixty-three battalions, 
five squadrons and forty-four batteries of "loyal" 
troops.108 Even if one assumed that some Magyars in 
unreliable units would simply desert rather than go into 
open rebellion and that not all units were at full
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strength, a rebel command would have fifty- one regiments 
of infantry and seventy-seven squadrons of hussars 
immediately available at full combat strength.109 The 
non-Magyar population at large could be expected to be 
passive. They had been "made cunning through experience 
and bitter disappointment," a reference to the treatment 
of the Croats in 1849 and the events on the Border in 
1868, and they had no reason to trust the imperial 
government to protect them against Magyar revenge. As 
much as the Croats, Romanians, Serbs, and Saxons hated the 
Magyar oligarchs, in a separate Magyar state their sheer 
mass might provide them with political weight.110 The 
imperial military could expect no help from the non- 
Magyars this time, and it would have to contend alone with 
treason in the Honved and unreliability in the ranks of 
the joint army.
The Operations Bureau of the general staff received 
Mecenseffy's work in mid-July. Through July the 
Coalition parties had devoted themselves to promoting a 
policy of total non-cooperation with the Fejervary 
government by the country and municipal authorities. In 
mid-July the city of Budapest announced that not even 
voluntary recruits would be accepted for the joint army 
and that the city would not accept any tax payments.
Within a few days the interior ministry had set about 
annulling such local ordinances and using the gendarmerie
to deliver and enforce conscription orders.111 The 
Fejervary cabinet had begun to consider the idea of using 
the gendarmerie and the military simply to replace the 
county administrations, local bodies whose impotence had 
been emphasized by their willingness to beg the "illegal" 
Fejervary government for aid when farm-labor and miners' 
strikes broke out all through the Dunatul.112 The 
Operations Bureau, considering the decay of affairs in 
Hungary, decided that "under the present circumstances in 
Hungary, military measures for the restoration of the 
legal order could be especially urgent around the time of 
the 15th of September.1,113 In mid-September, then, the 
4. Infantry Division (Brtinn) would enter Budapest to 
secure the government offices and the royal arsenals.
"Studie U," the most elaborate of the staff designs, 
is based both on Mecenseffy's plan and the results of a 
meeting of the operational and transport staffs (a meeting 
attended by naval delegates and a deputy of Beck's from 
the emperor's military chancellery as well) held at the 
war ministry in Vienna on 3 August.114 The final draft, 
undersigned by Krauss-Elislago, had two variants. The 
first, "Suppression of Localized Unrest in the Streets," 
was straightforward enough. The twelve battalions of the 
4. infantry Division, joined by the 11. Dragoons, slated 
to be transferred to Slavonia after 7 September, and thus 
immediately available, would occupy Budapest in support of
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the civil authority. Krauss-Elislago did not, however, 
wish to repeat Windisch-Gratz's error of 1848. Budapest 
was the economic and political center of Hungary, but it 
was not the whole of the country. A second variant, 
sketching out requirements for subduing widening unrest 
and outright rebellion, was also presented.
The second plan called for the immediate appointment 
of FML Prince Lobkowitz, commanding IV. Korps, as supreme 
commander and military governor in Hungary. Budapest 
would be immediately occupied, and the rail centers at 
Bruck-an-der-Leitha, Raab, and Komorn would be seized. 
Budapest could be reinforced by joining the 15. Dragoons 
to the 11. Dragoons already in place. The 25. Infantry 
Division, with twenty-six battalions, would then move into 
IV Korps. The 12. Infantry Division and six squadrons of 
the 5. Dragoons would move from X. Korps (Krakow) to V. 
Korps. Thirteen battalions of the 2. Infantry Division 
and the 6. Uhlans would move into VI. Korps. VII. Korps 
would get six battalions of the 14. Infantry Division 
(XIII. Korps), and XII. Korps would get six squadrons of 
the 14. Dragoons and ten battalions from the 11. Infantry 
Division (Lemberg).115 Full mobilization would proceed 
in the Cisleithanian lands and Bosnia-Herzegovina along 
the lines already laid down in Kriegsfall I— mobilization 
against Italy.116 At full strength, 406 battalions, 197 
squadrons, and 123 batteries of regular troops and 300
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battalions, 186 squadrons, and 112 batteries of the 
Landwehr would be available for operations against 
Hungary.117
Krauss-Elislago calculated that rebel forces would at 
most come to 282 battalions, 146 squadrons and 78 
batteries, drawn from the following sources:118
Battalions Squadrons Batteries 
Honvdd 97 54
Hungarian Landaturm 87 27
Unreliable k.-u.-k. 47 65 4
Questionable k.-u.-k. 51 —  74
TOTAL 282 146 78
The figures for the Hungarian Landaturm reflected staff 
estimates of the civil population likely to join an open 
revolt. Krauss-Elislago, though, was more cautious than 
Mecenseffy or Auffenberg in labelling k.-u.-k. units as 
unreliable. Units with less than twenty percent Magyar 
personnel were believed inherently reliable; units above 
seventy percent Magyar were written off as unreliable. 
Units at twenty to seventy percent— fifteen infantry 
regiments— were "questionable" and slated for special 
treatment: removal from areas of disaffection and 
indoctrination by their officers on the topic of loyalty 
under trying circumstances. Krauss noted a special 
problem here. Three battalions of the 60. (Eger), a
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regiment ninety-eight percent Magyar, were in Vienna, 
along with six squadrons of the 4. Hussars and three 
battalions of the "questionable" 101. (Beckescaba).
Special attention would have to be paid to such 
potentially hazardous situations outside Hungary.119
The staff plans were presented to a full crown 
council held at Bad Ischl on 22 August 1905. There was no 
effort to present a military solution as the sole or even 
leading option open to the imperial authorities. Count 
Goluchowski, the foreign minister, and War Minister 
Pitreich favored discussing the military option, but 
Goluchowski, along with Baron Gautsch, the Austrian 
minister-president, also favored continuing negotiations 
with the coalition in Budapest. Fejervary was against any 
attempt to install a military government in Hungary. He 
would, he claimed, be unable to find sufficient 
administrators willing to serve a military regime. The 
time when a few score "Bach hussars” could govern Hungary 
was gone; Fejervary was convinced that the administration 
would collapse from desertions by bureaucrats if the army 
moved in. In any case, Fejervary said, he could not 
support leading the Monarchy into civil war.120
On 24 August the Operations Bureau took note of how 
far preparations for Fall U. were to go.121 The staff 
was told to count on the Diet being prorogued between 15 
September and 10 December. Ersatzreserve troops would be
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called up in September to keep the infantry up to 
strength; the cavalry and artillery would continue to be 
kept at full strength with time-expired men. Should a 
military government be installed, the Budapest command 
would be in charge of full implementation of 
recruiting.122 The Danube Monitor-Gruppe and its patrol 
boat escorts would come under IV. Korps command effective 
1 September. The naval units would then go on exercises 
at Dunafoldvar while the sympathies of their Croat and 
Magyar crews were determined. Two monitors, staffed with 
hand-picked crews, would be kept on alert at Budapest.123 
Fejervary had insisted that joint rather than purely 
Cisleithanian units be used for the occupation of Budapest 
by 4. and 25. Divisions; the action, he maintained, would 
be in defense of state order and not a war against 
Hungary. Prince Lobkowitz would be given twenty-two 
battalions at his immediate disposal in case of 
disturbances— ten battalions of Bosniaks and Bosnian 
Feldjagers and twelve battalions of Hungarian troops from 
6. (Ujvidek), 51. (Koloszvar), 72. (Pressburg), and 61. 
(Temesvar) Infantry, all from regiments with less than 
fifty percent Magyar personnel. The 6. (forty-one percent 
German, thirty-two percent Croat), which had served in 
Budapest from 1890 to 1902, would be moved from Vienna 
back to Budapest at the end of August in order to relieve
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local garrison units for maneuvers and move them out of 
the city.124
In August and September the operations planners could 
look at Fall U. with some certainty that the first option, 
the occupation of Budapest, would be set in motion. 
Fejervary's government had been able to break a number of 
county assemblies, but resistance continued throughout 
most of the country, and government officials were subject 
to social ostracism and threats of mob violence. Reports 
in the press that the government was considering the 
proclamation of universal suffrage, joined with reports of 
revolutionary upheavals in Russia, led to increasing 
unrest on the left in both Hungary and the Cisleithanian 
lands. On 23 September, in an audience of less than five 
minutes, the emperor and the leadership of the coalition 
reached an impasse: the coalition leaders refused to make 
any concessions on their military demands.125 On 8 
October the war ministry despatched sealed letters to each 
of the corps commanders. Enclosed was the proclamation of 
martial law in Hungary and an appendix placing the HonvSd 
under the direct command of Prince Lobkowitz, the new 
military governor of Hungary.126
The army was ready to move at the beginning of 
October. It was, however, increasingly obvious that a 
military solution was losing favor among the emperor and 
his advisory. Fejervary had never been enthusiastic about
the use of armed force, and neither had his imperial 
master. Franz Joseph at seventy-five still retained vivid 
memories of 1848, and as he aged his taste for "rigorous 
measures"127 declined. In the summer of 1905 he had gone 
to Prince Alfred Windischgraetz's castle at Stekna with 
the generals gathered for the year's Kaiaermanover. He 
had told his generals that he was deeply moved to be 
there, in this last citadel of unswerving loyalty.128 
Yet he had no wish to draw the sword again. At dinner one 
night he had asked FZM Alexander von Krobatin what would 
happen if Hungarian affairs continued to deteriorate. 
Krobatin's reply was hearty and straightforward: "Why,
shooting, Majestyl" The emperor strode off in indignant 
silence.129 Imperial assent would be required for the 
order to execute Fall U.; short of an actual armed rising 
by Magyar nationalists, there was little imperial will to 
send in the army.
In any case, Fejervary and his interior minister had 
decided on an attempt to break the Magyar leadership—  
"insolent oligarchs" (UbezmUtige Oligarchen) Fejervary 
called them130— by purely political means. Kristoffy and 
Fejervary had been dropping hints that the government 
might favor universal suffrage throughout the summer, and 
Kristoffy had begun to court Hungary's small socialist 
party. Fejervary found the social democrats to be "ganz 
traitable" and began to hint that the Hungarian socialists
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might be acceptable as full partners in the political 
process and that no real danger might arise to Hungary and 
the Monarchy from a thorough-going reform of the Diet.131 
Fejervary and the emperor were both confident that the 
threat of universal suffrage by decree would ultimately 
break the resistance of the coalition. When in mid- 
September a mass demonstration in Budapest put 100,000 
workers in the streets to demand electoral reform, the 
government refused to send for troops and contented itself 
with cordoning off the plaza before the Parliament 
building. The Budapest garrison had been reinforced with 
two detachments of Honvdd from Odenburg, and, while on 
alert, was nonetheless ordered to keep out of sight until 
sent for. When the agitated deputies demanded that the 
government protect them from the workers, Kristoffy's 
chief of police informed them that they would have to look 
after themselves.133
The coalition leadership, headed by Ferenc Kossuth, 
attempted to counter Fejervary and Kristoffy's appeal to 
the workers and the nationalities by flirting with the 
South Slavs. On 4 October a conference of Croatian 
political leaders issued the Fiume Resolutions, offering 
political support to the coalition. The Fiume Resolutions 
were matched on 17 October by a similar Serbian resolution 
at Zara, thus presenting the imperial government with the 
spectre of the South Slavs allied with the Magyars. The
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Fiume Resolutions raised the possibility of unrest in 
Croatia and Slavonia, unrest that would prevent the 
military from using all its southern forces in Hungary 
proper and from drawing replacements out of the south to 
reinforce garrisons in occupied Hungary. Yet Croat 
support was an ambiguous weapon, and Kossuth's moves were 
disavowed by many of his fellow leaders. Croat support 
for the coalition had been conditional on a revision of 
the Croat-Hungarian agreements of 1868, and the Croats 
demanded greater local autonomy, economic concessions, 
incorporation of Dalmatia into an enlarged Croatia- 
Slavonia, and a widened role for the Croatian language in 
HonvSd units.133 The language of military regiments, the 
coalition leaders suddenly discovered, was not just a 
Magyar issue. The South Slavs presented problems for any 
imperial military moves in Hungary, but they offered 
problems to the coalition as well. The Party of 
Independence and its allies were brought face to face with 
the spectre of an enlarged and autonomous South Slav bloc.
On 4 October Kristoffy met with Franz Joseph. The 
interior minister offered the emperor two alternatives: 
universal suffrage or civil war. Two days later the 
Reichsrat issued a call for universal suffrage in 
Cisleithania. There was unrest growing in the Austrian 
lands as well, demands for electoral reform based both on 
rumors from Hungary and press reports of the revolution in
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Russia. From 4 to 6 October the emperor weighed the costs 
of a military solution. Croatia could not be stripped of 
garrisons, order could not be guaranteed in the Austrian 
lands, and full-scale civil war seemed unavoidable. Yet 
on 6 October134 Franz Joseph finally decided against 
military intervention. The general staff was still 
preparing the corps commands for Fall U., and transport 
officers were preparing to take over the Vienna docks to 
embark troops. But by 12 October, four days after the 
corps commanders had been sent their sealed orders, the 
political decision had been communicated to the military. 
Cipher telegrams were sent out to the commanders of IV.,
V., VII., XII., and XIII. Korps, ordering the immediate 
return of the sealed packets.135 On 7 November staff 
officers of the war ministry's Prasidial-Biiro burned the 
packets in the courtyard of the ministry, their seals 
still unbroken.13* The text of Fall U., although not its 
reputation, vanished into the depths of the Kriegsarchiv.
Kristoffy's plan for using universal suffrage as a 
political weapon was less dramatic and less thorough than 
Auffenberg's or Mecenseffy's, but it had the advantage of 
not making Hungary into a battlefield. A purely political 
program undercut national resistance in a way that the 
bayonets of the army could not. The administrators who 
ran the counties of Hungary were not, as they had been in 
1848, gentlemen doing a part-time job out of noblesse
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oblige; they were professional bureaucrats who owed their 
jobs to the lords-lieutenant appointed by Fejervary. The 
bulk of Hungarian officialdom might have resisted Austrian 
troops; they would not hazard their jobs in a fight 
between Fejervary and the coalition. Resistance in 
theatrical forms continued— the prefect of police in 
Budapest found his office looted, supporters of the 
government were snubbed in the street and expelled from 
gentlemen's clubs, the prefect of Debrecen was mobbed by 
students, metal tulips (made, in the finest comic-opera 
tradition, in Austria) appeared on Magyar labels as a sign 
of a boycott of Austrian goods,117 and the county lord- 
lieutenant at Ungvar found his inaugural ceremony marred 
by a mob carrying his effigy to a newly dug grave. 
Kristoffy and Fejervary, using Honvdd forces and a 
sprinkling of k.-u.-k. units, sent troops to Debrecen and 
Ungvar, and those guilty of interfering with the 
government found themselves marched off in handcuffs by 
imperial infantry or Honvdd hussars. Roving royal 
commissioners began to tour the counties with escorts of 
gendarmes and infantry, making the point that the 
government would physically support loyal officials, and, 
pour encourager les autres, summarily sacking and 
arresting any officials implicated in disorders, too 
conciliatory toward the coalition, or known to frequent
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political meetings without the express consent of a lord- 
lieutenant.138
By the end of the year the situation in Hungary's 
countryside had stabilized. The government and its 
commissioners had achieved a rough measure of control. 
Reliable men were sent down from Budapest to fill vacant 
posts, and outright defiance was at an end. the joint 
army, the gendarmerie, and the Honvdd had acted with 
despatch and discretion to maintain order without resort 
to extreme measures. The role of the Honvdd was a 
personal triumph for Fejervary. In mid-summer the Honvdd 
had been written off as a nest of traitors, real or 
potential; yet all through the autumn it had been a loyal 
instrument of order and royal authority. Fejervary's 
years as Honv4d minister had not been in vain. Whatever 
the officers and enlisted men of the HonvSd might think of 
the Dual Monarchy and dynasty, they had been taught to be 
loyal servants of state order.
There was,however, one center of disaffection still 
to be dealt with, and one more role for the Honvdd to 
play. The Diet was still sitting, though its sessions had 
degenerated into a mocking of a parliament. The Diet had 
been a forum for coalition pleas for funds— Kristoffy had 
stopped government payments to all areas of "national 
resistance"— and exhortations to defy the government. By 
January the Diet knew that it would be dissolved by royal
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order, and the coalition was seriously considering 
refusing to accept a rescript of dissolution.139 The 
Viennese press had reported as early as 18 December that a 
mobile force of k.-u.-k. troops was being readied in case 
the Diet refused to disperse.140
Fejervary approached the emperor at the beginning of 
February 1906 to urge that the Diet be dissolved by force, 
an act of force majeure designed to resolve the impossible 
political situation once and for all. A show of force, 
Fejervary insisted, was the key to Sanierung, a clearing 
of the air.141 Such an act, however, could not be 
entrusted to joint army troops. Fejervary had once said 
that the club he would need to beat his fellow countrymen 
into submission had to be painted in national colors. 
Therefore, there could be no doubt in any observer's mind 
that it was the king of Hungary and not the emperor of 
Austria who had acted.142
On 19 February the assembled Diet discovered the huge 
neo-Gothic Parliament House cordoned off by police and 
several squadrons of Honvdd hussars backed by a strong 
force of HonvSd infantry. The operation had been 
entrusted to GM Sandor Nyiri, who had been appointed royal 
commissioner in Hungary. Nyiri at fifty-two was one of 
the Monarchy's youngest generals, and he had been Honvdd 
minister under Tisza in 1903. He was talented, energetic, 
and proudly Magyar— the proper colors to be Fejervary's
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cudgel. The emperor had expressed his fear that things 
might become "a bit lively" in Budapest, and he was 
convinced that trouble lay ahead.143 Nyiri, however, was 
firmly convinced that rapid and self-confident action 
would carry the day. He had already obtained royal assent 
for removing the lord mayor of Budapest and appointing 
Kristoffy's hand-picked prefect of police as acting major 
with full local powers.144 It remained only to deal with 
the deputies.
Late in the morning of 19 February a group of Honvdd 
military police escorted Colonel Viktor Fabrizius into the 
Diet chambers. The Speaker refused outright to read a 
royal rescript of dissolution, and Fabrizius mounted the 
podium and began to read. A substantial bloc of deputies, 
joined by coalition supporters in the galleries, attempted 
to shout him down. At that point Fabrizius ordered in his 
men, and Honvdd infantry with fixed bayonets cleared the 
chamber.145 Later historians— among them A. J. May and 
Norman Stone146— claimed that Romanian troops had been 
employed, and that "foreign" troops had been sent to crush 
parliamentary freedom in Hungary. The story seems to go 
back no farther than 1910, to a Pan-Germanic polemic 
against the supranational position of the dynasty.147 
The troops involved were Fabrizius's own regiment, the 1. 
Honvdd Infantry, raised in Budapest. In the end, the 
Honvdd had simply obeyed orders. Its men acted
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unquestioningly against the pretensions of the coalition 
politicians. The coup of 19 February generated no popular 
outrage on any scale. There were demonstrations in 
Budapest for the next few nights, but Kristoffy's police 
contained them with a minimum of violence. A call by 
coalition leaders for a nationwide protest on 25 February 
failed utterly. Kristoffy banned all outdoor political 
meetings, and the day passed without incident.148 The 
Hungarian military had been loyal to the king, and
in the weeks following the dissolution of 
Parliament on February 19, national resistance ground 
to a halt. . . .  By the first of April the government 
was in control of local organs of administration 
almost everywhere. What is perhaps more important .
. . the Hungarian people took the authoritarian 
actions of the government calmly. . . .  The spirit of 
revolution . . . had burned itself out by spring.149
There was a final anticlimactic act. In mid-March
Fejervary summoned the coalition leadership to his offices
and laid down an ultimatum: they had brought Hungary to
the edge of civil war, and, since they were likely to win
any new elections, they were now required to accept
responsibility. They had to decide between cooperation
with the crown and accepting ministerial posts or arrest
and imprisonment for sedition.150 The coalition,
outplayed and outfought, collapsed. Its leaders repaired
to the Hotel Bristol in Vienna to receive terms from the
crown. The coalition leaders could administer the coming
of universal suffrage to suit themselves— Fejervary was in
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the end no real friend of the nationalities— but demands 
for a separate army and for Magyar Kommandosprache had to 
be abandoned, retroactive conscription had to be enacted, 
enlarged recruit quotas had to be accepted, and economic 
unity maintained.151 On 8 April a coalition cabinet was 
officially named. The moderate Sandor Wekerle was named 
premier, Andrassy minister of interior, Apponyi minister 
of education, and Ferenc Kossuth minister for commerce.
The nationalities were left to the mercies of the Magyars, 
but the coalition leadership had assumed power with the 
offhand contempt of the crown and the knowledge of their 
own humiliation.
On 23 April, in the immediate aftermath of elections 
which confirmed the coalition in power, annual maneuvers 
were held in Hungary. Reservists reported to their units 
without incident. The men standing in line on Honvdd 
barracks squares never knew that they had been considered 
potential traitors and rebels by the Operations-Biiro of 
the general staff. In almost thirty years of crisis on 
both sides of the Leitha the army command had learned to 
distrust the peoples of the Monarchy and to distrust 
openly the Hungarian units. Yet the Honvdd had been 
Kaisertreu after all. The army could have relied on its 
own. In later days, Franz Joseph told Conrad von 
Hotzendorf that whatever others, including many of his own 
advisors and generals, might say, his Magyar soldiers had
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been, after all, a reliable element in defense of the 
Monarchy.152
Three years later to the day, Fejervary rode at the 
head of the Royal Hungarian Life Guard at the Solferino 
memorial and received the Knight's Cross of Maria Theresa 
with Brilliants from his emperor.151 The old general was 
resplendent in his uniform and awards, and he was still 
straight-backed and thick-chested in his 70s, with a full 
hussar's moustache. The day was a triumph for him, a 
capstone to fifty-eight years of service to the dynasty.
He had fought for his sovereign in war and served him in 
peace. His government had restored order in Hungary and 
presided over an arrangement between the crown and the 
Magyar oligarchy that kept the army unified and gave the 
high command its enlarged troop quotas.
The habitually dour face of the emperor, however, 
told the other side of the story. Like all victories in 
Hungary, this one was inconclusive and at best only 
tactical. The humiliated coalition was free to avenge 
itself on the nationalities and the workers, and the army 
had suffered from year after year of budgetary neglect and 
a dearth of Hungarian recruits. Fejervary was there to 
receive the rewards due a loyal and faithful servant, but 
the fatalism of the emperor told the larger story. The 
Monarchy and its army had gone through thirty years of 
crisis. Some threats, such as anarchists in the Austrian
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lands, had been easily contained, but in Bohemia and 
Hungary rebellion had come very near. There had been 
victories at the brink, but they had bought only a little 
time. The army was no longer sure of the peoples of the 
Monarchy, even the Alpine Germans, and it was beginning to 
doubt itself.
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CHAPTER 5
ARMY AND NATIONALITIES: THE COUNSELS OF DESPAIR
On an August afternoon in 1900 Franz Joseph and his 
entourage rode up Mariahilferstrasse from the Hofburg 
toward Schloss Schonbrunn through crowds of Viennese 
assembled to celebrate the emperor's birthday. Franz 
Joseph was still a magnificent horseman, and he rode with 
the straight-backed classic form he had learned in the 
vanished age of Metternich. The old emperor possessed an 
effortless majesty, and to the young soldiers mounting 
guard at the imperial residences— the grandsons and great- 
grandsons of the sentries standing watch in the year of 
his accession— he had become a figure of legend. To the 
crowds assembled outside the Michaelertor on that day in 
1900 he was the embodiment of the Monarchy itself, and by 
1900 it required a serious act of will to imagine the 
Monarchy without him. The birthday procession of 1900 
could not match the Jubilee celebrations of 1888, when the 
emperor had been trailed by sixty-seven archdukes, but in 
a Catholic state the afternoon's cavalcade was bound to 
make a deep and disquieting impression. Today was the 
emperor's seventieth birthday, and the Biblical span was 
threescore and ten.
No one in Vienna— not the crowds on the Ring or the 
emperor's ministers in their offices— could doubt that the
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new century brought with it the waning days of Franz 
Joseph's reign. Each Austrian minister-president in his 
turn— Ernst von Koerber, Karl von Gautsch, Max-Vladimir 
von Beck, Karl von Sttlrgkh— knew that he might well be the 
emperor's last chief minister, and each saw it as a point 
of honor not to give Franz Joseph any political disaster 
to blight his last years. The emperor's age was known in 
Budapest, too, and there it was an incentive to extract a 
maximum of advantage from the ruler who had signed the 
Auagleich. Franz Joseph's reign had been characterized by 
a rigid adherence to form and to the letter of 
constitutional law, along with a pragmatic flexibility in 
daily politics. He had been both emperor and king, 
insisting on the unity of the Monarchy and yet still 
standing by Hungarian interpretations of the Auagleich.
In both Vienna and Budapest political observers predicted 
that such an attitude, such a sense of equipoise and 
attention to constitutional obligation, would not survive 
the passing of the old emperor.1 The Viennese literati 
assembled at the Cafe Central might listen to what Hugo 
von Hofmannsthal called "distant planets falling” in 
expectation of an age of new forms of painting and poetry, 
but in the ministerial offices throughout the Innere 
Stadt, fin-de-siecle had a concrete and ominous meaning.
The age of the emperor provided a focus for the 
problems facing the Monarchy in the decade and a half
between the imperial birthday that opened the new century 
and the outbreak of the Great War. The protracted 
constitutional struggle with the Hungarian Diet, the 
growth of virulent nationalism in Hungary and Bohemia, the 
annexation of Bosnia and the growing menace of Russia and 
Serbia— all the crises of the pre-war years— pointed to a 
reckoning facing any new regime. The Monarchy had to be 
remade; the days of Fortwiirsteln were drawing to a close. 
That much was clear in both Vienna and Budapest. It was 
clear, too, that the army— the symbol of the joint 
Monarchy, of the dynastic ideal— would bear the shock of 
the new age, the pressures from both within and without 
the Monarchy. One chief of the general staff put it 
simply enough: the Monarchy was.like no other state, and 
all other questions were dissolved in the question of the 
army.2
The army had its own fears for the new century. The 
emperor's soldiers had last gone to war in 1878, but as 
the new century began, it seemed all too likely that the 
long years of peace were drawing to an end. The Monarchy 
appeared to be surrounded by waiting predators, and the 
Monarchy's military planners came to believe that war with 
Russia, Serbia, and Italy— singly or in combination— was 
inevitable.3 The Monarchy's military spending had not kept 
pace with its rivals, and A.J.P. Taylor's judgment that 
the Monarchy "found it difficult to be even in the second
rank" of European powers4 had been shared by the 
Monarchy's military leadership since the mid-1880'
Table 5.1
Defense Budgets: European Powers 1890 - 1914s
(in 10s £)
1890 1900 1910 1914
Germany 28.8 41.0 64.0 110.8
Austria-
Hungary
12.8 13.6 17.4 36.4
France 37.4 42.1 52.4 57.4
England 31.4 116.0 68.0 76.8
Italy 14.8 14.6 24.4 28.2
Russia 29.0 40.8 63.4 88.2
The Monarchy's defense budget rose by seventeen 
percent— from 262 million crowns to 306 million— between 
1895 and 1906, but much of the increase had been devoured 
by hasty attempts to strengthen fortifications on the 
Italian frontier and to replace the grossly obsolete guns
of the field artillery.6 The size of the army had been 
fixed in 1889, and the Hungarian crisis had been sparked 
by attempts to increase its size. The gains finally won 
in 1906— an increase of 22,000 men, from 103,000 to 
125,000, in the joint army's annual intake— were modest 
enough, and Hungarian intransigence prevented any actual 
growth, any rise in the number of conscripts actually 
processed, until 1912.7 Yet in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the forces raised in European Russia 
had grown from 639,000 men to 1,000,000, and the Italian 
army— a particular fixation of Conrad von Hotzendorf, 
Beck's successor as chief of the general staff— had grown 
from 190,000 to 266,000 men.8
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Table 5.2 
Defense Budgets and Population
1906
Austria*
Hungary
Germany
Russia
Italy
France
England
Serbia
Defense 
as % budget
14.6
50
20
25
28
29
23
Recruit 
% pop.
0.29
0.47
0.35
0.37
0.75
0.18
0.65
Peacetime Army 
as % pop.
0.80
1.0
0.95
0.85
1.4 
0.65
1.05
Table 5.3 
Wartime Field Formations 19069
Batallions Squadrons Batteries
Austria- 676 352 254
Hungary
Germany 628 490 583
Russia 985 539 622
Italy 346 144 210
France 711 445 569
England 162 111 122
Serbia 61 17 57
The enemies of the Monarchy were able to outspend it, to 
recruit and to train more of their young men, and to
maintain a greater percentage of the population as 
soldiers. The slide into second-rank status had been 
obvious to Albrecht and Beck by the end of the 1880s, and 
in the new century it would seem to much of the Monarchy's 
military leadership to lead downward into the abyss.
The Monarchy's military leadership, distracted by 
events in Budapest, had been taken unaware by the 1903 
military coup that had transformed a docile Obrenovid 
Serbia into the aggressive and militarized Karadjordjevid 
Serbia of the Balkan Wars.10 As late as the Second Balkan 
War, k.-u.-k. military intelligence believed that the 
Serbs were still lacking in discipline and were not yet 
fully trained with their new Russian and French weapons, 
but there was no doubt that the 450,000 men Serbia could 
field were both physically hard and highly motivated.11 
By August 1914 the Serbian field armies were fully the 
equal of the southeastern k.-u.-k. forces in both numbers 
and equipment, and far superior in combat experience and leadership.
To the 450,000 Serbs the Monarchy would face had to 
be added the Italian army. Whatever its adventures (or 
misadventures) in Libya and Abyssinia, whatever facile 
assurances the diplomats at the Ballhausplatz might 
extract from their opposite numbers in Rome, the planners 
of the lc.-u.-k. general staff held fast to the belief that 
Italy would take the opportunity of an Austro-Serbian or 
Austro-Russian war to fall upon Dalmatia and the
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Siidtirol.13 And behind Italy and Serbia was the spectre 
of Russian might, of limitless reserves of manpower— the 
nightmare of Cossack hordes swarming across Galicia into 
Moravia or pouring out of the Carpathian passes onto the 
Hungarian plain. When plans for a multifront war—  
Kriegsfall R + I + B(S)— were drawn up in 1907/08, the 
underlying assumption had to be, as the Archduke Albrecht 
had noted in despair twenty years before, that the 
Monarchy had to rely on German support, that it could no 
longer fight a major war on its own.14
The alternative to a hopeless war against 
overwhelming odds seemed to be increasing reliance on, and 
subordination to, German strength. The military security 
of the Monarchy could not be tied to German promises, but 
the concrete steps the k.-u.-k. high command could take 
were limited. No additional conscripts arrived at recruit 
depots until 1912, and the demands of pursuing a policy of 
maritime dominance in the Adriatic put additional strains 
on an already limited manpower pool. The k.-u.-k. fleet, 
headed by the aggressive and highly competent admirals 
Anton Haus and Rudolf Montecuccoli, grew into a compact 
but technically excellent fighting force. Nonetheless, 
the growth of the fleet meant a diversion of funds from 
rifles and field artillery to dreadnoughts, from the 
instruments of survival to the instruments of prestige.
By 1912 the fleet had more warships than it could find
289
crews for, and the army was called upon to provide an 
additional 3000 men a year for the fleet.15 The army cut 
back individual battalion strength to create new 
formations— a purely phantom force increase— and stripped 
men from service units, replacing soldiers with civilian 
contract workers wherever possible, and incurring the 
wrath of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by pulling musicians 
from military bands and returning them to line duty.16 
Yet there were only so many flautists to be made into 
riflemen. Any concerted attempt to improve the condition 
of the army ran headlong into Magyar obstructionism and, 
behind that, the question of nationalism throughout the 
Monarchy.
The number of new conscripts entering the army from 
the Hungarian lands showed no growth until 1912 despite 
the promises made in 1906. The "Hungarian crisis” had 
been resolved, but the problem of Hungary remained. Franz 
Joseph had refused to sanction a violent solution to the 
Hungarian crisis of 1905, but the possibility of violence, 
of a new deadlock at the next Ausgleich negotiations, of a 
nationalist outbreak in Hungary remained. Fall U. 
remained on file at the war ministry. The military 
leadership could not believe it would never be needed, and 
the plans were updated at least once. In the spring of 
1907, FML Conrad von Hotzendorf, successor to the aged 
Beck as chief of the general staff, had the plan reviewed
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and ordered changes drawn up in the order of battle, 
shifting larger cavalry contingents to the northern 
front.17 There would be other crises, other deadlocks.
The generals knew that Hungarian intransigence had not 
ended and that the demands of the Magyar oligarchy would 
continue to call for a separate Hungarian army and perhaps 
for Hungarian secession. Fall V. remained in the vaults 
of the war ministry, a temptation to believe that the army 
must one day save the unity of the Monarchy and a reminder 
that, however loyal and professional the performance of 
Honvdd units in dispersing the Hungarian Diet had been, 
there were still lists of "questionable" and "unreliable" 
units that had to be borne in mind.
Fall U. remained as the sole fully-elaborated plan 
for a military solution to the Monarchy's internal 
problems. Yet, if the Hungarian crisis had dominated 
political life in the Monarchy in the first years of the 
century, Hungary was not the only locus of nationalist 
discontent, nor was the "Hungarian problem" the most 
intractable of the Monarchy's problems— or even the only 
one with a potential for violence. The command at VIII. 
Korps in Prague had been sufficiently disturbed by 
nationalist sentiments in Bohemia— and inside some of its 
own regiments— to begin discussing plans for dealing with 
a nationalist revolt.18 In 1908 the garrison command at 
Trieste warned III. Korps HQ in Graz that it feared that
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the Italians of the Kiistenland would take advantage of any 
war with Serbia to revolt against the Monarchy and 
requested that plans for occupying the Littoral with loyal 
troops be drawn up.19 Neither plan found its Auffenberg, 
and no sealed folders for a "Fall Bohmen” or "Fall 
Kiistenland” found their way into the war ministry 
archives. But the war ministry could not ignore the 
potential for violent upheavals in those regions, nor 
could it ignore the fact that, using the criteria 
Auffenberg had applied to Magyar regiments, eleven 
Bohemian regiments could be defined as potentially 
unreliable (70+% Czech) and ten more could be defined as 
"questionable" (20-70% Czech).20
The list of potential catastrophes— a multi-front 
war, the festering German-Czech quarrel in Bohemia, fear 
of Hungarian secession, and the hovering question of what 
would happen when Franz Joseph died— continued to grow.
Yet the amount of actual disloyalty simmering within the 
Monarchy should not be overdrawn. Joachim Remak once 
pointed out that, while "happy cooperation" might not have 
been the mood of many of the nationalities, there were few 
who did not feel at least "passive acceptance."21 It was 
after all a Budapest Honved unit that dispersed the 
Hungarian Diet in 1906. In July and August 1914 the 
nationalities— even the Czechs— responded loyally to the 
declarations of war against Serbia and Russia. There
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existed in the Monarchy in the last years before the Great 
War far deeper reserves of popular loyalty than many 
postwar historians, knowing the events of October/November 
1918 (and, in some cases, seeking to construct nationalist 
hagiographies) were willing to see. The political aims of 
the nationalities— Czech, Croat, Magyar, Serb— in the last 
decade before the war were still based on demands for 
national privilege and not the destruction of the state 
that could ensure those privileges. Only the Italian 
unrest in the Littoral and the SUdtirol was insoluble as 
an internal problem— only the Italians sought an outright 
departure from the Monarchy.23
The amount of actual disloyalty within the Monarchy 
was not a question that seemed to interest the k.-u.-k. 
military leadership. By 1914 much of the imperial-and- 
royal high command saw itself as beset by impending doom. 
Conrad expected that war with Russia would be "a hopeless 
struggle," one which, though fatal, could not be avoided 
if the Monarchy was to be true to its sense of honour.22 
Their predecessors had been blithely complacent before 
1848 and 1866; the officers of Conrad's generation wrote 
and spoke in an atmosphere of near-hysteria. In some 
measure this was only a pessimism born of professionalism. 
They had been taught to judge the capabilities of an enemy 
rather than his intentions, and the k.-u.-k. generals were 
well aware of the Monarchy's weaknesses in the face of a
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seemingly inevitable war on multiple fronts, and they were 
no less aware of the truism (so recently borne out in 
Russia) that external defeat breeds internal discontent.
On a deeper level, their unease ("needless panic" in 
Norman Stone's phrase34) was a response driven by 
frustration, by the inability of an increasingly isolated 
military class to obtain the reforms— financial and 
structural— that might give the Monarchy the strength to 
survive in a world of predatory neighbors and national 
discontents.
Corelli Barnett put forth the formula that "military 
disaster is...national decline exposed by violence."25 
Conrad or Auffenberg would have agreed absolutely. And 
the military leadership, so painfully aware of the costs 
of years of struggle over the military provisions of the 
Ausgleich, saw in the weaknesses of the k.-u.-k. army the 
decay of the Monarchy itself. The officers of the 
Monarchy had always been certain that theirs was an 
honorable and honored calling. Even in the years of 
defeat, of Solferino and KoniggrStz, it had been no mean 
thing to wear the emperor's coat and serve the dynasty.
Yet in the new century the officer corps, trained to an 
ethic of service and dynastic loyalty, saw itself as 
increasingly isolated and unheeded, its ideals held to be 
irrelevant if not faintly laughable. Its claim to be the 
key unifying element in the Monarchy was highlighted by
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nationalist and socialist attacks on the army, but there 
was little solace to be had in a pose of beleaguered 
nobility. An old world was ending, a new reign was 
looming, and the ability of the army to defend the 
Monarchy it claimed to hold together was withering away.
That professional soldiers should feel alienated from 
their nation's political leadership is perhaps not 
surprising; in the latter half of the twentieth century 
such alienation has become a given in Western journalism. 
The k.-u.-k. military leadership was not alone in its 
feelings of isolation. The French army had been swept by 
politically directed purges in the last two decades of 
the century; each change in parliamentary complexion had 
swept a new class of officers into forced retirement or 
professional oblivion. The Russian army had undergone 
disaster in Manchuria and revolution at home in 1904-07; 
throughout the first months of 1906 mutinous units had 
exchanged artillery and gunfire with loyal troops in a 
series of bitter firefights. By 1912 the tsarist police 
were convinced that the Russian army was riddled with 
networks of officers whose zeal for military 
professionalism and modernization was only a mask for 
radicalism and— with an eye on the officers' coups in 
Lisbon and Constantinople— seditious views on the role of 
the army in leading the state into modernity.26 The 
tsarist police had already aroused the wrath of the army
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by openly questioning the loyalty of Polish officers (and 
Russian officers with Polish wives) serving in the tsar's 
forces.27 Nor was the k.-u.-k. leadership alone in its 
pessimism. The staff planners of the British army spent 
the last years before the Great War preparing for an 
inevitable and savage civil war in Ireland. The last week 
of July 1914 saw an ironic coup de theatre at Whitehall: 
the British leadership, poring over maps of Ireland, 
convinced that the fate of Britain hinged on a handful of 
parishes in county Fermanagh and county Tyrone, was 
suddenly confronted with an ultimatum in Belgrade and 
panicky calls for maps of Flanders and France.28
Yet the Austrian case remained unique. Conrad's 
insistence that in the Monarchy all other questions were 
dissolved in the question of the army had a subtle edge to 
it. The joint army, the imperial-and-royal as opposed to 
the Royal Hungarian units, was based on a denial of 
national feeling. The k.-u.-k. army was required not 
simply to repress nationalism but to resolve it, to create 
a loyalty not based on race or language. The civil 
administration had no such sense of mission, and the 
military grew increasingly disenchanted with the 
bureaucracy. In Bohemia the civil service had become a 
prize to be captured and wielded for national aims by 
Germans or Czechs. In Hungary the administration was 
openly a tool of Magyarisation. In Galicia the army was
296
treated by the administration as vaguely irrelevant. 
Auffenberg claimed that the governors from Goluchowski on 
had seen themselves as "more imperial satrap than 
governor— more an assistant king than a high official" and 
simply excluded anyone not of the Polish nobility from 
influence.29 An officer of k.-u.-k. military intelligence 
complained that in Lemberg
the Commanding General tried to eliminate the 
latent tension between civil and military authority. 
He found no support from the Governor... who as 
direct representative of the Monarch believed himself 
superior to everyone, and this conceit carried over 
to his exclusively Polish staff... [The] off-duty 
activities of officers were confined solely to 
military circles, especially since the Polish 
nobility would not on principle speak German and 
visibly exerted themselves to have no contact with 
the Officer Corps. One had the feeling of being not 
in Austria, but in some enemy land.30
The generals could find no allies in the chanceries.
Conrad pointed out that, while the army was starved for
manpower, the civil service held 150,000 more men— a dozen
divisions' worth— than served in the peacetime army.31
The upper ranks of the k.-u.-k. army saw themselves
as very nearly alone— alone in understanding the threat of
a multi-front war with Russia, Serbia, and Italy and alone
in offering unconditional loyalty to the dynasty. "We
cannot count," Conrad wrote, "on our populace expressing a
unified patriotic desire to improve the conditions of our
armed forces."32 What applied to the "public" applied no
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less to the civil administration. The civil service, 
wrote General Alfred Krauss,
stood in utter opposition to the army. Austria 
was a Beamtenataat. Every fifth or sixth man was a 
civil servant. Half the revenues of Austria went for 
the support of the civil service. The bureaucrats 
saw in the army the most dangerous opponent of their 
dominance.. .Although the army cost not a third of the 
army of bureaucrats, all the bureaucracy clamoured 
about the unbearable costs of the army. 3
Worse yet, Krauss insisted that the access of seasoned
soldiers to the emperor and his ministers was thwarted by
the host of young, often aristocratic, bureaucrats that
filled the Hofburg and, jealous of their own dominance and
ignorant of the condition and role of the army, kept the
emperor's soldiers at arm's length.34 Krauss wrote with a
great dose of professional envy and postwar bitterness,
and his descriptions must be treated with caution. Yet he
expressed the attitudes of many officers in the last years
of peace. Fearful of the nationalities, utterly cynical
about the "public," disenchanted with their civilian
counterparts, the military leadership of the Monarchy grew
increasingly pessimistic about the future of the Monarchy
itself.
For five days in October .1905 it had been possible 
that the Hungarian crisis would be resolved by force. The 
corps commanders of the Monarchy had been in possession of 
sealed warning orders for Fall U.— for military 
intervention in Hungary. Officers of the k.-u.-k. general
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staff had been on hand at the docks in Vienna and 
Fressburg to note how much shipping could be requisitioned 
to move troops downriver to Budapest. Civil war, the 
staff planners at the Reichakriegaminiaterium knew, was 
only a telegram away. By 12 October, though, the moment 
had passed. Special couriers retrieved the sealed orders, 
and the plans for Fall U. were locked away in the staff 
archives. The moment for civil war had passed in secret, 
but its first anniversary produced an unsettling literary 
echo— a vision of what might have been, and what many k.- 
u.-k. officers feared might still come to pass.
In late October 1906 copies of a small, anonymous 
novel called Unaer Letzter Kampf were presented to the 
Kriegaarchiv-Bibliothek in Vienna. The book was subtitled 
"The Testament of an Old Imperial Soldier" and, while its 
title page announced that it had been printed in Vienna 
and Leipzig in 1907, the Kriegaarchiv staff noted on the 
introductory page of copy #3 that it had been checked into 
the library holdings on 25 October 1906.35 The anonymous 
author, the "old imperial soldier" of the title, was no 
stranger to either the Kriegaarchiv-Bibliothek or the 
halls of the Reichakriegaminiaterium. He was in fact a 
general staff officer named Hugo Kerchnawe, a future k.- 
u.-k. general and, after the war, the author of numerous 
German-nationalist and stridently right-wing histories of 
Europe since 1789.36
The book itself was a Zukunftroman, a genre falling 
somewhere between the political tract and what a later age 
would call "speculative fiction." Despite the promise 
inherent in its title— a military history of the 
Monarchy's next and final war— Unser Letzter Kampf is 
neither schoarly analysis nor a fleshed-out wargame 
scenario. It has nothing in common with the theoretical 
exploration of future conflicts found in works such as 
Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War
or the work of Feldmarschalleutnant Adolf von Sacken of 
the Vienna Kriegaarchiv,37 and it should not be taken as a 
forerunner of the "techno-thriller" genre pioneered by Sir 
John Hackett and Tom Clancy in the 1970s and 1980s. Unaer 
Letzter Kampf has more in common with the spate of call- 
to-arms novels that appeared in the United States in the 
years before 1917, warning of the evil intentions of 
Europeans (usually Germans, but occasionally British) and 
urging an aroused populace to arm for war. Yet 
Kerchnawe's work is less a clarion call than a nightmare. 
Its English-language equivalent might be Thomas Dixon's 
The Fall of a Nation (1916), in which the Pope incites 
Imperial Germany to invade an America weakened by Jews, 
immigrants, and suffragettes.38 The mood here is not one 
of military plausibility; it is one of manic despair, 
where disaster is absolute and ineluctable.
The book was, Gunther Rothenberg claims, "widely 
read" in military circles39, and, given its author— a 
general staff officer with aspirations to historical 
scholarship— its readers would have found it disquietingly 
plausible. Kerchnawe would certainly have been familiar 
with the overall state of the k.-u.-k. army, with the 
desperate improvisations by which the army sought to 
maintain itself during the long Hungarian crisis, and with 
the political furor of 1905/06. He may even have been 
aware of the existence of Fall I/.. That secret, as the 
Auffenberg scandal of 1912 will show, was never airtight. 
In any case, Kerchnawe's military audience, well aware of 
how the army had suffered since 1900, of how dangerous a 
year 1905 had been, and of how bleak the future seemed, 
would have come to the story all-too-ready to believe.
The novel opens in a windswept Viennese February on a 
scene any k.-u.-k. officer would have found familiar in 
1906. The imperial capital is paralyzed by strikes and 
mobs demanding universal suffrage and socialism; the 
Monarchy itself is paralyzed by Magyar obstructionism and 
separatist demands. The government vacillates; the 
ministers cannot bring themselves to order the streets 
cleared with deadly force. There could be no doubt in a 
military reader's mind that Kerchnawe was drawing on 
memories of 1905, of the huge Vienna demonstrations 
attendant upon the revolution in St. Petersburg.
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The novel'8 heroes are gathered in the Arsenal, where 
the Vienna city garrison has been withdrawn in the face of 
the mobs. As they lament the state of affairs inside the
Monarchy, a young captain of artillery sums up the
condition of the k.-u.-k. army:
Ancient cannon, no men, no horses, no recruits 
for half the army, no maneuvers, badly-trained 
reservists, everything you see just patched together, 
no ships— nothing. If the Prince of Monaco declared 
war on us we'd have to pack it in. Tough luck for
him, that his princedom doesn't border on us.40
And behind the weakness of the army Kerchnawe placed not
just the "hypertrophied" bureaucracy and the "decayed men
of 'culture'"41 who filled the Reichsrat, but specific
political figures as well— "[Viktor] Adler, [Heinrich]
Ellenbogen, [Engelbert] Pernerstorfer and company" of the
Social Democrats, the traitorous "[Count Albert] Apponyi
and consorts" in Budapest. Kerchnawe expected nothing but
sedition in the Hungarian Diet, where only the most
blindly naive could fail to see that government and
opposition were both part of the same Magyar oligarchy and
sought the same ultimate ends.42 In Vienna he found sure
signs of degeneracy inside the Greek temples on the
Burgring: "Speeches, speeches, speeches, and rabble-
rousing, but never deeds.”43
The late winter of Kerchnawe's mythical 1908 sees
disaster piled upon disaster. While riots rage in Vienna
and the major provincial cities of the Monarchy, a secret
coalition of Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro launches a 
sudden attack across the Monarchy's southern borders. The 
k.-u.-k. army, weakened by years of neglect and by the 
long Hungarian crisis, its ranks already stretched thin to 
contain internal disorder, is hard-pressed to deal with 
the invaders, and Serbs and Montenegrins stream into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Count Apponyi, speaking at a plenary 
session of the Hungarian Diet, announces that the Magyar 
leadership will not vote for the mobilization of Hungarian 
units. Troops are sent in to clear the Diet, but unlike 
the straightforward mission carried out by Colonel 
Fabrizius and the Honvdd military police in the real 
world, the attempt miscarries. The doors of the great 
parliament building are closed and barricaded, and the 
Diet is defended by an armed mob. The troops— unsure of 
themselves, without orders to open fire— are driven off by 
the crowd. Hungarian reservists, corrupted by nationalist 
emissaries, begin to melt away from their depots. The 
Kingdom of Hungary begins a headlong descent into 
revolution and chaos.
Kerchnawe's account of events in Budapest is in sharp 
and strident counterpoint to the real events of February 
1906. In reality, the Diet had been cleared by a 
detachment of local troops who had obeyed orders without 
question. Protestors had filled the boulevards of 
Budapest for the next few nights, but there had been no
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attempt to defend the Diet or defy the military. A show 
of force had not defused nationalist sentiment, but it had 
trumped the Magyar oligarchy. Mo one had been willing to 
raise the stakes once force had been admitted as an overt 
factor. Still, for any k.-u.-k. officer who followed the 
events in Budapest, for anyone aware of the existence- 
even if not the substance— of a Fall U., there would have 
been a terrible kind of plausibility in Kerchnawe's 
depiction. Fabrizius's brief Sanierung of February 1906 
might all-too-easily have turned into insurrection.
Unaer Letzer Kampf moves forward at a nightmarish 
pace. The k.-u.-k. fleet is annihilated by the Italians 
in a savage battle off Pola. The Russians descend upon 
Galicia and, fittingly enough, Hungary. The perfidious 
German Reich offers no aid to its sometime ally and 
instead moves its own forces into Bohemia and the Alpine 
provinces to "protect" the German population and complete 
the work of 1866. The story ends in midsummer, with the 
last k.-u.-k. forces drawn up on the plains of Lower 
Austria, facing a final battle against overwhelming 
Italian forces.
The book is a strident and hysterical little tract, 
and it outruns the avowed intentions of its author. 
Kerchnawe took as the text for his sermon a saying of 
Prince Eugene'st "An army of 300,000 men is worth more 
than any treaty of alliance."44 The novel was intended to
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be a call for rearmament, but Kerchnawe seemed unable to 
decide whether the destruction of the Monarchy was due to 
the superior firepower and numbers of the Italians, Serbs, 
and Russians or to disaffection and treason within. The 
Monarchy's final defeat in the field was made possible by 
its internal enemies— by Social Democrats and Magyar 
oligarchs; by the mobs in Vienna, Prague, Zagreb, and 
Lemberg who choose chaos over loyalty; by the weakness and 
indecision of the Monarchy's political leadership, who 
will not face the need for strong measures. In the face 
* of all this, Kerchnawe's (or, on another level, Conrad's) 
call for a strong army has a hollow ring. The extent of 
disaffection portrayed in the novel renders its author's 
call for rearmament irrelevant. Empires are won by 
armies; they are maintained by faith. An army can take 
and hold territory, it can control lines of communication, 
it can confront an enemy army in the field. It cannot 
provide a basis of belief for a society. It can make men 
obey, but it cannot make them believe. That fact 
underlies the whole of Unaer Letzter Kampf and gives it 
its air of hysteria and despair. In the aftermath of 
1905/06, that fear would have intruded upon any military 
reader. A weapon, whether an army in the hands of a state 
or a rifle in the hands of a soldier, is worse than 
useless if there is no belief in its use.
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The fears expressed in Unser Letzter Kampf did not 
fade away after 1907, and other Zukunftromanen emerged 
from within the k.-u.-k. world to capitalize on them. In 
1909 Kerchnawe published a second, and more widely 
distributed, anonymous work, Die Vorgeschichte von 1866 
und 19-?*5 This second work showed off Kerchnawe's 
academic bent in a first half devoted to a history of the 
catastrophe of 1866, an historical exposition that 
attacked Prussian perfidy and Hungarian disloyalty with 
equal venom. The second half reworked the ground of his 
earlier book: no loyalty could be expected from the 
Magyars or Czechs, the Monarchy was surrounded by jackals 
waiting to spring, and only within the shrinking circle of 
the k.-u.-k. ranks could loyalty be found. Kerchnawe 
stressed that the Magyar oligarchy's obstructionism had 
prevented Albrecht from fighting on against the Prussians 
in 1866; he was equally certain that Germany would abandon 
the Monarchy to its enemies in any future war. Kerchnawe 
could find hope only in the vision of a strongly- 
centralized and re-armed Monarchy with German as the 
language of state— since presumably only by re-Germanizing 
the state apparatus could cultural fragmentation be halted 
and the loyalty of the Monarchy's German subjects be 
protected from pan-German sentiment.
Lass strident, but perhaps more distressing, was a 
small novel called Quo vadis Austria?, published in Berlin
late in 1913.48 The novel lacks the fevered violence of 
Kerchnawe's books, and its depiction of the ruin of the 
Monarchy is distinctly low-key, a matter more of belief 
than of Russian or Italian bayonets. The disturbing 
feature of the novel was its subtitle: "A Novel of 
Resignation." Resignieren carries the same possibility 
for wordplay in both English and German, and the book was 
at once a yielding to History and Fate and an act of 
renunciation by the "Austrian Officer" who had anonymously 
published it. Its author was Gustav Sieber, late of the 
54.(01miitz) k.-u.-k. Infantry. Sieber had been born in
Moravia in 1885, the son of a k.-k. major, and 
commissioned into k.-u.-k. service in 1908. He served 
with line infantry companies in Bosnia at Plevlje and 
Sarajevo before being posted back to the regimental depot 
at Olmiitz. His resignation from active service in 
December 1913 had not been caused by the publication of 
Quo vadia Austria?; the novel had given concrete form to 
his decision to leave k.-u.-k. service.47
Quo vadia Austria? raises quite pointedly the issue 
of faith: who still believes in Austria? Sieber was not 
concerned with battlefleets clashing in the Adriatic or 
fortresses in the Alps or even sedition in Budapest or 
Prague. His concern was with how many people in and out 
of k.-u.-k. service still found the Monarchy worth 
devoting their lives to. His answer was simple enough:
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too few. If general war loomed, there would be Germans or 
Magyars or Czechs, but too few Auatrians. Sieber had no 
animus against the dynasty and no belief in the need for 
any sort of Pan-German solution to the Monarchy's future. 
His concern was that the Monarchy could offer its soldiers 
a sense of professionalism and duty, but nothing else. 
There was, Sieber insisted, no underpinning of faith left, 
no overriding belief that the Monarchy was not merely 
convenient, but necessary. How many men would offer up 
their lives or their devotion for something that was 
simply faute de mieux? That question— that sense of 
aimlessness— carried beyond Sieber's novel to even the 
most Monarchietreu of Vienna's intellectuals, to those not 
given to assuming despair as a fashionable pose. In 1912 
Hoffmansthal wrote a friend:
And the domestic scene? Half indolence, half 
heedlessness. The problems too intricate, too 
Gordian-entwined. Decency, courage here and there—  
as in Conrad's case— but these men, too, without any 
real faith.48
The generals in the ministerial complex on the 
Dominikanerbastei and in the high command offices at 
Wiener Neustadt were no less attuned than the literati at 
the Cafe Central to the sound of "distant planets 
falling." The fears articulated by Kerchnawe and Sieber—  
the decay of the Monarchy's military standing, separatist 
movements in Budapest and Prague, the unwillingness of the 
Reichsrat to take remedial action and the failure of
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society to demand action— were echoed from the 
Reichskriegsministeriim to the corps headquarters in 
Budapest and Prague and Lemberg and on to the garrison 
commands in Trieste and Sarajevo. Yet Conrad and his 
colleagues on the general staff were also aware that the 
army was in danger of losing both the political standing 
and physical means to act even if the moment for action 
arrived.49
It was still possible for the army to present itself 
as the beloved servant of the dynasty and for its officers 
to tell one another that they belonged to an honoured and 
honourable estate. If one looked at the works of the 
army's favoured painters, such as Ludwig Koch, one could 
see the army's official and desparately-held view of 
itself. Koch's "Gala-Dinner der Angehdrigen der Arcieren 
Leibgarde in Schonbrunn" (1913)*°, with its glittering 
array of officers dining with their sovereign, might have 
come from the days of GrUnne and Hess, the days when 
liberal critics and conservative officials alike had 
declared that the Monarchy was being run by the army. Yet 
all the vast watercolour portrayals of court balls (Balls 
bei Hof) could not hide the fact that since the death of 
the Archduke Albrecht no military figure been able to make 
policy. The reality of military life was less the Balls 
bei Hof than Franz von Myrbach's "Auf Vergessenem 
Posten"51— the forlorn officer riding across a desolate
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Ruthenian landscape on his way to a forgotten little 
fortress.
The Jt.-u.-Jt. army over which Conrad assumed 
operational command in 1906 found itself increasingly 
isolated within society. In part this was the army's own 
doing: a narrowly professonal education and a belief in 
the officer's direct loyalty to the dynasty left little 
room for interest in those social or historical questions 
derided at the military schools as reflektierende—  
"thought-provoking."52 But it was also an isolation that 
the outside world inflicted on the Monarchy's affairs. In 
areas where 'national' feeling ran high, officers found 
the homes and company of the local elites increasingly 
closed to them. Outside Budapest itself, Hungarian 
traditions of hospitality often overcame separatist 
distaste for the joint army, but in Prague both Czech and 
German nationalists openly despised the army, leaving its 
officers only the company of the local Jews, who were 
equally disdained by the two factions. Galicia, where the 
bulk of the cavalry and an increasing percentage of the 
infantry were stationed, was seen by the officers posted 
there as a kind of minor hell: alongside the legendary 
physical discomforts, the Polish nobility behaved as if 
the garrison officers were simply not there.53 It was a 
rare thing in a Galician town for a HabBburg officer to be 
asked to a Polish gentleman's home, even, some officers
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said, if the officer were a general and the Pole the 
province's viceroy.*4 Vienna of course never lacked in 
social calls, but the Haupt-und-Reaidenz-Stadt itself had 
its dangers. In the German cities of the Monarchy 
including Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck, the student 
duelling societies had so made a sport of insulting 
officers in cafes or on the street that the army found it 
necessary to set up special courses in the sabre in order 
to give its officers any chance at all of remaining, if 
not unscarred, then at least free of public humiliation. 
The problem was only solved by a decree from the war 
ministry authorising challenged officers to use the pistol 
rather than the sabre.55
The officer's uniform guaranteed him special seating 
at a purely nominal cost to the Hofoper or the Burgtheater 
and gave him the right to attend the annual Hofball. It 
did not, however, guarantee his economic security. The 
officers of the dynasty had long been given only minimal 
salaries. In the 1850s a junior officer was paid no more 
and often less than a senior journeyman in a craft guild. 
Sixty years later in an age when he would be far less 
likely to have a private income, an officer in k.-u.-k. 
service would still be paid on average two-thirds of what 
his French or German counterpart would make. A more 
bitter comparison would be with the members of the 
Monarchy's civil service, where the same ratios applied.56
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Chronic underpayment might have been acceptable if one 
fully subscribed to the vision of the officer corps as a 
special caste of vassals bound directly to their prince, 
but by the last decade before the War, such a vision was 
eroded by the growing economic differences between 
officers and civil servants. Not the least of Conrad's 
achievements in the eyes of his contemporaries was the 
supplementary pay for k.-u.-k. officers that he extracted 
from the Reichsrat at the height of the Bosnian crisis of 
1908.
Yet it was still true that civil servants enjoyed 
higher pensions than officers, higher per diem allowances, 
more extensive subsidies for moving between assigned 
posts, and higher tuition subsidies for their children. A 
district judge could afford to send his sons to a "good" 
Gymnasium, but an infantry captain— his equivalent in 
rank— could not. An officer's son had first claim on 
admission to military schools, where tuition costs would 
be borne by the state. The military academy at Wiener- 
Neustadt noted in its annual report for 1912/13 that 67.1% 
of its students (294 of 438 total) had come up from 
military preparatory or cadet schools. The Theresianum 
itself was largely tuition-free; over ninety percent of 
its students paid nothing at all, and many of its future 
officers were there for exactly that reason, just as their 
fathers had placed them in state-subsidized military
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schools as boys.57 Behind Alfred Krauss's disdain for the 
bureaucrats who allegedly monopolised influence at court55 
was a hostility based on very real economic pressures that 
drove the officer corps in upon itself.
Cartoons in the military press had long played on the 
theme of the enclosed military family— types satirized in 
such pieces as Franz Schdnpflug's "An Army Family 
Idyll"59* the choleric colonel, the massive and poker- 
faced Frau Oberst, the dandified older son in his uhlan's 
helmet, the rowdy younger son in cadet's uniform, all 
pbering through monocles around the breakfast table. It 
was still possible for k.-u.-k. officers to laugh at 
themselves, but such cartoons made a point: the number of 
"outside" applicants to the regular officer corps was 
declining; reasons both economic and ideological had begun 
to keep the middle and upper classes of the Monarchy from 
aspiring to wear the emperor's coat.
Gunther Rothenberg noted that after 1905 in the 
officer corps of the Monarchy, "a strong hereditary 
element of sons following in their fathers' footsteps 
became evident."60 Rothenberg saw this as a positive 
factor, but this attitude, based on the images of Prussian 
or British "regimental families," neglects the other side 
of the coin: a growing separation between a world of 
professional officers and the larger world of the Monarchy 
as a whole. The military itself was not unaware that it
was losing its appeal for officers from the upper 
classes61 and that its own social and political horzons 
were narrowing. One internal study of 757 junior officers 
showed that seventy-one percent came from the families of 
officers (fifteen percent), NCOs or provosts (ten 
percent), higher civil or military officials (twelve 
percent) or the lower ranks of state service (thirty-four 
percent).62
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89
25
11
20
263
37
32
79
71
17
757
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Table 5.4
Junior Officers (1908)* Fathers' Professions
Percent Profession
15 Officer
12 Higher civil or military
official
3 Free professions (academics,
phys icians, advocates)
1 Landowners
3 Higher trades (apothecaries, book
dealers, wholesalers, 
businessmen)
34 Lower civil or military official
5 Private income (rentier)
4 “ Farmer (small holder or tenant)
11 Lower trades (salesman, clerk,
craftsman)
10 Underofficer or provost
 2 "Non-independent" professionals
100
Istvan Deak pointed out that the Theresianum's class 
of 1913, with 99 of 133 graduates drawn from military or 
state service families (74.4%) was "clearly...less 
representative of the officer corps and of state service" 
than the class of 1874, when ninety percent of the 
graduates had come from families who wore the dynasty's 
colours.63 Yet the one-quarter of the class not from state- 
or military-service families was almost wholly drawn from 
the lower middle classes, from families which had "lost" a 
son in offering him the chance of social advancement. 
Indeed, by 1913 the representatives of the nobility at the 
Monarchy's premier military academy— one Baron, two 
Ritters, and twenty-nine lesser nobles— were almost 
completely drawn from the service nobility, from families 
newly ennobled by personal distinction in the service of 
the monarch.
By the end of the first decade of the new century, a 
pattern was evident: the officer corps replenished itself
from its own sons and the sons of k.-u,-k. officials plus 
a growing number of young men from the lower middle 
classes who had separated themselves from their families 
and class background in taking the emperor's commission.
The army's efforts to extend itself into the Monarchy's 
educated classes by offering reserve commissions after a 
single year of service to conscripts who had completed 
their secondary education were largely unsuccessful. The
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reserve officers were suspected by their career 
counterparts of harbouring nationalist sentiments, and far 
too few "one-year” men availed themselves of the 
opportunity to turn the privileged status of their 
conscript days into an officer's career. Of 16,000 career 
infantry and J&ger lieutenants commissioned into k.-u.-k. 
service between 1883 and mid-1914, only 2300 (14.4%) came 
from the ranks of the reserve.64
As the officers' world narrowed, the military 
authorities tried to come to grips with the idea of an 
officer corps cut off from the nobility and the educated 
middle classes. The officer corps had long envisioned 
itself as the "mute instrument" of the dynasty, but there 
now occured a shift of emphasis in the meaning of the 
phrase, from implying a non-national, non-political 
professionalism to implying a beleaguered, anti-political 
caste sealed off from society.65 The ubiquitous 
Auffenberg was once more at hand to explain the problems 
facing the officer corps. Early in May 1908 he submitted 
to the war ministry, and to his patron, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, a memorandum "On the Composition of the Officer 
Corps” wherein he lamented that the k.-u.-k. professional 
officer of the future would be drawn (at best) from the 
lower middle classes and that historical experience in 
"all eras and all lands" showed that
317
extraordinary losses in battle were, throughout 
history, accepted only by those military units led by 
a homogeneous and socially well-established officer 
corps with an especially well-developed sense of 
honour...One must therefore realise that....our 
officer corps and, quite probably the army as a whole 
cannot be expected to offer a better-than-average 
performance...66
The social background of the officers would make them 
unlikely to produce any automatic deference or admiration 
on the part of society as a whole. The solution, 
Auffenberg believed, was to "educate, educate, educate"—  
though what he had in mind was not at all an education in 
the liberal spirit which the reserve officers were 
supposed by the Liberal politicians of the 1870s to 
provide to the army, but a kind of indoctrination in 
deracination.
Education, Auffenberg proclaimed, gave its recipients 
both self-confidence and a sense of self-worth. More to 
the point, education would raise a young officer candidate 
out of the social milieu of his birth. The "bonds of 
heart and family" which might become a hindrance to an 
officer confronted with upheavals in the larger world of 
the Monarchy would doubtless weaken. Auffenberg was 
willing to concede that, in separating k.-u.-k. officers 
from the worlds into which they had been born, there was 
the risk of the officer corps becoming an exclusive caste. 
Yet while such exclusivity was "no advantage in the 
cultural and intellectual development of an officer, it
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is, in a strictly military sense, no disadvantage 
either... ”67
Auffenberg's second point is of course arguable. One 
analyst has claimed that the greatest source of 
instability in the k.-u.-k. army was a lack of "basic 
trust" between private soldiers and officers, a lack based 
on a mutual incomprehension that was far more a product of 
the officers' isolated social caste than of language or 
rank.68 Exclusivity severed the army leadership from a 
sense of the political and social life of the Monarchy. 
There was no k.-u.-k. equivalent of the Victorian officer 
who could expect as a matter of course to be a local 
magistrate or member of Parliament once he had left active 
service. Imperial-and-royal officers, both in 
Auffenberg's prescription and in fact, formed a caste 
whose education was narrowly technical, who were trained 
to believe absolutely in the Monarchy and the dynasty, and 
who were shielded from any discussion of the political and 
social factors shaping the military and its future.69 The 
"mute instrument" of the dynasty was also deaf, and 
Auffenberg's vision of itB leaders' education was intended 
to keep it so.
In the long-ago world of Franz Joseph's youth, in the 
days before Solferino, the young emperor's adjutant had 
declared that "the Army does not discuss. The Army does 
not reason.” Yet of course it did both. The k.-u.-k.
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army was expected to be a world unto itself, to be the 
silent instrument of the dynasty's will. Nonetheless, 
however mute the army was expected to be in the face of 
the outside world, however deaf to external voices its 
officers were trained to be, it possessed its own inner, 
institutionalised voice. At the end of each year, the 
chief of the general staff was expected to produce a 
Militar-Politiache Denkschrift, an overview of the state 
of both the army and the Monarchy as a whole for the eyes 
of the emperor and the war minister. Conrad's annual 
reports had been the work of a mind focused on 
quantitative matters; his view of the Monarchy's condition 
had been embodied in his constant pleas for more recruits, 
for the Hungarian agreements of 1906/07 to be implemented 
at long last, for money to repair the "desolate condition" 
of the army.70 Conrad's reports had been pessimistic 
enough, but they had been relentlessly technical. It was 
only in 1912, when Conrad's incessant quarrels with the 
foreign ministry had briefly driven him from favour, that 
the army's views were given a more emotional expression.
The author of the Militar-Politiache Denkschrift for 
1912 was General der Infanterie Blasius von Schemua, who 
temporarily replaced Conrad as chief of the general staff 
at the end of 1911. Schemua's appointment seems never to 
have been intended as permanent. Schemua was a man of 
some personal charm and he was well-regarded at court; his
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appointment served to provide a respite after Conrad's 
long-standing quarrels with Count Aerenthal, the 
Monarchy's foreign minister, over Balkan policy.71 
Schemua's term in office served to allow the temporarily- 
disgraced Conrad time to reflect that the chief of the 
general staff did not make diplomatic policy as well as 
run the army. Gerhard Ritter was correct in describing 
Schemua as "evidently no more than a caretaker."72 
Schemua lacked Conrad's drive, ambitions, and technical 
expertise; he devoted his free time to theosophical and 
occult societies. Yet, ouija boards aside, he was a 
competent administrator who ably handled the large-scale 
mobilisation of k.-u.-k. forces in late 1912, when it 
appeared that the Balkan crisis might lead to war against 
Serbia and Russia. Schemua was a solid and steady, if 
obscure, officer, and his 1912 surveys spoke for the mass 
of k.-u.-k. officers who lacked the aggressive visibility 
of Conrad or Auffenberg, but who nonetheless shared their 
fears.
The characteristics of the modern age, wrote Schemua, 
were "dissolution and disintegration.” One had only to 
look around oneself to see "ferment, flux, unrest..." 
Society had lost any sense of its aims, of its goals. Yet 
"social, economic, and political" tensions demanded 
solutions.
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Such solutions could not come from the civil 
administration. The civil service of the Monarchy no 
longer served the needs of the population. It had become 
bloated and ineffective. Unable to recruit conscientious 
staff, it relied on no more than appearances and 
capricious authority. In consequence, internal policy was 
shaped not by the plans of the government, but by 
"impulses from below," and internal policy was 
increasingly marked by corruption, weakness, and 
impotence.73
Schemua, like Conrad and Albrecht before him, 
recognized that the Monarchy's peoples had been brought 
together by force of circumstance. "Austria-Hungary," he 
wrote, "is not a temporary assemblage of states, no, the 
peoples have grown together because they, whether they 
wish to see it or not, are joined by common interests.1,74 
Yet it was only the Monarchy's soldiers who were willing 
to serve and defend those common interests: "The soldier
will soon be the only one who does not make a business of 
his profession, who serves selflessly the common idea, and 
for whom there exists a common fatherland.”75
Schemua was as well aware as Conrad of the material 
failings of the army— the lack of recruits, of artillery, 
of funding. Yet underlying all that was a far graver 
lack, a lack of belief. The two parliaments, he told 
Franz Ferdinand, were corrupt in the most basic sense:
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They lacked the will to act for the good of the Monarchy 
as a whole, they lacked any sense of the Monarchy as a 
whole.76 Istvan Deak, titled his study of the Habsburg 
officer corps Beyond Nationalism, but as R.J.W. Evans 
pointed out, the k.-u.-k. officer corps in the last years 
before 1914 was not so much "beyond" nationalism as "still 
on the threshold" of a "largely uncomprehending Austrian 
patriotism."77 Penned within narrowing horizons, the k.- 
u.-k. officer corps sought some sign that the Monarchy 
possessed a belief in itself, in its own future. The 
increasing air of desperation and hopelessness seen in the 
memoranda of Conrad, of Schemua and of Auffenberg was 
based on the need to believe, to see a belief in the 
Monarchy held by groups outside the tight circle of those 
who wore the emperor's coat. Increasingly desperate to 
see concrete signs of belief, the military leadership of 
the Monarchy began to cast about for the possibilities of 
action.
Action did not necessarily mean a demand for military 
action. Conrad's much-heralded and obsessive demands for 
war with Italy and Serbia were not shared by the foreign 
ministry, by the heir-apparent, by the emperor, or by 
many, perhaps most, of his colleagues. Military 
intelligence was well aware of the strength of the Serbian 
forces and understood that a war against even Serbia alone 
would absorb all the Monarchy's energy.78 Schemua's
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Denkschrift for the beginning of 1912 had emphasized the 
danger of any multi-front war and called for 
circumspection in the Balkans and improved relations with 
Russia.79 Schemua and his staff were under no illusions 
about the costs of military action. The next war, he 
wrote in February 1912
will be in the fullest sense of the word a 
people's war, in which armies will battle until 
annihilation, until the enemy army is powerless the 
national strength of the enemy is broken, his centres 
of industry, trade and commerce overrun and 
occupied.. .As Bismarck saidt seigner it blanc,80
Action need not have meant a call for war. Yet a call for
action, action for its own sake, marked a total failure of
political thinking.
The historian Josef Redlich once described Conrad as
"exclusively a technician. In politics he recognises only
quantifiable and measureable factors, corps, guns,
fortresses, etc... He lacks the ability and understanding,
in short, everything essential for the great concept of a
state based on the nationalities."B1 Conrad's limitations
were those of his profession and class; as Rothenberg
pointed out, "Conrad's sentiments were shared by the vast
majority of senior soldiers and by the regular officer
corps."82 The "mute instrument" of the dynasty had been
rendered unable to comprehend the political life of the
Monarchy or envision any real changes in either the
composition of the Monarchy or the role and place of the
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army. Conrad himself was able to entertain briefly 
visions of some form of tripartite structure, of playing a 
South Slav card against the Magyars,83 but in the end he, 
like his colleagues, was unable to accept the "chaos," the 
loss of control, both political and psychological, 
implicit in politics. The officers of the Monarchy knew 
that for a unit under fire only discipline and a firm hand 
would permit survival, and what was true for a regiment 
was true for the Monarchy as a whole.
In the last decade before 1914, there was no doubt in 
staff circles that the Monarchy's next war would be a 
multi-front struggle against enemies possessed of superior 
numbers and equipment. That catastrophe— embodied in a 
Kriegsfall R + I + B(S) (1908)64— weighed with increasing 
urgency on the k.-u.-k. leadership. The weakness of the 
army was no secret. The army, lamented Baron Franz von 
Schonaich, the Monarchy's war minister, was "withering 
away." Yet nothing could be done to rebuild the military 
until the internal situation was resolved, and the 
military leadership could think of no solution other than 
the traditional evocations of dynastic loyalty and a call 
for a firm hand.
Conrad had come to office in 1907 convinced that "all 
our preparations and planning for external war are useless 
so long as our internal situation is not resolved."85 But 
the consummate technician could find no solutions.
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Unable, as he later admitted, to accept a "policy of 
patience"86 he began to demand "energetic"— violent—  
measures: abrogation of the Ausgleich, suspension of the 
constitution.87
Conrad's obsession with finding a war, with war as a 
"magic potion to master a situation which was really 
without remedy"88 might have been predicted from his 
techical works. His 1903 survey of the Boer War concluded 
that the new age of firepower had completely altered the 
face of warfare. Yet the Monarchy lacked the financial 
base and the trained reserves of manpower necessary to 
exploit the technology and tactics of modern war, and 
Conrad lacked the vision to imagine a thoroughgoing 
reconstruction of the Monarchy and its army. Josef 
Redlich found him to be "a true Austrian of our time: full 
of doubts concerning everything Austrian.”89 Convinced 
that the army could not take advantage of the new 
techniques of warfare, unable to imagine political changes 
that might lessen the danger of a major war, Conrad 
yielded to his own sense of despair. The army would have 
to rely on offensive spirit, to charge on and hope that 
determination alone might overcome the inevitable 
losses.90
Conrad's insistence on a war with Italy or Serbia was 
not finally based on a linkage between success abroad and 
an end to the stalemate at home. Unlike key members of
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Louis Napoleon's regime before the Franco-Prussian War or 
the Argentine junta in 1982, Conrad offered no promises of 
domestic renewal as the fruits of victory. He could not, 
by 1912, offer more than even odds that any war would be 
successful, nor did he have any clear sense of what 
further complications— foreign or domestic— such a war 
might entail.91
By 1914 Conrad had reached a state of complete 
intellectual bankruptcy. All he could offer was action 
for its own sake— a demonstration that the Monarchy and 
its army could still act. When in the summer of 1914 he 
finally got his war, no one could have been more 
pessimistic about what he lamented would be "a hopeless 
struggle" made inevitable by the Monarchy's need to save 
its last asset, its honour.92 Yet while Conrad in his 
office on the Stubenring was spinning out ever more 
desperate and desperately pessimistic fantasies, south and 
east across Vienna in the Belvedere were men who 
understood exactly what the army could do to save itself 
and the Monarchy.
The Belvedere— the twin palace complex built for 
Prince Eugene— had been Archduke Franz Ferdinand's 
official residence since 1898. It had been given him 
along with a roving commission zur Disposition, at the 
pleasure of the emperor, as inspector-general of the armed 
forces. The Belvedere had been a symbol that the
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archduke, so recently seriously ill with tuberculosis and 
usually regarded with little interest or favour by the 
emperor, had at long last— a decade after the suicide of 
Crown Prince Rudolf, three years after the death of his 
father, the emperor's younger brother Karl Ludwig— been 
acknowledged as heir-apparent. By the time of the 
Hungarian crisis of 1905, the Belvedere had become a 
symbol of Franz Ferdinand's opposition to the whole 
political atmosphere of the Monarchy. The Belvedere had 
become what its occupant saw as the seat of a shadow 
government, and the archduke's military chancellery had 
become the center of planning for the role of the army in 
Franz Ferdinand's reign and his proposed new order.
Franz Ferdinand had been commissioned at fourteen; he 
had been made a colonel at twenty-seven and a general at 
thirty-one. By 1905 he had worn the Monarchy's uniform 
for twenty-eight years and had been expecting for over a 
decade to be named titular commander in chief in case of 
war.” His promotions were of course dynastic; it was 
considered essential that a Habsburg archduke be a soldier 
and equally essential that an archduke have sufficient 
military rank to be presentable at court and diplomatic 
functions. Franz Ferdinand had never received formal 
staff training or attended any of the higher military 
schools, and he lacked the consuming military interests of 
the late Archduke Albrecht or his own brother Otto. Yet
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the army was the focus of much of his attention, and it 
was the army that he planned to use to save the Monarchy 
he would inherit.
Franz Ferdinand had been known to disparage publicly 
the Aasgleich arrangements as a "typical product" of Franz 
Joseph's "love of compromise"99 His own opinions had 
formed early in life, and he saw no reason to change them. 
In 1896 he wrote FeldzeugmeiBter Beck that
in the difficult times which face the Monarchy,
one must ask, who and what supports the Throne and
the Dynasty? To this question there is only one
answer— the Army. The Army does not serve only to 
defend the fatherland against foreign foes; its chief 
role is the defense and maintenance of the throne and 
the struggle against the enemies within.95
The enemies within were easily identified. In 1908 he
wrote Conrad that the Monarchy was "totally in the hands
of Jews, Freemasons, Socialists, and Hungary," and "those
elements" sought to ruin the army and the officer corps so
that "when the time comes that I need it, I can no longer
rely on the army!"9*
Frederic Morton has recently pictured Franz Ferdinand
as the leader of a "peace" faction— a "dove," and one "all
the more ferocious because there was hardly any other in
the Empire's highest council.”97 And the archduke indeed
had no use for Conrad's war plans and argued in favour of
conciliating Russia and moving with caution in the
Balkans. Yet if he had no wish to march on Belgrade or
Cetinje or Milan it was not out of any attachment to peace
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as an ideal. What drove the archduke apart from his 
erstwhile protege Conrad was that Franz Ferdinand needed 
the army for something other than wars in the Balkans or 
Italy. Franz Ferdinand needed the army to establish his 
new reign by marching on Budapest.
Conrad wrote that the future of the Monarchy required 
"a strong central state administration supported by a 
unified Army, with a centralized parliament... If the 
nationalities cannot fit themselves into this order of 
things, then catastrophe is unavoidable."*B If in the end 
Conrad came to believe that catastrophe could not be 
avoided, it was because he saw no way to force the 
nationalities to believe in the Monarchy. Like Beck 
before him, he realised that 1849 could not be repeated, 
that Hungarian obstructionism could not be solved by 
force. Conrad was prepared to rage against concessions to 
the Magyars on military questions, but though at the 
beginning of his tenure as chief of staff he had had Fall 
U, updated, he was never prepared to urge its 
implementation. It seemed far easier to dream of 
conquests in Serbia or the Veneto" than to risk civil 
war. Conrad may indeed have found, as Redlich said, "all 
the non-material problems of modern politics— public 
opinion, national ideas" to be Unknown territory,100 but 
he was well able to weigh up the risks of an internal 
solution by force. There would be at least "honour" and
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"prestige" to be gained abroad; there would be nothing to 
be won by an attempted conquest of Hungary. Franz 
Ferdinand, like his seventeenth-century Styrian namesake, 
knew that his future subjects could— should— be forced to 
believe.
Franz Ferdinand was far closer in temperament to the 
second of his namesakes than the first, and contemporary 
observers continually described him as a figure of the 
High Baroque. An Italian journalist envisioned him "among 
the grey granite of the Escorial,"101 but there was more 
of Ferdinand II than of Philip II in him. He lacked 
Philip's concept of prudence, of endlessly weighing 
alternatives. His two deepest beliefs— in dynastic 
absolutism and in the presumed treason of all the Magyar 
oligarchy— were openly and energetically held. He wrote 
to Kaiser Wilhelm that "the so-called noble, knightly 
Magyar is the most infamous, anti-dynastic, unreliable and 
lying wretch, and all the difficulties which we have in 
the Monarchy have their ultimate source in Hungary."102 
During his unhappy tenure as colonel of the 25. (Odenburg) 
Hussars he had had no qualms about expressing the same 
views to his Magyar officers; as inspector-general he 
refused outright to review any Hungarian unit.103
The key to all of Franz Ferdinand's ideas was the 
destruction of the Magyar oligarchy and its dominance in 
Hungary. As early as 1895 he had shown interest in an
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"American" federalism— a strong central regime that would 
permit domestic autonomy in a new set of crownlands, where 
Slovak and Croat autonomy would undercut Magyar 
strength.104 By 1903 he had moved to consider trialist 
ideas, adding a Kingdom of Croatia as a third unit of the 
Monarchy, and in 1906 he expressed great interest in the 
federal plans of Aurel Popovic, whose Die Vereinigten 
Staaten Grossosterreichs called for twenty ethnically- 
based crownlands with their own courts and internal 
administrations.105 But by 1907 he had abandoned 
trialist and federal ideas. The willingness of Serbs and 
Croats to combine in the Fiume Resolutions convinced the 
archduke that any Slav bloc would be as dangerous to the 
unity of the Monarchy as a Magyar one. In the end, 
trialism would only give the South Slavs and the Czechs a 
chance to copy the Magyars. The only hope of maintaining 
order in the Monarchy was "To break this preponderance of 
Hungary/ Otherwise we will with absolute certainty become 
a Slavic empire, and trialism, which would be a disaster, 
is inevitable."106
The mechanism through which the archduke developed 
his plans for his new regime and the breaking of Magyar 
dominance was the military staff granted him by the 
emperor in 1898. As part of the archduke's position as 
inspector-general he was entitled to copies of all major 
papers from the Reichskriegsministerium and the Austrian
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and Hungarian defense ministries, and a staff of two 
military aides was assigned to deal with the documents.
Its initial head was Heinrich von Krauss-Elislago, later 
chief of the Operations-Biiro and one of the architects of 
Fall U. The role of the archduke's staff had at first 
been largely limited to preparing digests of ministerial 
reports. After 1906, with the arrival of a new adjutant, 
Captain Alexander von Brosch of the KaiserjMgers, the 
staff became the centre of the archduke's plans and, in 
the eyes of many observers, something of a shadow cabinet.
Allmayer-Beck described Brosch rather disingenuously 
as an "outspokenly political but not politicised 
officer."107 He was a fine staff officer and a fine 
light infantry officer as well. He had attracted the 
archduke's attention while commanding a Kaiserjager unit 
on maneuvers in the Tirol in the late summer of 1905; he 
was appointed the archduke's adjutant in February 1906 and 
promoted to major three months later.108 Brosch's 
portrait in the Kriegsmuseum shows him as a combat 
soldier, leading his encircled Jagers in a last, doomed 
charge in August 1914, but he was a born courtier, a 
political soldier who very deftly interpreted his master's 
wishes and who expanded the small staff he inherited-- 
formally designated the archduke's military chancellery in 
November 1908— into an intelligence and advisory body only
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marginally smaller than the emperor's own military 
staff.109
Franz Ferdinand had long felt himself blocked from 
any access to real authority in the Monarchy, from the co­
regency {Mitregentachaft) he felt was his due from the old 
emperor, and he was given to saying that he knew less 
about policy than the lowest servant at Schonbrunn.110 
Brosch saw his job as establishing the role of the 
Belvedere in all affairs of state. To that end he 
expanded the Belvedere's intake of ministerial documents 
and began to submit questions to local commands. The 
story ran in the army that if a rifle fell from its rack 
in some forgotten Galician garrison, the archduke— always 
fascinated with military detail— would know its serial 
number the next day.111 Behind the joke lay the 
information net that Brosch spread throughout the army, 
seeking details about events and, more importantly, 
personnel changes and appointments.112 It became the 
business of Brosch's staff to know when any officer 
suspected of being "soft" on Hungarian matters or not 
sufficiently in tune with the archduke's views or, as in 
the case of Baron Holzhausen, head of the Theresianum and 
later commander of the 4.(Hoch-und-DeutBChmeister)
Infantry, too Protestant for the archduke's taste, 
received a new posting.113
At the very beginning of his tenure as adjutant 
Brosch had established contacts between the Belvedere and 
the Christian Social journal Reichspost, which had been 
strongly critical of any concessions to Hungary in 
military affairs. In short order Reichspost became the 
"official", and financially-supported, newspaper of the 
Belvedere. Friedrich Funder, From Empire to Republic, the 
young editor of Reichspost, was summoned to the Belvedere 
several times a week and given direct telephone access to 
Brosch, who also provided him with copies of confidential 
documents that Brosch or the archduke wished to have 
publicised.114 It was through Funder that Brosch began 
to assemble a group of intellectuals—  Aurel Popovici, the 
Croat Ivo Frank, the Slovak Milan Hodza, the Romanians 
Iuliu Maniu and Alexander Vajda— who, along with the 
"renegade" Magyar Joszef Kristoffy, minister of the 
interior in Fejervary's government, would begin to 
formulate plans to use universal suffrage and the 
nationality question to attack the dominance of the Magyar 
oligarchy in Hungary.115
Brosch's own views on concessions to Hungary— in 
uniforms, flags or language of command— was as hard-line 
as the archduke's. Brosch knew
only too well that the unity of an army was not 
only in its arms and equipment, but more especially 
in its spirit... [which is the] prerequisite for 
successful leadership, Every concession to Hungary, 
be it over flags or insignia or the language
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question, was in regards to constitutional and also 
military affairs a mistake, against which Major von 
Brosch immediately opened a front.116
Brosch was willing to go public with attacks on any
concessions to Hungarian aspirations. Articles, first
using Brosch as deep background, then signed by "a highly-
placed military personality," and finally under Brosch's
own name, began to appear in Reichspost and
Osterreichische Rundschau opposing any and all of the
compromises offered by war ministers Pitreich and
Schdnaich. "Der Militarische Ausgleich," which ran in
Osterreichische Rundschau for 13 March 1908 and was later
reprinted as a pamphlet under Brosch's name, made the
Belvedere's position clear: the future of the Monarchy
depended on a unitary, non-national army, commanded in
German, loyal only to the dynasty.117
The position papers issuing from the Belvedere were
quite openly designed to let the army and the public know
that the heir-apparent planned to open his reign by
sweeping aside decades of temporizing and drift. The
current staff at Schonbrunn was well aware of its symbolic
role in the archduke's eyes and had given Count
Montenuovo, the emperor's chamberlain, signed, undated
resignations as a hedge for their pension rights against
the mass dismissals Franz Ferdinand was known to be
preparing for the first day of his reign.118 The
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archduke's plans included sacking the old emperor's 
retinue; they included abandoning the Auagleich as well.
By mid-1911 Brosch had prepared a complete program 
for Franz Ferdinand's accession. The 
Thronwechselprogramm, including updated lists of 
appointments to be made to the new emperor's government 
and army, was complete by September 1911, two months 
before Brosch's term as adjutant expired.119 Friedrich 
Funder and Joszef Kristoffy believed that the archduke 
"entertained no thoughts of revolutionary plans of action 
against Hungary" and planned to proclaim his plans for a 
renewed Monarchy during the coronations in Budapest and 
Prague.120 Brosch's plans for the change of reigns make 
clear that Franz Ferdinand intended from the first to 
undertake "revolutionary plans.”
Franz Ferdinand intended to reign as Franz II of 
Austria, not of Austria-Hungary. A manifesto "An unsere 
Volker" would be issued in three versions— one for the 
Cisleithanian lands, one for Hungary, and one for Bosnia- 
Herzegovina— proclaiming the new reign and explaining that 
the time had come for a firm hand to restore unity.121 
The vision of the new regime was not unlike that found in 
the October Diploma of 1860— the crownlands to be given 
local administrative autonomy, the imperial government 
above them absolute control of army and finances. The 
Dual Monarchy would be at an end; Franz II would refuse to
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swear a coronation oath to the Crown of St. Stephen, and 
the Hungarian constitution could be immediately abolished. 
All concessions on issues of military insignia or language 
of service and command would be immediately retracted.
The new emperor's first general order to the soldiers of 
the imperial (no longer imperial-and-royal) army 
proclaimed that
under old and honourable banners and insignia, 
hallowed by the centuries, should the Army and Navy—  
when God so wills— fight for Emperor and Fatherland 
and, undisturbed by any and all social and national 
tensions under unified leadership and command, be but 
an instrument of its supreme commander for the 
welfare of Our fatherland.122
There would immediately be a new and enlarged 
military budget and on expanded intake of conscripts.
Those sections of the Ausgleich (sec. 11, 12: 1867) 
dealing with military affairs would be revoked. All 
rights of command and organisation would be absolutely 
reserved to the Crown; there would be no more control of 
the army by "parliamentary clique." The army's needs 
would be supplied without reference to the Reichsrat or 
the Hungarian Diet— perhaps on the model of Bismarck's 
handling of the Prussian military budget in the 1860s.
There could be no more pressing task, the archduke told 
Joszef Kristoffy, than removing the army from the whims of 
parliamentary control.123
The program drafted by Brosch fit perfectly with the 
archduke's personality. Franz Ferdinand thrived on the
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thought of "decisive" action. In 1908 he had told Conrad 
that if he were emperor he would summon the two prime 
ministers and the war minister for an ultimatum:
do you know what I would do if I were the 
emperor? I'd summon Wekerle, Beck...and Schonaich 
and I'd say to them: "I'll send you all to the Devil 
if I don't get more recruits and higher officers' pay 
for my army in eight days," and I'll tell you right 
now, in 24 hours I'd have it alll124
Franz Ferdinand was fond of proclaiming that "When I
become supreme commander, then I'll do what I want. Woe,
if anyone does anything else! I'll have them all
shot!"125 The bellicose rhetoric, though, masked the
fact that the archduke had no long-term view of how to
handle a defiant Hungary, and that the needs of the army
itself, the need to mount a credible force against foreign
threats, made the army less likely to be a mute instrument
to be used against the Magyars.
The archduke himself believed that there would be
little resistance to the new regime. He counted on
support in Hungary from the nationalities— especially the
Romanians, whose cause he publicly championed— and indeed
from the "ever-loyal" Hungarian peasantry, on whom he
counted for support against not just the gentry but
against all his other enemies— "the dominance of
Freemasons, Socialists, Anarchists, Jews, radical Slavs,
irredentists"124— as well. The archduke seems to have
assumed that the proclamation of a new order would rally
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the bulk of the Monarchy's population behind him. Brosch 
had held discussions in the summer of 1910 with the jurist 
Heinrich Lammasch on revising Hungarian constitutional 
law, but he had done nothing to build political support 
for the archduke in Hungary,127 and neither Brosch nor 
Franz Ferdinand had been able to attract German support 
for the proposed new order. By 1911 the German government 
had in fact made it clear to both the archduke and to the 
diplomats at the Ballhausplatz that no German support 
would be offered for any kind of coup in Hungary.128
The initial assumption about a coup de main in 
Budapest seems to have been that no real resistance would 
be offered. Fall U, was still on file with the 
Operations-Btiro of the general staff and remained 
available to the new Franz II. Yet Brosch showed no 
interest in any detailed plans for military intervention—  
neither in presenting them to the archduke nor even in 
obtaining information for his own files. Action against 
the Hungarian parliament was seen as being much along the 
lines of the Sanierung undertaken by Fejervary and 
Fabrizius— a limited number of troops deployed to occupy 
the Diet and disperse the deputies. Brosch did, however, 
propose to garrison key points on the Hungarian rail and 
telegraph nets with "reliable" detachments of infantry and 
engineering units.129 Hungary would then receive a 
military governor, whose role would be modeled on that of
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Archduke Albrecht, in the 1850s. Franz Ferdinand, in what 
Norman Stone described as a gesture of "characteristic 
futility"130, planned to give that post to a suitably- 
promoted Brosch.
It was only with the approach of the 1912 army bill 
negotiations that Brosch and the Militarkanzlei staff 
began to consider the larger problems of a coup in 
Budapest. Brosch had long since prepared lists of civil 
officials to be dismissed and replaced with "loyal" 
Magyars; by 1910 he had begun to consider military changes 
as well. Lines of communication would have to be secured; 
that much had been obvious from the beginning. Should any 
real resistance develop, Budapest would have to be held, 
as would key towns and fortresses in the countryside. The 
archduke remained convinced that "neither the Jewish 
businessman, nor the peasant in the Hungarian plains, nor 
finally the worker in the industrial centers" would "risk 
his own skin" for the likes of the Magyar oligarchy131, 
but his staff had to consider the possibility of real 
resistance from Hungarian troops. Brosch began to plan 
for strengthening key Hungarian points with Cisleithanian 
troops and transferring heavily Magyar regiments out of 
Hungary.132
The k.-u.-k. army had been garrisoned on a 
territorial basis since the 1880s. With the exception of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was garrisoned by units drawn
from the Monarchy as a whole, regiments were ordinarily 
stationed in their recruiting districts. The system had 
been designed to permit rapid mobilization against an 
enemy— Russia— possessed of a superior initial strength.
It was of course possible for units to be moved away from 
politically sensitive areas. In 1911 troops of the 
70.(Peterwardein) Infantry, a regiment eighty percent of 
whose men were Serbs, were withdrawn from the garrison at 
Semlin following unrest in Slavonia and replaced by the 
all-Magyar 68.(Szolnok) Infantry. Nonetheless, the army 
had long since set rapid mobilization as a top 
priority.133 The growth in Russian strength since the 
1880s, along with the inability of the k.-u.-k. forces to 
substantially increase their manpower levels, made rapid 
mobilization all the more vital.
Rothenberg argued that Conrad was prepared by 1911 to 
subordinate speed of mobilization to questions of 
political loyalty,134 but this seems a misreading of 
Conrad's views. Conrad's concern was, as always, numbers. 
He never ceased to press home the fact that a peacetime 
k.-u.-k. infantry company contained ninety-three men and 
its Russian counterpart held 167, or that by 1913 the 
Russian army would have thirty-eight reserve divisions 
while the k.-u.-k. forces would have none at all.135 
Conrad's plans called for the wartime k.-u.-k. army to 
field forty-eight first-line divisions, a number that
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could be reached only be re-assigning the Landwehr and 
HonvSd as first-line units.13* Conrad's projections 
could offer no hope of creating substantial reserve forces 
in less than a decade.137 Only by speed of mobilization 
and use of the Landwehr and Honvdd as first-line units 
could the Monarchy hope to stop any initial Russian 
onslaught. Conrad might sanction special instances of 
moving units for political reasons, but he would not 
support any large-scale dismantling of the territorial 
system.
Conrad was preparing for war in Galicia; Franz 
Ferdinand's plans did not depend on speed of mobilization. 
By 1911, at the end of his appointment as adjutant, Brosch 
had drafted plans for large-scale garrison transfers to 
safeguard the accession of Franz II. His successor, 
Colonel Karl von Bardolff, devoted the first part of his 
tenure to drawing up plans for altering the whole 
territorial system and ensuring the loyalty of the army in 
the face of any political upheavals brought on by the new 
regime. By the spring of 1913 Bardolff's designs had been 
submitted to the archduke.136 Territorial garrisoning, 
Bardolff wrote, was no longer effective. In view of 
nationalist propaganda and the intensification of national 
unrest, one could no longer assume that the army was 
unaffected by national tensions. It was therefore vital
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to "return, at least in part, to the principles which 
regulated garrisoning before the '80s."
Bardolff proposed giving special attention to the 
twenty-four infantry regiments with sixty percent or more 
Magyar personnel. Five would be left in their home 
districts; eight more could be kept inside their corps 
areas, but moved outside their home districts; eleven 
would be shifted completely away, thus giving an increase 
of five regiments with completely "extra-territorial" 
stations. Thirteen regiments of sixty percent plus Magyar 
troops would remain inside the lands of the Hungarian 
crown. They would be balanced by sixteen "nationality 
regiments," all presumably reliable for use against the 
Magyar oligarchy, as well as two Bohemian infantry 
regiments and one regiment of Bosniaks. Five of sixteen 
hussar regiments were already serving with the expanded 
cavalry forces facing the Russians in Galicia; two more 
would be transferred to the Polish frontier. Of the nine 
remaining hussar regiments, five would be at their home 
depots and four stationed elsewhere inside Hungary, 
possibly as small units of border patrol horse. The new 
governor-general's cavalry forces would be augmented by 
two Bohemian dragoon regiments and the Croatian 5. Uhlans.
The same criteria were applied to the Czechs, who 
during the crises over the annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in 1908 and the Balkan War in 1912 had showed
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disturbing pro-Serb sympathies. Of fifteen infantry 
regiments with sixty percent or more Czech troops, four 
would remain in their home districts, three in their 
present corps commands, and eight would be extra­
territorial— an increase of four extra-territorial 
regiments. Of ten Bohemian cavalry regiments with fifty 
percent or more Czech troops, eight (an increase of two) 
would be extra-territorial. Six largely Czech infantry 
regiments would remain in Bohemia— the seventh would be in 
its home corps area, but outside Bohemia proper. The 
Magyar 1. Hussars, the Ruthene 7. Uhlans, the German 4. 
Dragoons, and the German-Bohemian 14. Dragoons would be 
used to augment cavalry forces.
Bardolff also planned to shift garrisons in the South 
Slav provinces of the Monarchy. Of seven Serbo-Croat 
regiments in XIII. Korps (Zagreb) and the Dalmatian 
command (site of the planned XVI. Korps at Ragusa), one 
would be left in its home district, three more would be in 
the corps area, and three (an increase of two) would be 
extra-territorial. Of fifteen battalions raised in 
Dalmatia, ten— an increase of five— would be extra­
territorial. Only a single k.-u.-k. battalion, drawn from 
the 22.(Sinj) Infantry, one battalion of the 37.(Laibach) 
HonvSd, and two battalions of the 23.(Zara) Landwehr 
Infantry would remain territorialized.
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Bardolff was prepared at least to nod in Conrad's 
direction by acknowledging that, bearing in mind the 
"gravest misgivings" (schwerwiegendsten Bedenken) of the 
chief of the general staff, he had maintained the 
territorial system intact in the Galician corps commands 
(I. X., XI., Korps) as well as in III Korps (Graz) and XIV 
Korps (Innsbruck) covering the Italian frontier. But he 
insisted that any successful overhauling of the garrisons 
required that five Magyar infantry and two hussar 
regiments, four Czech infantry regiments and two Czech 
cavalry regiments, one Croat infantry regiment, and two 
Dalmatian regiments be moved out of their present stations 
and replaced by "foreign" (fremdnationale) units— in 
addition to those units already posted to duty in Bosnia 
or Galicia. Some transfers, Bardolff argued, could not 
wait for a general change. Units thought especially 
susceptible to bad influences— such as the 18.(Koniggratz) 
and 102.(Beneschau), eighty percent and one-hundred 
percent Czech respectively— needed to be moved "This year 
and as soon as possible."139
All the plans drawn up at the Belvedere by both 
Brosch and Bardolff turned on the question of succession. 
Franz Ferdinand's authority as inspector-general had been 
expanded by 1913, and he had been formally given the role 
of commander-in-chief in wartime. But he lacked authority 
to order any major changes in the territorial system on
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his own, and there was no chance that Franz Joseph and 
Conrad would support his plans. Each month that the old 
emperor remained on the throne— and Franz Joseph would 
suffer no serious illness until the spring of 1914, when 
he contracted pneumonia shortly after Easter--made the 
plans drawn up at the Belvedere more difficult to 
implement.
Franz Ferdinand hoped to base his foreign policy on 
caution in the Balkans and conciliation with Russia. Yet 
the k.-u.-k. military had to face the spectres of Russian 
power and the near-certainty of fighting a multi-front 
war. The point of the protracted Hungarian crisis had 
after all been an expansion of the army. The Army Bill of 
1912, enacted amidst impending war in the Balkans, gave 
the army 42,000 more men annually— 136,000 for k.-u.-k. 
forces, 20,175 for the Landwehr, and 17,500 for the 
Honvdd1*0— a total of 181,000 men, which would rise to 
236,300 (170,000 k.-u.-k., 35,300 Landwehr, 31,000 Honvdd) 
over the next six years. The two second-line forces would 
henceforth be treated as first-line units, and both 
Landwehr and Honvdd would receive not just more men but 
organic artillery and technical units as well.
Honvdd units had been organized at regimental level 
since 1890; by 1913 the Honvdd consisted of thirty-two 
infantry regiments organised into seven divisions. Its 
ten hussar regiments were at full strength, and plans were
.t*
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underway to double the cavalry establishment.1'11 The 
Army Bill of 1912 gave both the Landwehr and the Honvdd 
their own artillery. Artillery units were of course vital 
in moving the Landwehr and Honvdd to first-line status; 
artillery also gave the Honvdd the ability to undertake 
its own combined-arms operations and resist any k.-u.-k. 
coercion with heavy weapons.
The Hungarian Diet was quite willing to vote funds 
for its "national" forces, an attitude that meshed exactly 
with Conrad's desperate attempts to rebuild the Monarchy's 
military strength. By mid-1913 each of the Honvdd hussar 
regiments had been given reinforced machine-gun 
detachments. A field artillery regiment had been formed 
at Budapest, and a horse artillery regiment was being 
raised.142 By 1917 the Honvdd would possess eight field 
artillery regiments143, all integrated into brigade 
formations. Heavy artillery units, including howitzers, 
would be based at major strongholds in Budapest, Zagreb, 
and along the Szekesfehervar— Pressburg line. By 1920 
HonvSd artillery strength would consist of eight field 
artillery regiments, two horse artillery regiments, and 
eight heavy artillery regiments based at Budapest, 
Debreczen, Lugos, Marosvasarhely, Nyitra, Szekesfehervar, 
Zagreb, and Pressburg.144 Had Franz Ferdinand succeeded 
to the throne in 1916— in the year of Franz Joseph's 
actual death— his plans for a coup in Budapest would have
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had to take into account an expanded, well-armed HonvSd 
equipped with heavy artillery.
The Magyar leadership was certainly aware of Franz 
Ferdinand's intentions in outline if not full detail.
They were certainly aware of the existence of Fall U., and 
of the plan's original author. By mid-1911 Auffenberg had 
become the Belvedere's choice for war minister— a post 
now, in deference to Hungarian demands, styled k.-u.-k. 
Kriegsminister rather than ReichskriegaminiBter.
Auffenberg had long identified himself as the archduke's 
man. His "The Role and Mission of the Next War Minister," 
sent to the Belvedere from Sarajevo in November 1910,145 
was fully in accord with the Belvedere's insistence on 
revoking all concessions to Hungary. He had even written 
Bardolff assuring him of his personal loyalty to the 
archduke: "His Highness's intentions are the only
guiding-light which I will follow while I am in this post 
and while I am capable of doing my duty."146 However, in 
mid-1912 the Hungarian press began reporting that 
Auffenberg had prepared plans for military intervention in 
Hungary and implied that the new war minister still had 
those plans in mind.147 The war minister, already in a 
politically exposed position over budgetary debates, was 
suddenly seen as a liability in securing the support of 
Count Istvan Tisza, the Hungarian premier. Auffenberg 
appealed in panic to his patron for support, but his
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political usefulness was clearly at an end. His career 
was saved— his old classmate Conrad secured an army 
inspector's post for him148— but by the end of the year 
he had been dismissed by the emperor.148
The Magyar leadership had seen Auffenberg as an 
obvious stand-in for the archduke and as an easy target. 
Count Istvan Tisza, head of Hungary's ruling party, had 
been willing to drive the 1912 Army Bill through the Diet- 
-at one point, in an ironic replay of the days of 
Fejervary and Fabrizius, he had had armed guards 
physically remove recalcitrant deputies150— but, while he 
was willing to expand the army to meet the Russian danger, 
he was under no circumstances ready to yield on any 
questions of Hungary's rights within the Ausgleich 
structure, and his object at all times was to maximise 
Hungarian influence. "I would," Tisza said in rejecting 
offers to mediate between himself and the archduke, "fight 
even my king if he would violate the Hungarian 
constitution."151 Franz Ferdinand regarded Tisza as the 
archvillain of all Magyardom and, on Bardolff's advice, 
refused to receive him.152 Tisza was secure in his 
convictions and his dominance of Hungarian political life, 
and he was no less secure in his belief that Franz 
Ferdinand's plans would never be realized. When, over 
Easter 1914, the emperor's illness raised the possibility 
of a change of reigns, Tisza let it be known in both
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Vienna and Budapest that, should Franz Ferdinand attempt 
to use the military against Hungary, it would be Tisza who 
would have the last laugh. It was widely believed in 
Vienna that Tisza intended to call out the Honv£d to 
thwart the heir-presumptive.1*3
In the last months before the assassination at 
Sarajevo rendered all the plans drafted at the Belvedere 
meaningless, it became increasingly obvious that any new 
reign was likely to begin with violence. The archduke 
still envisioned a new Monarchy, unified and centralised. 
Colonel Brosch, who had remained in close touch with Franz 
Ferdinand and was still his confidant, was slated to be at 
the new emperor's side as military governor of Hungary 
and, as the archduke told Frau Brosch, as future imperial 
chancellor.154 The new commander of IV. Korps in 
Budapest, General der Kavallerie Karl von Tersztyansky, 
was the archduke's personal choice, and Tersztyansky was 
known to be a frequent visitor to the Belvedere. It was 
widely believed in Vienna that he had been put in place to 
act against the Hungarian Diet and to remove Tisza from 
power by force.155
Norman Stone argued that the military leadership of 
the Monarchy, closed in upon itself and increasingly aware 
of its inability to effect real policy changes, now 
"required" a "policy of violent conservatism" which would 
"restore a Greater Austria where some form of national
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justice might be achieved through a policy of even-handed 
repression."156 Yet there was no agreement on exactly 
what should— or could— be done. Conrad believed no less 
than the archduke in a unified, centralized Monarchy free 
of Magyar obstuction, but he was unwilling to embark upon 
civil war or abandon the territorial system. He preferred 
to flee from domestic entanglements to scenarios for war 
abroad where, although his estimates of the probability of 
success became increasingly pessimistic after 1908, there 
was still hope that a show of force could give the peoples 
of the Monarchy some reason to believe in the k.-u.-k. 
ideal. The archduke and his circle sought to go to the 
heart of the problem, to remove any Magyar interference 
with army and state by destroying Hungary's special 
position. Conrad had originally attracted the archduke's 
patronage because of his reputation for energetic 
measures, but by 1913 his obsession with war against Italy 
and Serbia and his failure to view the army as purely an 
imperial guard had cost him the Belvedere's confidence. 
Franz Ferdinand used his role as inspector-general to 
harass Conrad throughout the autumn maneuvers of 1913 in 
an atempt to badger him into resigning as chief of the 
general staff. His successor would likely be 
Tersztyansky, Conrad's rival for the post in 1906, and now 
a firm believer in the archduke's views.157
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There did exist some sympathy for a third 
possibility, one that required neither war abroad nor a 
coup in Budapest. Auffenberg had caught Franz Ferdinand's 
eye by proposing armed intervention in Hungary, and he 
remained outspoken in his opposition to any concessions to 
Hungarian demands.138 Yet after 1906 he began to take an 
interest in conditions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and during his tenure as corps commander at XV. Korps in 
Sarajevo, he had come to consider trialism, the creation 
of a south Slav crownland built around Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
a serious and perhaps necessary possibility.159 Brosch 
and the archduke viewed trialism with no small amount of 
mistrust, but Auffenberg continued to argue in its 
favor.150 A South Slav crownland offered the possibility 
of forming a counterweight to Hungary, foiling the 
attraction of Belgrade on the Monarchy's Serb population, 
and ensuring the continued loyalty of the Monarchy's 
Croats. Auffenberg's views on the situation in the 
southeast of the Monarchy may not have conformed to the 
Belvedere's line, but they did find an echo in the 
military's Bosnian policy after 1908.
Bosnia-Herzegovina had been goverened through the k.- 
u.-k. finance ministry during the years (1878-1908) when 
it had been an occupied territory still belonging in 
theory to the Ottoman Empire. A civil administration had 
been granted the newly-annexed province in 1910, but the
real authority in the area remained with the military.
The area had traditionally been the haunt of komitadji, 
brigands whose depredations were often intertwined with 
nationalist beliefs, and XV.Korps had long since been 
supplying "order." Fifteen extra battalions were sent in 
during the annexation crisis of late 1908 and fifteen more 
in early 19091*1 During the Balkan Wars XV. Korps, the 
newly formed XVI. Korps (Ragusa), as well as the 
Dalmatian Landwehr were mobilised. The military held 
extraordinary authority throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
the military looked to Bosnia as a province where, free of 
parliamentary obstruction, a policy of "even-handed 
repression" could be employed to win the population away 
from nationalism.1(2
The arrival in 1911 of Feldmarachalleutnant Oskar 
Potiorek as governor-general was widely hailed by the 
military as a first step in overcoming pro-Serbian 
enthusiasm. Potiorek had come to demonstrate that the 
Monarchy was still capable of determined action, that a 
policy of strength and fairness carried out by an 
administration whose chief was himself a Slovene would 
convince the population of the desirablitiy of Habsburg 
rule, and that incipient disloyalty could be overcome by a 
firm hand in Bosnia— as it could be in Prague or Budapest 
as well. Potiorek's authority was far-reaching, and the 
powers granted him would later be used as a basis for the
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extensive control over civil and economic life the k.-u.- 
k. military would acquire during the First World War.
Potiorek came to Bosnia with the intention of making 
it a "model" province. Yet his view of his role— as being 
a much needed strongman— suffered from the narrowness of 
the officer's conception of the world. A firm, fair hand 
on the parade ground might produce a cohesive and obedient 
infantry company, but "discipline" alone could not reach 
the causes of dissatisfaction in Bosnia. Potiorek, one 
historian noted, "was basically a gendarme, and not a very 
good one at that."163
The imperial authorities had attempted to make the 
initial occupation more palatable by leaving the local 
social structures alone, and this meant leaving 900,000 
largely Orthodox and Serbian peasants enserfed to a 
largely Muslim landowning class. The population of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina remained, outside of a few mining 
districts, desperately poor and illiterate.164 Military 
policy could make no headway against rural poverty, nor 
could it implement land reform. By mid-1914 the 
impoverished population of eastern Bosnia, an area long 
regarded as bandit country, had become so entangled with 
smuggling and Serbian komitadjis that the military had 
simply written off the population of the province east of 
the Bosna River as hopelessly disloyal.165 Potiorek's 
"firm hand" was no more successful. All Serbian
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organizations were dissolved, the Serb press was regularly 
confiscated and the province's schools— regarded as 
nurseries of radicalism— were put under strict police 
control. Potiorek himself remained cloistered in his 
headquarters, unwilling to admit that his policies had 
failed to attract the population to Jc.-u.-k. rule and 
might indeed be counterproductive, yet convinced that he 
was surrounded by disloyalty.
Auffenberg had at least been willing to understand 
the political implications of constructing a South Slav 
crownland, a move certain to provoke forceful opposition 
from Budapest, especially since it would entail the loss 
of Croatia.166 Potoriek in Sarajevo had attempted to 
order loyalty into being "by mere administrative routine,” 
in Stone's phrase.167 Potoriek's failure and his attempt 
to overcome political frustration by violent rhetoric 
filled folder after folder sent to the war ministry.168 
His situation on a hostile frontier might be extreme, but 
his tone was shared by his colleagues in Prague, Budapest, 
and the Belvedere. By 1912/13, the military leadership of 
the Monarchy could not contemplate the future without 
overtones of desperation and panic.
Brosch had used his office to establish contacts with 
potential allies of the archduke. Bardolff seems to have 
seen himself as a collector of information, and he devoted 
himself to informing the archduke of any instance of
perceived disloyalty by the populace or weakness on the 
part of the government. Franz Ferdinand was given copies 
of all editorials in the Hungarian press attacking the 
army or the archduke, though this was very much preaching 
to the choir. When the Balkan Wars and k.-u.-k. 
mobilization led to unrest in Bohemia, Bardolff was there 
to pass on stacks of memoranda and telegrams. The tone of 
his commentary was unrelentingly shrill: there was 
disloyalty and anti-military sentiment everywhere, and the 
administration was absolutely passive in the face of 
subversion— "totally without initiative" in~Bardolff'b 
underlined phrase.169 The information only fed the 
belief of the archduke and his supporters that the 
Monarchy must be fundamentally restructured and given a 
new, firm regime with the army serving as the chief 
instrument of the Crown.
There had indeed been unrest in Bohemia. 
Demonstrations supporting Serbia's war against the 
Ottomans had taken place throughout the autumn of 1912.
In two towns— Prerau and Prossnitz— these had dovetailed 
with local arguments to produce clashes between Czech and 
German mobs, a pattern that was repeated in Pilsen and 
Koniggratz in early December.170 A student mob at 
Koniggratz had tried to prevent a column of reservists of 
IR 18 (Koniggratz) from boarding troop trains, and a final 
total of seventy-eight gendarmes and military police was
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required to disperse the crowd. The 8. Dragoons at 
Pardubitz and IR 35 (Pilsen) had shown symptoms of 
disquiet.171
Yet Bardolff's comments portrayed each incident in 
the most hysterical light possible. In July 1913 a 
lieutenant Johann Ovcicka of the 11. Uhlans was given a 
commendation by the local command for quelling unrest 
among a transport of reservists from the 8.Dragoons—  
restoring order at the point of a drawn pistol after a 
party of reservists had attempted to settle an argument 
with the military police by using their sabres.172 None 
of the reports in Bardolff's files indicated that there 
had been any political overtones or that the unrest had 
been likely to spread to the rest of the regiment. A 
similar incident— a fight between mobilized reservists and 
military police— on the quay at Portsmouth or Marseilles 
would have been treated as a localized (and likely 
drunken) quarrel, the young lieutenant who stopped it 
praised, and the officers and NCOs of the offending unit 
called on the carpet. Guardhouse time, extra drill, and 
company officers packed off to other assignments would 
have been the result. Bardolff, and indeed the archduke 
and much of the war ministry treated the incident as a 
serious mutiny, an incipient rebellion.
The same panic set in when the archduke's staff was 
informed by the interior ministry that a planned exchange
of reserve units slated for Bosnia and Dalmatia— an 
exchange of older for younger reservists— would likely 
produce demonstrations in I.(Krakow), II.(Vienna),
VIII.(Prague), and IX.(Leitmeritz) Korps. The 
mobilization of older classes, of men with jobs and 
families, in peacetime, even if during a time of 
diplomatic crisis, would seem certain to generate 
unpopularity. The immediate response at the Belvedere was 
a denunciation of the "passivity" and cowardice of the 
political authorities in the affected areas.173 By the 
end of August 1913 Bardolff was conveying the archduke's 
demands that local officials be transferred or sacked for 
lack of firmness and replaced with men of more "energy" or 
by the military.174 When in October 1912 an 
Oberleutenant Ban of IR 53 (Zagreb) joined a group of two 
dozen local civilians crossing over from the Foca region 
to join the Montenegrins against the Turks, this became 
not only a matter of local legend— of Serb k.-u.-k. 
officers deserting still in uniform to fight at the siege 
of Scutari— but a matter for enciphered telegrams between 
XV.Korps command and the Belvedere, where the incident was 
taken as a harbinger of large-scale desertions.175
The spring of 1914 saw the military leadership of the 
Monarchy trapped inside an increasingly desperate sense of 
pessimism. Conrad and his operational staff were 
convinced of the inevitability of a multifront war against
Russia, Serbia, and Italy (and possibly Romania as well), 
and even with German and Bulgarian aid they did not 
believe that the Monarchy had any real hope of success in 
such a war.176 Should the old emperor die before war 
came, Franz Ferdinand's plans were almost certain to 
result in civil war against Hungary. The failure of 
military authorities in Sarajevo and Ragusa to hold on to 
the loyalty of the South Slav population underlined the 
cost of trying to maintain the status quo. The army 
itself was only slowly being fleshed out after the passage 
of the 1912 Army Bill— after more than a decade of Magyar 
obstruction. The battalions and squadrons were still in a 
skeletal state, and the costs of the long periods of alarm 
and mobilization in 1912/13 during the Balkan Wars and the 
crisis over Albania had cut hard into the army's budget. 
The disruptions of personal and economic life had 
seriously sapped the morale of many units, reserve and 
regular alike. Conrad was terrified that the army— its 
combat ability, its morale, its stability— was withering 
away before his eyes.177 By mid-1914 Conrad had come to 
believe that even a catastrophic war was preferable to 
death by a kind of spiritual and economic evaporation.
When war finally came, he wrote that it would be "a 
hopeless struggle, but it nevertheless must be, for such 
an ancient monarchy and its army cannot just perish 
ingloriously. "l7B
The ultimate question for the k.-u.-k. leadership was 
one of belief. The men of the k.-u.-k. officer corps had 
devoted themselves to the dynasty and the Monarchy since 
cadet school and the Theresianum. Their devotion to the 
dynasty and to the ideal of service was in Istvan Deak's 
phrase, "near-religious," and was taken as given, and no 
more than a handful ever wavered in that devotion.179 
Two-thirds of them were children of public-service 
families— sons of fathers who were themselves officers or 
NCOs, or who served in the gendarmerie, the bureaucracy, 
the state railways, the customs service— which might be 
transferred throughout the Cisleithanian lands (the whole 
of the Monarchy, in the case of k.-u.-k. families) and had 
as Deak says "for all intents and purposes, no 
nationality."100 They believed absolutely in the 
Monarchy, and they identified the army with the Monarchy 
as a whole. Conrad, Brosch, Auffenberg, Schemua, and 
Potiorek all believed in a unified, centralized Monarchy 
imbued with a common will and a common vision of loyalty.
A company, a battalion, a regiment, or a division— their 
success required a strong authority, clear-cut lines of 
command, and an overarching sense of loyalty to and belief 
in the group. The model of the nation for the k.-u.-k. 
officer corps was in the end regimental. The required 
virtues of the k.-u.-k. officer were the virtues of the 
military vassal: personal bravery, loyalty to the person
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of the liege, devotion to a cause beyond the self. By 
1912 the army leadership, as Schemua said, believed itself 
alone in society in possessing or admiring those virtues.
When the army leadership looked out at the larger 
world, what it saw was a Reichsrat dominated by "anti- 
politics," by the eagerness of political factions to 
forego any positive gains in order to block the plans of 
rivals, a system based on pure defensiveness and abetted 
by an administration whose taste for "stability" meant an 
avoidance of all conflict and change.181 In Budapest the 
Magyar oligarchy sought either independence or Hungarian 
dominance within the Monarchy. Hungarian obstruction had 
blocked any reconstruction of the army between 1889 and 
1912, and the price of Hungarian assent was that the 
Magyars were able to use the army as an instrument of 
Magyarization— to force Slovak or Romanian or 
Transylvanian Saxon recruits to speak Magyar, to obey the 
king, represented by a Diet controlled by the Magyar 
oligarchy, and not the emperor, to look to the Hungarian 
flag rather than the double eagles of the dynasty. The 
army alone stood as the support of the dynasty and the 
Monarchy. In 1911 Brosch lamented that
every year in October we conscript men who have, 
as often as not, undergone a preliminary training in 
nationalist, anti-Austrian atmospheres and have been 
educated as irredentists or anti-militarists, or who, 
being illiterate, know less than nothing of the 
world; and out of such material we have to fashion
362
intelligent, responsible individuals and
enthusiastic, patriotic citizens.182
In the years after the Hungarian crisis, in the last 
decade before the war, the k.-u.-k. leadership had come to 
feel that the future offered only a choice of nightmares. 
Kriegsfall R+I+B(S)— a multifront war where the depleted 
k.-u.-k. forces faced overwhelming odds— seemed all too 
likely to occur. Or the vision of Kerchnawe's Unser 
Letzter Kampf could materialize: predatory neighbors 
taking advantage of internal conflict to dismember the 
Monarchy. Or the scenario advanced by Gustav Sieber— a 
grey, whimpering end where the Monarchy would collapse 
with slow agony because no one could be bothered to 
believe. The Monarchy's military leadership saw 
themselves as the only force that stood for the unity and 
future of the realm, and their perceived helplessness 
drove them deeper into despair, desperation, and a 
corrosive distrust of the society around them. In the end 
Conrad contrived to call his own nightmares into being, to 
involve the Monarchy in a fatal Balkan policy and, 
finally, in the multifront war he had feared for so long.
The army bill of 1912 had contained a War Services 
Act that granted the military extraordinary civil and 
economic authority in time of war183 and after 1914 the 
army would assume control over large areas of the 
Monarchy, including regions (Bohemia and Croatia) far from
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the actual fighting. The policies of the 
Kriegsiiberwachungsamt, the War Supervisory Office, were 
little different from those tried by Potiorek— -a drill- 
sguare view of instilling loyalty. The army engaged in 
bitter political conflicts with the civil administration, 
which it regarded as flaccid and indulgent, and its 
policies far too often deepened any existing 
disaffection.184
In its panic the military wildly overreacted to any 
incident that might show disaffection. When in the most 
famous incident of 1914 troops of the 9. Landwehr Infantry 
and IR 28.(Prague) went off to the front drunk and 
chanting that they were going to fight the Russians and 
didn't know why, the military ignored the fact that both 
units came from heavily socialist working-class districts 
and had a long-standing distaste for "being ordered about 
by the military or any other organ of state"185 and the 
more salient fact that, drunk and unhappy or not, both 
regiments went off to fight. The military chose to regard 
all Czechs as suspect even when the all-Czech IR 102 
(Beneschau) became one of the first wartime units to be 
mentioned in despatches.188 Any incidents became proof 
of widespread underlying disaffection and thus proof of 
the need for stronger and more wide-ranging military 
control.
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Suspicion was not confined to the Czechs. In 1914 
both the Italian 97.(Trieste) Infantry and its reserve 
component, the 5. Landwehr Infantry, went off willingly 
to war; the 97. saw especially hard fighting in Galicia. 
Units of LIR 5. and Italian units of the 20 .Feldj&gere as 
well as some Italian units of Kaiserjagera, fought with 
determination against the Italians in 1915/16. This did 
not prevent the military from evacuating much of the 
Italian populations of the Tirol to internment camps and 
brigading Italian troops into special "southwest" units 
(Siidwestbataillone)— less tactfully known as 
Italienerbataillone or PU (politiache— unzuverlassig, 
"politically-unreliable")-Einheiten.197 The Serb troops 
of BHIR 1. and 2. were taken from combat formations, 
disarmed, and sent off to labour battalions. The Serbs, 
treated nearly as convicts and affronted in martial pride, 
became ready targets for seditious propaganda and, when 
combat losses required their return to their units, 
carriers of disaffection. In contrast, the commander of 
BHIR 4. retained his Serbs, announced his confidence in 
his men, and was rewarded with loyal and outstanding 
service.108
The open unrest that appeared in the Monarchy after 
1917 was predicated upon privation and exhaustion, but the 
policies of the military— panicky, desperate suspicion and 
heavy-handedness— drove local populations into
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disaffection. The irony here is that the k.-u.-k. 
leadership, convinced that they alone believed in the 
Monarchy, by treating the administration and the populace 
as suspect, ended by eroding loyalty. All the plans drawn 
up to stave off the dissolution conjured up by Kerchnawe 
only helped bring on the nightmare.
The k.-u.-k. army of 1918 bore little resemblance to 
the force Conrad led to war in 1914. Norman Stone 
estimated that of the 900,000 men who had been in uniform 
at the beginning of August 1914, 845,000 were lost—  
killed, wounded, captured or invalided home due to 
disease— by the end of the year. Of fewer than 60,000 
officers— career and reserve k.-u.-k., Landwehr, Honv6d, 
and those who had left the army and were now reactivated—  
available at the start of the war, 22,310 would become 
casualties duringthe final four months of 1914.189 One- 
third of the professional officers serving at the outbreak 
of the war would die— in action, in captivity, or of 
wounds— during its course.190 The expansion of the army 
further diluted the k.-u.-k. officer corps. By October 
1918 there were 188,000 serving officers, of whom only 
35,000 were career soldiers.191 The war diluted the 
ranks of professionals in all the armies— one might 
consider the change from the small, long-service British 
army of 1914 to the huge citizen's army that fought for 
Britain in 1916— but in the Monarchy the change had a
special significance* the officers commissioned to 
replace the losses of 1914 lacked the k.-u.-k. 
indoctrination and linguistic skills of the pre-war 
officer coprs, and many brought "national" sentiments to 
the front with them. Since no reservist was promoted 
beyond the rank of captain,192 it would be the "new" 
officers who were in close daily contact with their 
troops, who would have to deal with language barriers and 
national tensions. Such problems were made more complex 
by losses among the enlisted ranks as well. The losses 
sustained during the war put an end to the territorial 
basis of the army; conscripts were brigaded into units 
without regard for territorial usage. By 1918 Vienna's 
all-German 4.(Hoch-und-Deutschmeister) Infantry contained 
18.5% Italians. Vienna's other regiment, the equally all- 
German IR 84, would be twenty percent Italian and five 
Czech. The all-Czech 102.(Beneschau) Infantry would be 
fourteen percent German; the 55.(Brzezany) Infantry, once 
ninety-five percent Ruthene, would be twenty-five percent 
Polish and twelve percent German.193
Yet the wartime army held together and fought on, and 
in the late summer of 1918 the army's standards flew far 
beyond the Monarchy's borders. The army of the Monarchy 
outlasted its Russian opponent and very nearly outlasted 
its German ally. The k.-u.-k. army experienced no 
disaffection on the scale of the mutinies experienced by
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the French army in 1917, nor was the Monarchy faced with 
nationalist revolts such as the British faced in Ireland 
in 1916. The army remained loyal during the general 
strike of January 1918, and seven divisions returned from 
the front to maintain order in Bohemia and Upper and Lower 
Austria.194 The k.-u.-k. leadership only began to employ 
organized propaganda techniques among the troops during 
the last six months of the war19*; the soldiers of the 
Monarchy had fought for four years on previously- 
unsuspected reserves of loyalty to the emperor-king and to 
the idea of a fatherland, in the end it was the high 
command, with its willingness to see disaffection 
everywhere, that failed to believe, that failed to see 
that loyalty could exist outside the ranks of k.-u.-k. 
professionals.
Conrad wrote once that in the Monarchy all other 
questions were dissolved in the question of the army; by 
1914 the military leadership sought to dissolve all other 
questions by applying the methods of the barracks square. 
Had Franz Ferdinand survived to become Franz II those 
methods would have had full reign inside the Monarchy.
One can only note that such methods failed in the "model” 
province of Bosnia in peacetime, and they failed 
throughout the Monarchy in wartime. Conrad's own sense of 
desperation led him to advocate bellicose and increasingly 
fantastic policies which finally involved the Monarchy in
a war Conrad himself believed would only lead to disaster. 
The conscripts who went off to war in 1914 still possessed 
strong reserves of loyalty. It was the military 
leadership and not the rank-and-file which no longer 
believed in the future of the Monarchy.
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CONCLUSION
In 1848/49 it had been the imperial-royal army that 
had held the Monarchy together, and throughout the seventy 
years between the revolutions of 1848 and the dissolution 
of the Monarchy the army had seen itself as a special 
institution, one above nationality and loyal to the 
dynasty and the emperor. Since the days of Prince Eugene, 
the Monarchy's generals had been well aware of the 
polyglot nature of the regiments they commanded, but up to 
1848 the military leadership paid remarkably little 
attention to the question of nationality. The Archduke 
Charles had insisted that there could be no privileged 
nationalities in the ranks of the army, and in fact the 
various nationalities were looked on with neither fear nor 
favor. Regiments were garrisoned throughout the Monarchy 
with little regard for national origin; the imperial-royal 
army lacked both the inclination and the resources to 
operate any coherent system of garrisoning troops away 
from their homelands.
The events of 1848 made the army's leadership aware 
of the possibility of national revolt, and throughout the 
1850s and 1860s Hungarian units were deliberately kept 
away from Hungary. Yet Magyar officers continued to be 
commissioned into imperial-royal service, and there were 
Magyar officers commanding Magyar troops. Hungarian and
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Italian units fought in the campaigns of 1859 and 1866, 
and their performance, despite later legends of mass 
disaffection, was by and large loyal. The imperial 
government was unable to overcome Hungarian political and 
fiscal obstruction in the 1850s and 1860s, but the 
imperial-royal army was able to integrate Hungarian 
recruits and Hungarian regiments into its ranks and 
instill a sense of common purpose.
The army leadership— exemplified by the Archduke 
Albrecht— had been unwilling to station Hungarian 
regiments inside Hungary, but after 1867 both the changed 
political climate of the Monarchy and its straitened 
finances meant that such a policy could not be maintained. 
Throughout the late 1860s and 1870s there was a slow 
movement of Hungarian regiments back to Hungary. The 
fears raised by the revolution of 1848 had largely 
evaporated. No voices were raised in warning, and the 
creation of the Honvdd, of a "national" Hungarian force 
provoked little opposition from the military. By 1883, 
when the army was re-organized on a territorial basis, the 
loyalty of the army— of regiments of all nationalities—  
was taken for granted. Opposition to territorialization 
was based on fears for the army's combat efficiency, not 
for its political reliability.
Territorialization put the army in direct contact 
with the nationalities on a daily basis. Yet in the
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political unrest that began in the 1890s, the army 
remained a reliable instrument for maintaining order. It 
was after all a Honvdd unit that dispersed the Hungarian 
Diet in 1906. It was not the rank-and-file, but the 
officer corps itself that began to show signs of 
disaffection.
The world of the k.-u.-k officer corps became 
increasingly narrow as the nineteenth century ended. Its 
members still saw themselves as direct vassals of the 
emperor, and many of them had no nationality outside the 
concept of army and regiment. The economic and social 
position of the officer corps declined relative to both 
the bureaucracy and the civilian middle classes, and its 
narrowly technical education meant that the officer corps 
was increasingly cut off from political and intellectual 
currents in the Monarchy. They had been trained to be 
loyal and to be above nationality, and in holding fast to 
those ideas they came to doubt that any other group in the 
Monarchy was prepared to be self-sacrificingly loyal.
The k.-u.-k. leadership was all too aware of the 
army's material weakness, and they blamed it on political 
weakness, on a lack of will on the part of the imperial 
government. In the last years before the war, the army's 
leadership began to gravitate to figures who offered the 
promise of "decisive" action— toward Conrad's dreams of a 
war with Italy or Serbia, or toward Franz Ferdinand, who
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offered no less unrealistic plans for re-making the 
Monarchy by a coup in Budapest. Xn both cases these were 
the counsels of futility and despair, and Conrad for one 
was intermittently aware of the lack of realism in his 
designs. The Monarchy's generals were aware that their 
special sense of loyalty was not shared outside the ranks 
of the military, and they could not believe that there was 
any alternative source of loyalty other than military 
values. ''Action" would, they hoped, force others to once 
again believe in the Monarchy; the irony is that a policy 
of the "firm hand"— in Bosnia or in wartime Bohemia— only 
drove much of the population away from any hope of 
loyalty.
Archduke Albrecht wrote in the 1880s that the army 
was the single great link holding the Monarchy together, 
and that the Monarchy could not survive the break-up of 
the army. The peoples of the Monarchy surprised the 
military leadership with their willingness to fight in 
1914, with the unexpected depth of their loyalty. Yet the 
military leadership no longer trusted them, or even 
trusted its own ability to defend the Monarchy. Albrecht, 
preparing for the territorial reforms of the 1880s, had 
said that the strength of the army lay in its ability to 
use the special characteristics of each nationality to 
make a greater whole. The men of Conrad's generation were 
no longer able to envision an army— or a Monarchy— built
385
along those lines. The demand for an enforced unity had 
failed for both Ferdinand II and Joseph II; it was no less 
untenable for Franz Ferdinand and Conrad. The 
nationalities still had faith in the Monarchy in 1914. It 
was the k.-u.-k. leadership and not the nationalities that 
first despaired of the future.
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